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INTRODUCTION

For well over a century the United States Supreme Court
has debated who has final authority to define what is a "crime" for
purposes of applying the procedural protections guaranteed by the
Constitution in criminal cases. After numerous shifts back and
forth from judicial to legislative supremacy,' the Court has settled
upon a multi-factor analysis for policing the criminal-civil divide,
an analysis that permits courts to override legislative intent to define an action as civil in the rare case where the action waddles and
quacks like a crime. 2 This tug-of-war over the finality of legislative
labels in defining crime and punishment is far from over. For just
as labeling an action "civil" may allow the government to circumvent criminal procedure entirely, so labeling a fact an "affirmative

1.

The Court first overrode the legislative label in 1886. See Boyd v. United States, 116

U.S. 616 (1886); Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886), overruled by United States v. One
Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361 (1984). There was a switch to legislative deference
in the early twentieth century. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) (finding that a
statute imposing an additional 50% penalty on amount of delinquent taxes where the deficiency
was due to criminal fraud was not punitive action requiring criminal procedures). Not surprisingly, there was a shift toward judicial dominance during the Warren Court years. See Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 167 (1963) (characterizing as criminal a statute that revoked
the citizenship of those evading the draft). The Burger Court returned to legislative supremacy
in United States v. Ward, giving us the Court's present test for distinguishing between civil and
criminal penalties. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980). A blip in the late 1980s to
the early 1990s moved away from a legislative deference test, see Dep't of Revenue of Montana v.
Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), before returning
to the Kennedy-Ward test during the 1996 and 1997 Terms. See Hudson v. United States, 522
U.S. 93 (1997).
2. The seven factors of the Court's present test were first identified in Kennedy u. Men.
doza-Martinez. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69. The Court asks: (1) whether the sanction involved
an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only upon a finding of scienter; (4) whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the be.
havior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may
rationally be connected is assignable for it; and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned. Id. The "clearest proof' is required to override legislative intent
and conclude that an act denominated civil is punitive in purpose or effect. Seling v. Young, 121
S. Ct. 727, 734 (2001).
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defense" or a "sentencing factor" instead of an "element" of an offense may allow the government to bypass, for that particular fact,
certain procedures that the Constitution requires in the adjudication of offense elements. These procedural guarantees, namely,
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, inclusion in the indictment, and
trial by jury,3 need not be provided for non-elements.
In its recent decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court
has put to rest one aspect of this ongoing battle about the significance of labels, by declaring that any fact-other than a prior conviction-that increases the penalty for an offense beyond the pre-

scribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. 4 But even as Apprendi settles one dis-

pute, it prompts others. The Apprendi Court also recognized the
possibility that in order to avoid the adjudication of sentence-

enhancing facts in a full-blown trial, legislatures might simply
amend some of the many criminal statutes affected by this rule.
Suggesting that efforts to avoid the consequences of the rule in Apprendi by redrafting criminal statutes will be subject to "constitutional scrutiny," the Court has invited litigation over the constitu-

tionality of substantive criminal law. Not surprisingly, it has offered few clues about the shape of that constitutional scrutiny. This

Article takes up that challenge. Drawing guidance from the rich
and varied history and commentary of constitutional regulation of
the substantive criminal law under many different constitutional
provisions, 6 we develop here a modest multi-factor test to help

3. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977) (holding that the government must
prove all elements beyond a reasonable doubt); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117
(1974) (holding that all elements must be included in the indictment); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (holding that the government must prove all elements to the jury).
4. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000).
5. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of completed criminal prosecutions under dozens of state
and federal statutes are now subject to attack. We examine this problem in Nancy J. King &
Susan R. Klein, Apr~s Apprendi, 12 FED. SENT. REP. 331 (2000).
6. Dozens of articles by other criminal law and criminal procedure scholars have examined
the need to enforce some constitutional limits on substantive criminal law in order to protect the
procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights, including work by Professors Ronald J. Allen. John
C. Jeffries, Jr., and William J. Stuntz. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Supreme Court Review--Foreword. Montana v. Egelhoff-Reflections on the Limits of Legislative Imagination and Judicial
Authority, 87 J. CalM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 633 (1997) [hereinafter Allen, Reflections on the Limits
of Legislative Imagination]; Ronald J. Allen, Vie Restoration of In re Winship: A Comment on
Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases After Patterson v. New York, 76 MICH. L REV. 30
(1977) [hereinafter Allen, A Comment on Burdens of Persuasion];John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B.
Stephan II,Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE LJ.
1325 (1979); William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil.CriminalLine, 7 J. CONTrE!.tP.
LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1996) [hereinafter Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-CriminalLine];
William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393 (1995)
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courts identify those few statutes that contain facts, designated as
"non-elements" by a legislature, that nonetheless quack like elements under the Constitution.
I. THE APPRENDI RULE: A JUSTIFICATION
Before turning to the issues raised by the ruling in Apprendi,
a summary of the decision and a defense of its holding are in order.
Only by evaluating the narrow holding of the majority in light of
precedent and past practice can one discern how best to address the
litigation that will inevitably follow in its wake.
Charles Apprendi, Jr., fired shots into the home of an African-American family and pleaded guilty to a number of state weapons offenses. The most serious of these offenses was punishable by
up to ten years in prison. The New Jersey trial judge applied the
state's statute that enhanced sentences for "hate-crimes." Pursuant
to this statute, the judge found at sentencing that Apprendi faced
not a ten- but a twenty-year maximum, because "in committing the
crime," he "acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual... because of race." 7 The judge sentenced Apprendi to twelve years for
the offense. Apprendi, whose attorney had reserved the right to
challenge this enhancement when he entered his guilty plea, challenged the judgment, arguing that the "hate-crime" statute created
a separate, more aggravated offense than the offense he admitted
as part of his plea, that the finding of biased purpose was an element of this separate offense, and that he was denied his right to a
jury determination beyond a reasonable doubt of each offense element.
After New Jersey's highest court rejected Apprendi's challenge, the Supreme Court agreed to review the case, and the decision generated five separate opinions. Justice Stevens, writing the
opinion for the Court, was joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Tho-

[hereinafter Stuntz, Substantive Origins of CriminalProcedure];William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy
RelationshipBetween Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997) [heroin-

after Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship]. Prior commentary, however, has for the most part considered a question different from, or more limited than, the one we examine here. For example,
commentators have proposed various approaches for regulating, under individual provisions of
the Constitution, a legislature's decision to impose strict liability, presumptions, affirmative
defenses, "civil" penalties, presumptive sentences, or unusually severe penalties. Building upon
the many insights of this prior work, we explore a constitutional meaning for an "element" of
crime within a broader context, provide a synthesis of the different situations in which this issue
arises, and add both historical analysis and a healthy dose of pragmatism.
7. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2351 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 2000)).
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mas, and Ginsburg. In that majority opinion, Justice Stevens declared, "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Justice Stevens defended the ruling as rooted in
precedent and the historical practice of American and English
courts. Justice Thomas concurred, joined in part by Justice Scalia,
who wrote yet another concurring opinion. Justice Thomas argued
that history supported an even broader rule that would, in addition,
designate as elements prior convictions that boost maximum sentences, as well as all factual findings that modify the permissible
sentencing range, including those facts triggering mandatory
minimum sentences.
In separate opinions representing the four dissenting justices, Justices O'Connor and Breyer found that the Court's holding
was unsupported by either history or the Court's prior decisions.
They argued that the decision would disadvantage defendants, that
it would undermine thirty years of sentencing reform, and that it
amounted to a "meaningless and formalistic" rule because it could
so easily be avoided by legislatures. 9 Simply by raising the maimum sentence for a crime, the dissenters observed, a legislature
could ensure that the very same sentence enhancements that were
deemed elements by the Court's opinion would continue to be adjudicated without a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt.
We believe that these objections to the majority's rule are
unpersuasive. After offering additional support for the decision in
response to the critique based on history and precedent, this Part
will focus on the argument that the rule in Apprendi is too easily
avoided to be meaningful.
A. The HistoricalBasis for the Apprendi Rule
The Apprendi Court relied upon history for guidance, as it
has so often when construing the Bill of Rights in criminal cases,
particularly the provisions of the Sixth Amendment. Every justice
in Apprendi recognized the importance of history in defining the
scope of constitutional limitations on the ability of legislatures to
define penal law, a question that has persistently eluded alternative analysis. There is, of course, no small controversy surrounding

8.

Id. at 2362-63.

9.

Id. at 2390 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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reliance on history in constitutional interpretation. 10 Later, we conclude that reference to history is an important feature of any effort
to gauge the Constitution's impact on substantive criminal law.11
For now, we note simply that, of the competing historical accounts
offered by the opinions in Apprendi, the account offered by Justice
Stevens in the majority opinion most accurately reflects past practice.
First, the practice of treating as an element any fact other
than a prior conviction that increased the statutory maximum sen-

tence was consistent throughout the nineteenth century.' 2 What
had to be proven at trial depended on what had to be alleged in the
indictment. 13 Allegations required for early nineteenth-century
crimes invariably included the value of property stolen, injured,
burned, or obtained whenever a statute varied the fine according to
that value. 14 The fact that a theft was from a church or dwelling-

10. See, e.g., Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 6, at 1325, 1363-64 (critiquing Justice Powell's
historical test in his Pattersondissent, noting that, "in the context of the penal law, we see little
reason to ascribe virtue to antiquity," since crimes have evolved without coherent policy, and
common-law doctrines lack relevance today, such that "many prominent aspects of the common
law tradition of crime definition seem unfortunate models for modern lawmaking"). A complete
list of the work examining this question would be prohibitively long, so a sampling of recent
sources must suffice. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177
(1993); Daniel A. Farber, The OriginalismDebate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J.
1085 (1989); Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995); Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1997); Eric
J. Segall, A Century Lost: The End of the Originalism Debate, 15 CONST. COMM. 411, 413-19
(1998) (discussing Arthur W. Machen, Jr., The Elasticity of the Constitution, 14 HARV. L. REV.
200, 273 (1900)).
11. See infra notes 258-60 and accompanying text.
12. In addition to the cases supporting this proposition cited in Apprendi, see also State v.
Kane, 23 N.W. 488, 490-92 (Wis. 1885) (collecting cases); 2 T. BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
200-01 (1866) (collecting cases); Mark D. Knoll & Richard G. Singer, Searching for the 'Tail of
the Dog'" Finding "Elements"of Crimes in the Wake of McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 22 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 1057, 1063-68 nn.26-54 (1999) (collecting cases); infra notes 14-16, 22, 26 (citing cases).
13. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
14. Punishment for larceny has long depended upon the value of the items involved, See l
Stat. 16 (1790) (providing that those charged with larceny "shall, on conviction, be fined not
exceeding the fourfold value of the property"). The value of property stolen distinguished grand
from petit larceny; value had to be averred in the indictment. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith,
1 Mass. 245 (1804); 2 BISHOP, supra note 12, at 393, 395; 1 T. BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 237
(1866) (stating that, in the case of usury, where the judgment depends upon the quantum taken,
the usurious contract must be averred according to the fact and variance from it, because the
penalty is apportioned to the value); JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL
LAW 235-36 (1816); H.C. UNDERHILL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 670-71
(1923) (collecting cases from seventeen states); see also United States v. Fisher, 25 F. Cas. 1086,
1086 (D. Ohio 1849) (No. 15,102) (noting that when a statute provides that a mail carrier is
subject to a higher penalty for stealing a letter containing an article of value, the indictment
must allege that the letter contained an article of value, "which aggravates the offense and incurs a higher penalty); State v. Garner, 8 Port. 447, 448 (Ala. 1839) (reversing a conviction for
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house had to be alleged in the indictment and proven at trial whenever larceny from those places was punished more severely than
larceny alone.' 5 The intent to kill or the status of victim as an officer had to be alleged and proven whenever an assault statute specified a more severe penalty for assault committed under these aggravating circumstances.' 6 Statutes that raise sentence maxima
following judicial findings of fact (other than prior conviction) at
sentencing are recent departures from this past practice.1 7 Indeed,
all but two of the dozens of such statutes collected in Appendices B
and C of this Article were enacted after 1969.18
Second, the Apprendi rule makes sense given the historical
distinction in the Constitution between the procedures afforded
those accused of petty crimes and the procedures provided those
accused of serious offenses. The Fifth Amendment right to grand

malicious mischief, because the indictment failed to allege the value of the horse that was killed,
when the fine was capped at four-fifths of the value of the property destroyed); Clark v. People, 1
Scam. 117, 120 (III. 1833) (finding an indictment for arson insufficient for not alleging the value
of a building destroyed by fire, when punishment included a fine equal to the value of the burned
property).
15. See 2 BISHOP, supra note 12, at 424-28 (collecting cases); see also Hobbes v. State, 44

Tyler 353 (Tex. 1875) (finding that when the defendant was charged with burglary of a nondwelling house-an offense carrying a sentence of t%-o to five years-it was error for the judge to
have instructed the sentencing jury that the sentencing range was two to ten years, even though

the statute provided for up to double punishment (ten years) if entry was effected by force, because the indictment failed to allege that the defendant's entry was effected by force); see also
Fisher,25 F. Cas. at 1086 (noting that when the statute provided that a carrier of mail is subject
to a higher penalty for stealing a letter out of the mail, if the letter contains an article of value,
the indictment must allege that the letter contained an article of value, "which aggravates the
offense and means a higher penalty").
16. See Beasley v. State, 18 Ala. 535, 540 (1851) (finding an indictment insufficient for failing to allege the facts that constituted assault with intent to commit murder); State v. Seamons,
1 Greene 418, 421 (Iowa 1848) (finding that an indictment failing to allege the manner in which
an assault was committed was sufficient because it followed the words of the statute, even
though it would have been insufficient at common law); Commonwealth v. Kirby, 2 Cush. 577,
561 (Mass. 1849) (re-sentencing the defendant for the lesser crime of assault, when the indictment did not allege that the defendant knowingly assaulted an officer, a crime carrying a greater
penalty); State v. Burt, 25 Vt. 373, 376 (1853) (ruling that the defendant could only be convicted
of lesser offense of assault, and not higher offense of impeding an officer, when indictment did
not charge that the victim of assault was an officer).
17. One case from 1819 in Indiana suggested that a court, at sentencing, could determine
the extent of a fine for larceny when the statute provided that the maximum fine depended upon
whether the property was returned. See Morris v. State, 1 BlackU 37, 37-38 (Ind. 1819) (examining a statute providing that the offender pay twofold the value of the thing stolen if it was not
returned, otherwise the fine was equal to the value of the stolen property;, holding that the total
fine ought to have been fully settled by the court as part of the judgment, and could not be determined at a later date). One way to reconcile this unusual case with the otherwise uniform
treatment of facts triggering higher sentence ceilings is to characterize the added "fine" for failure to return the property as restitution rather than punishment.
18. Earlier versions of these appendices were included in King & Klein, supra note 5, and
are reprinted with permission.
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jury review and the right to a jury trial in the Sixth Amendment
and under Article III do not extend to petty offenses, but are guaranteed only to those facing felony charges. Whether a charge is
petty or serious is measured by the penalty that an accused faces
upon conviction, which, in turn, is determined by the maximum
penalty specified by statute for the offense, not by the aggregate
penalty a defendant faces after any given trial. 19 Without the rule
in Apprendi, a defendant convicted of a minor offense could con-

ceivably face stiff fines or imprisonment of longer than a year, yet

20
be denied the protections due one prosecuted for a felony.
Finally, the historical basis for the broader rule advocated by
Justice Thomas is much more ambiguous than the clear support for
the limited rule advanced in the majority opinion of Justice Stevens. Admittedly, the language that Justice Thomas quotes from
early nineteenth-century cases and treatises is not inconsistent

with a broader rule treating as elements all facts that determine
the sentence even without raising the sentence maximum. How-

ever, closer examination reveals that courts of this earlier era were
not presented with the necessity of deciding whether a fact, other

than prior conviction, that triggers a mandatory minimum sentence
but not a higher maximum sentence, was an essential ingredient of
an offense that must be pled in the indictment and proven to a jury
21
beyond a reasonable doubt.
19. See Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitu.
tional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1926); see also Lewis v. United States,
518 U.S. 322, 328 (1996) (determining that, if a statute specifies a maximum of six months' incarceration, the offense is a petty offense that need not be tried by a jury, even when the defen
For more on the fol.
dant faces a number of such charges while in a single trial).
ony/misdemeanor distinction, see Horace L. Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant,22 MICH. L. REV.
541, 569-73 (1924).
20. Even prior to Jones and Apprendi, several modern cases cited this reason as a basis for
recognizing as elements facts that boost what would otherwise be misdemeanor penalties to
felony levels. See, e.g., United States v. Stone, 139 F.3d 822, 837-38 (11th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Deisch, 20 F.3d 139, 147 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Sharp, 12 F.3d 605, 606 (6th
Cir. 1993); see also OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2921.331(B), 2921.331(C)(2) (providing that the misdemeanor of failing to stop for an officer is enhanced to a felony offense if injury to a person or
property results). These statutes have been interpreted by Ohio courts, following Jones, as setting forth two separate offenses. See State v. Morton, No. C-980391, 1999 WL 252631 (Ohio App.
Apr. 30, 1999) (unpublished opinion) (finding that a felony enhancement is a separate element,
not a sentencing factor).
21. Of the numerous cases cited by Justice Thomas as support for his rule, in only two did
the Court invalidate an indictment or judgment. Of those two, one barred the imposition of a
fine in addition to the sentence absent proof of property embezzled when the statute required the
fine to be based upon the value of what was embezzled. United States v. Woodruff, 68 F. 536
(S.D.N.Y. 1895). The other held that the government had to aver whether a burglary took place
during the night or during the day, when the penalty range-both maximum and minimumchanged based on that fact. Jones v. State, 63 Ga. 141, 144 (1879).
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Numerous early statutes did designate minimum sentences
based on the presence of aggravating facts, but these aggravating
facts had the effect of raising the allowable maximum sentence as
well. Several statutes mandated a specific sentence depending on
the aggravating fact. For example, fines were set at a particular
amount depending upon the value of property involved.2 2 Mandatory penalties often followed a second offense.2 More common were
statutes that designated a higher range of acceptable penalties once

an aggravating fact was established, raising the maximum allowable sentence as well as mandating a higher minimum sentence.2 4
Other statutes raised the maximum allowable penalty without
changing the minimum sentence.22 When choosing sentences within
allowable ranges set by statute, judges of the nineteenth century

22. See, e.g., Woodruff, 68 F. at 58. This was true in states that allowed jury sentencing.
See, e.g., State v. Garner, 8 Port. 447 (Ala. 1839) (reversing judgment for killing livestock because of the failure to allege in the indictment the value of property destroyed, noting that "the
statute makes the value of property maliciously injured or destroyed, the basis of the verdict,
and permits the jury to go to the extent of fourfold its value"); 1789 Va. Acts ch. XXVI § 3 (pun.
ishing a juror who takes a bribe, and fining him ten times "as much, as he shall have taken").
This was true as well in states where judges pronounced the sentence in non.capital cases. See,
e.g., Clark v. People, 1 Scam. 117 (l 1833) (reversing conviction under an arson statute that
imposed a fine equal to the value of the property burned, because the indictment failed to allege
the value of the property destroyed and should have been quashed); Richey v. State, 7 Blacltf.
168 (Ind.1844) (same, where the fine ceiling was set at double the value).
23. In 1790, for example, Pennsylvania required death upon a second conviction for an offense carrying a possible death sentence. 1790 Pa. Laws 305. Four years later, this was changed
to mandatory life in prison, with a mandatory sentence of twenty.five years for second convictions for other offenses. 1794 Pa. Stat. at Large 179; see also Ex parle Seymour, 31 Mass. 40
(1833) (interpreting an 1817 statute providing for imprisonment for life upon third conviction);
1796 N.Y. Laws 669 (life in prison upon second offense).
24. See, e.g., 1811 Ga. Laws 40. Larceny in Georgia in 1811 carried six months to one year
if the value of stolen property was ten dollars or less, one to three years if the value was more
than ten dollars, and three to seven years if the stolen property was a horse. Id. at 46. After
1811, a second conviction for maiming raised the sentence range in Georgia from three to seven
years to five to twelve years; those convicted a second time for stabbing faced five to ten years
instead of two to five. See id. 44-45; see also 1786 Mass. Acts 459 (second conviction for counterfeiting punished by hard labor for life or any term of years).
25. In Connecticut, after 1801, a second conviction for arson not endangering lives boosted
the sentence from any term up to seven years, to "any limited period, or during his natural life."
1801 Conn. Acts 556. After 1815, stealing from a person carried up to two years, but if one stole
from a person gathered to extinguish a fire, the penalty jumped to a five-year maximum. 1815
Conn. Acts 207. Massachusetts statutes in 1806 punished entering without breaing with up to
three years; with the additional elements of burglary, the penalty was hard labor for life; if
armed, the penalty was death. 1806 Mass. Acts 121; see also George Fisher, PleaBargaining's
Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 874 & n.41 (2000) (noting that, until 1836 in Massachusetts, other
than mandatory death sentences for very serious crimes and mandatory life sentences for robbery, "none of the typical common-law offenses called for a minimum sentence"). In Maine, the
higher penalty that attached to the rape of a girl under ten years of age was a prison sentence of
hard labor rather than the option of jail, which was available to those convicted of ravishing girls
ten and older. See State v. Fielding, 32 Me. 585 (1851).
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undoubtedly considered various aggravating and mitigating fea26
tures that were not found by the jury's verdict.
In sum, with the possible exception of provisions governing
increased penalties for prior offenders, 27 statutes setting a mandatory minimum sentence but not changing the maximum sentence
upon proof of an aggravating fact do not appear in the codes of the
early nineteenth century. 28 Statutes that required a certain minimum sentence to follow from proof of an aggravating feature in-

variably increased simultaneously the maximum penalty the defendant faced. We can only guess how early nineteenth-century judges

would have regarded facts other than prior convictions that, by

26. See, e.g., United States v. Lancaster, 26 F. Cas. 854, 856 (D. IM. 1841) (No. 15,556)
(noting in an embezzled mail case that it was not necessary to include in the indictment a description of bank notes taken: 'The taking of these notes does not constitute the principal offence.
It adds greatly to the enormity of the act, and increasesthe punishment. But the main offence is
the violation of the sanctity of the mail. . . .')(emphasis added); United States v. Herbert, 26 F.
Cas. 284 (C.C.D.C. 1836) (No. 15,354); 2 BISHOP, supranote 12, at 421 (explaining that, when a
statute conditioned a higher sentence upon proof of a certain value of property, and the govern.
ment proved an amount higher than the threshold value, the jury did not need to specify the
actual amount, even if it "might have a practical effect upon the sentence when pronounced by
the court') (citing McCorkle v. State, 14 Ind. 39 (1860); State v. Bunten, 11 S.C.L. (1 Nott &
McC.) 441 (1820)).
This seemed to be contemplated by the statutory provisions themselves. See, e.g., 1784 S.C.
Acts 53; 4 Stat. 775 (1835) (punishing mutiny with a 'fine not exceeding two thousand dollars,
and by imprisonment... not exceeding ten years according to the nature and aggravation of the
offense'); see also 1806 Mass. Acts 121 (providing for punishment within the stated sentence
maxima "as the Justices of the said Court, before whom the conviction may be, shall sentence
and order according to the aggravation of the offense); 1786 Pa. Laws 283 (providing that the
penalty for all non-capital crimes formerly punished by maiming, pillory, whipping, or impris.
onment for life, would be a fine and hard labor for "any term not exceeding two years, which the
court before whom such conviction shall be, may and shall in their discretion think adapted to
the nature and heinousness of the offense). This sentence maximum was extended to seven
years in 1807. See Rogers v. Commonwealth, 5 Serg. & Rawle 462, 466 (Pa. 1819).
27. Legislation designating mandatory minimum penalties upon proof of prior offensewithout raising the maximum penalty allowed-does appear later on. Prior offenders in several
states faced higher minimum sentences, usually accompanied by higher maximum exposure as
well, see supranote 23, but not always. See Fisher, supra note 25, at 1031, 1034-35 & nn.655-57,
681 (noting that New York and California enacted mandatory minimum sentences for second
offenders in 1829 and 1872, respectively).
28. As Professor George Fisher documents in his path-breaking article, the mandatory
minimum sentence, which limited judicial discretion to dispense leniency, was a key catalyst in
the rise of plea bargaining and became much more popular in the twentieth century. Fisher,
supra note 25, at 1072-73. By 1960, mandatory minimums varying by offense were enacted in
twenty-nine states. See Note, Statutory Structuresfor Sentencing Felons to Prison, 60 COLUM. L.
REV. 1134, 1140 (1960) [hereinafter Note, Statutory Structures]; see also MICHAEL TONRY,
SENTENCING MATTERS 146-47 (1996) (noting that since 1975 mandatory sentencing laws have
been America's most popular sentencing "innovation;" between 1975 and 1983, forty.nine states
adopted mandatory sentencing laws for offenses other than murder or drunk driving; by 1991,
the United States had enacted twenty new mandatory penalty provisions; by 1994, most states
had several mandatory sentences).
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statute, triggered mandatory minimum sentences but not higher
maximum penalties. Would they have considered such facts
equivalent to those facts that triggered higher maximum sentences,
as elements of the offense? Or would they have considered them
equivalent to facts that judges routinely considered in setting the
sentence within the maximum range, as mere sentencing factors
that need not be alleged in the indictment and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt? No such guesswork is necessary for the
more limited rule, articulated by Justice Stevens in the Apprendi
Court's majority opinion.
B. PreservingPrecedent and Sentencing Reform
In addition to its clear historical support, a significant advantage of Justice Stevens' narrow Apprendi rule is that it admirably harmonizes years of diverse decisions regarding legislative control of substantive criminal law, including decisions that uphold
legislative efforts to control judicial discretion in sentencing. A brief
review of these decisions provides a useful summary of the precedent around which post-Apprendi litigators must navigate.
Under Justice Stevens' narrow rule, any fact-other than recidivism-that increases the maximum statutory penalty must be
submitted to the jury for a finding beyond a reasonable doubt. This
rule helps explain the difference between the results in Williams v.
New York 29 and Walton v. Arizona 0 on the one hand, and Specht v.
Patterson3 ' on the other. The judge in Williams raised the defendant's sentence to death from the life imprisonment recommended
by the jury, based on his conclusion at sentencing that Williams
possessed "a morbid sexuality" and was a "menace to society."3 2 The
Supreme Court found the judge's action acceptable because the
statute in New York already designated death as the maximum
penalty for the offense of first-degree murder found by the jury.
Similarly, in Walton, the Court held that allowing the judge to determine the aggravating circumstances necessary to impose the
death penalty does not violate the Sixth or Eighth Amendments, so
long as the sentence of death is specified by statute as the maximum penalty for the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt to
the jury at trial. By contrast, the Court held that it was unaccept-

29. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
30. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
31. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
32. Williams, 337 U.S. at 244.
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able for the judge in Specht to increase Specht's sentence from a
maximum of ten years to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of
one day to life, based on his finding that the defendant "constitute[d] a threat of bodily harm to members of the public" or was
"mentally ill."33
Likewise, the holding in Apprendi leaves intact In re Winship34 and Mullaney v. Wilbur,35 as well as Leland v. Oregon,36 Patterson v. New York, 37 and Martin v. Ohio.3 8 All of these decisions
examined the ability of a legislature to transform an element of a
criminal offense into an affirmative defense, thus relieving the
prosecutor of the burden of proving the fact in question. As Justice
Stevens suggests, a formal rule, consistent with the holding of Apprendi, emerges from these cases: Due process will not bar legislatures from designating as affirmative defenses to murder proof of
self-defense, insanity, and provocation or emotional distress, at
least where the legislature makes this designation clear on the face
9
of a statute.3
The sharply divided McMillan v. Pennsylvania ° decision is
also fully consistent with Apprendi because McMillan's five-year
mandatory minimum sentence, based upon a judicial finding of
visible possession of a firearm, did not exceed the ten-year statutory
41
maximum penalty for the underlying felony of aggravated assault.
For the same reason, the Apprendi rule preserves the United States

33.
34.
35.

Specht, 386 U.S. at 607.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).

36. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) (holding that due process permitted the State of
Oregon to require a defendant to prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain an insanity acquittal).

37. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (five-three decision).
38. Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987) (five-four decision) (finding that states may impose

upon a defendant the burden of proving self-defense, despite the fact that this same evidence
may disprove premeditation, an element of the charged offense).

39. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 2360 n.12 (2000). The Maine statute at is.
sue in Mullaney, as well as the New York statute at issue in Patterson,had precisely the same

effect-to shift the burden of proof on heat of passion or extreme emotional distress from the
state to the defendant. Maine had retained the common law's heat of passion mitigator, while
New York adopted the ALI Model Penal Code's extreme emotional distress analogue. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 201.3 cmt. at 46-48 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959). The New York version is acceptable under Apprendi because the legislature did not include "malice" as an element of the
offense of murder; the Maine version is unconstitutional because the legislature did include
"malice" as an element. Admittedly, this reconciliation involves some reinterpretation of the

Mullaney decision.
40. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (five-four decision).
41. That fact distinguishes McMillan from Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), and
United States v. Castillo, 530 U.S. 120 (2000), where the enhancements did increase the statutory sentence ceiling and thus had to be considered elements.
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Sentencing Guidelines and is consistent with recent cases such as
Witte v. United States,42 Edwards v. United States,43 and United
States v. Watts. 44 That is, the narrow Apprendi rule does not
threaten presumptive sentencing schemes such as the Guidelines,
so long as the sentences dictated by statute, court rule, or guideline
are within the maximum sentence authorized by statute for the offense.
Somewhat more difficult to reconcile with Apprendi is Almendarez-Torres v. United States,45 in which the Court rejected a
Fifth Amendment challenge to a significant penalty enhancement
beyond the sentence maximum specified for the offense due to the
offender's prior conviction. In Almendarez-Torres, the Court held
that the fact of a prior conviction, even when it increases the maximum penalty for a crime, need not be alleged in the indictment with
the last offense, at least in a case where the defendant pleads guilty
to that last offense and admits his prior conviction. 46 One method of
reconciling the Apprendi rule with Almendarez-Torres-suggested
by Justice Stevens' opinion-is simply to recognize an exception to
Apprendi's mandate for recidivism generally. This would allow legislatures to continue authorizing stiffer maximum sentences for
prior offenders, even when the defendant's prior conviction is not
formally charged, and even when the prior conviction is proven only
by a preponderance of the evidence to a judge following conviction
of the underlying offense.
Alternatively, the Court may conclude that when a prior
conviction triggers a higher maximum sentence, an accused has the
right to insist that the government prove the prior offense beyond a
reasonable doubt to a jury, but no right to insist that the prior of-

42. Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995) (providing an enhancement for uncharged
drug conduct within statutory sentence range for crime of conviction).
43. Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511, 515 (1998) (holding that a judge may determine
the type and quantity of drugs at a sentencing hearing where the sentence imposed did not ex-

ceed "the maximum that the statutes permit[ted] for a cocaine-only conspiracy").
44. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (per curiam) (providing enhancement for
acquitted conduct within statutory maximum sentence for the crime of conviction).
45. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 247 (1998) (upholding 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(b)(2) (1994), which authorizes a twenty-year term of imprisonment for alien re-entry if
initial deportation was for commission of an aggravated felony, and which authorizes a penalty
provision despite an otherwise applicable statutory maximum of two years' imprisonment).
46. Almendarez-Torres had admitted the existence of three earlier convictions, and pleaded
guilty to the indictment Id. at 227. Therefore, the issue of whether the fact of recidivism must
be submitted to a jury for a finding beyond a reasonable doubt never arose.
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fense be alleged in the original indictment.47 In other words, the
Court could interpret the Constitution to require the government to
treat recidivism as an element for some purposes (jury and burden
of proof) but not others (indictment).48 This construction of Almendarez-Torres would require less departure from the rule in Apprendi, but would nevertheless invalidate prior offender laws across
the nation that allow the government to prove contested prior convictions without a jury. 49 It may also require reconsideration of several Supreme Court decisions that have exempted the adjudication
of prior convictions from other procedural protections typically followed when adjudicating offenses, such as freedom from double
jeopardy.5 0

47. Adding Justice Thomas' vote to the four dissenting votes in Almendarez-Torres means
that at least five current justices have expressed their dissatisfaction with the holding in that
case.

48. This would preserve those cases that date back to at least 1912 permitting the existence
of a prior conviction to be litigated subsequent to conviction, even when an information is not
filed until after the conviction on the underlying offense. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 455.56
(1962) (holding that the defendant was not denied due process when he was notified, by information, of the habitual offender penalty only after being convicted of the substantive offense, in a
case where he had the right to trial by jury on the fact of prior conviction, but admitted his prior
conviction); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 630 (1912) (upholding an habitual offender
sentence although the prior offense was included in a separate information rather than the
original charge, in a case where the jury determined the prior offense); see also In re Ross, 19
Mass. 165 (1824) (holding that the existence of a prior conviction need not be presented to the
grand jury because the inquiry was not whether the offense had been commited, rather, the
inquiry was whether the defendant had been convicted of the offense).
49. See 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.6(a) (1999) (summarizing
variations in habitual offender laws); see also Harold Dubroff, Note, Recidivist Procedures, 40
N.Y.U. L. REV. 332, 347-48 (1965) (noting that eight states provided at the time for a determina.
tion of recidivist status without a jury).
50. In Monge v. California,for example, the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did
not bar, after appellate reversal for insufficient evidence, a new sentencing hearing on the issue
of whether to increase a defendant's sentence from the statutory maximum of seven years to
eleven years based on his prior convictions. Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 729-30 (1998).
The Court reasoned that the fact of the prior conviction was a sentencing enhancement and not
an element of a more aggravated criminal offense. Id. at 730-32; see also Parke v. Raley, 506
U.S. 20, 37 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (upholding a statute that shifted the burden of
proof on the validity of prior convictions to the defendant); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 56668 (1967) (upholding a simultaneous trial of the substantive offense and prior convictions);
McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901) (rejecting double jeopardy and ex post facto
challenges to an habitual offender sentence, in a case where the prior offense was pled in the
indictment and found by the jury). In Spencer v. Texas, the Court noted that:
an habitual offender proceeding can be instituted even after conviction on the
new substantive offense. The method for determining prior convictions varies
also between jurisdictions affording a jury trial on this issue, and those leaving
that question to the court . . . . A determination of the "best" recidivist trial
procedure necessarily involves a consideration of a wide variety of criteria ....
To say that the two-stage jury trial ... is ... the fairest ... is a far cry from a
constitutional determination that this method of handling the problem is compelled by the Fourteenth Amendment.
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In contrast to the majority opinion, which is able to take
cases "at odds with each other" and turn them into a "coherent body
of caselaw,"51 the more expansive approach contained in Justice
Thomas' concurring opinion wreaks doctrinal havoc. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, suggests that
if the legislature. . has provided for setting the punishment of a crime based on
some fact... that fact is also an element .... One need only look to the kind, degree, or range of punishment to which the prosecution is by law entitled for a given
set of facts. Each fact necessary for that entitlement is an element.ra

Justice Thomas not only openly advocates the reversals of Tcillan53 and Almendarez-Torres,54 but his broader test also under-

Spencer, 385 U.S. at 566-68 (citations omitted).
51. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 254 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (taking the
opposite view, however, on the issue of which position is the coherent one).
There is one Supreme Court case that we think the Apprendi decision places at risk. In Li.
bretti v. United States, the Court held that FED. R. CRIL P. 11(o, which requires that a trial
judge determine whether a factual basis exists for a guilty plea, did not require that the judge
find those facts underlying the stipulated asset forfeiture embodied in the agreement because
criminal forfeiture was part of the sentence and not a separate crime. Libretti v. United States,
516 U.S. 29, 38-39 (1995). The substantive federal criminal statute to which the defendant pled
guilty, 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1994), specifically includes criminal forfeiture as part of the penalty.
Id. at 39 ("[A] person convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise 'shall be sentenced.., to the forfeiture prescribed in section 853. "). The Court noted that the same was true
for criminal forfeiture based upon violation of RICO. Id. (18 U.S.C. § 1963 provides that forfeiture is imposed "in addition to any other sentence" for a violation of RICO.). The mere inclusion
of"forfeiture" as part of the penalty for violating CEE or RICO, however, is not sufficient to avoid
an Apprendi challenge to the adjudication at sentencing of the forfeitability of assets, unless the
statute is interpreted as providing a statutory maximum sentence that includes the forfeiture of
all of the defendant's assets. Yet these provisions do not authorize the forfeiture of all assets.
Instead, they authorize the forfeiture of only those assets that meet certain criteria, a scheme
something like the one set out by larceny statutes that condition the amount of fine on the
amount of loss sustained or the value of the property stolen. Se supra notes 14 & 22. Unlike
the RICO and CCE statutes, the controlled substances statute, 21 U.S.C. § 841, and the money
laundering and currency reporting statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957, and 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313,
5316, do not contain an express reference to forfeiture as part of their penalties. Even if the
government succeeds in arguing that criminal forfeiture is part of the stated statutory maximum
for these underlying crimes, it would be hard-pressed to claim that each offense may be punished
by the forfeiture of up to all of the defendant's assets. Rather, the amount forfeited is contingent,
by statute, upon a showing that each particular item to be forfeited is one of the following: proceeds of a controlled substance violation, 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1); used to facilitate a controlled
substance violation, 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(2); or involved in or traceable to a money-laundering or
currency reporting violation, 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1). These factual showings arguably must be
treated as elements afterApprendi. Corresponding civil forfeiture statutes, 21 U.S.C. § 881 and
15 U.S.C. § 981, may, in any event, provide the means for the government to seize and retain the
same assets that it seeks under criminal forfeiture provisions. See Susan . Klein, Civil In Rem
Forfeitureand Double Jeopardy, 82 IOWA L. REV. 183, 195-207, 217 (1996).
52. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2369 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 2378-80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 2371-73 (Thomas, J., concurring) (listing cases establishing the common-law tradition that the fact of recidivism was an element of an aggravated criminal offense).
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defenses generally, the

Guidelines, 56 and similar presumptive sentencing systems in the
57
states.
Under Justice Thomas' approach, the sentencing enhancement in McMillan should have been considered an element because
"the prosecution is empowered, by invoking the mandatory minimum, to require the judge to impose a higher punishment than he
might wish. The mandatory minimum 'entitl[es] the government'
...

to more than it would otherwise be entitled (5 to 10 years,

rather than 0 to 10 years . . .).,s This rationale also undermines
Patterson,in which the Court rejected a challenge to the New York
statute that keyed the punishment for homicide to a particular fact:
whether the defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional distress. The prosecution was entitled under the statute to
the higher penalty for murder, but not if the defendant acted under
such distress. It therefore follows, using the approach advanced by
Justice Thomas, that the absence of such distress is an element of
the offense.
Justice Thomas, who does not mention Patterson in his
opinion, attempts to sidestep the impact of his approach on the continued viability of affirmative defenses by arguing that "a 'crime'
includes every fact that is by law a basis for imposing or increasing
punishment (in contrast with a fact that mitigates punishment)."5 9
But his opinion offers no means by which to distinguish aggravating facts from mitigating facts. If legislative labels control, then
there is no judicially enforceable constraint on a legislature's ability
to bypass the consequences of the rule Justice Thomas proposes.60
55. Id. at 2380 (Thomas, J., concurring).
I need not in this case address the implications of the rule that I have stated
for the Court's decision in Walton v. Arizona .... Walton did approve a scheme
by which a judge, rather than a jury, determines an aggravating fact that
makes a convict eligible for the death penalty, and thus eligible for a greater
punishment. In this sense, that fact is an element.
Id. (citation omitted).
56. Id. at 2380 n.11 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("It is likewise unnecessary to consider
whether (and, if so, how) the rule regarding elements applies to the Sentencing Guidelines.')
(citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
57. See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Is GuidedDiscretionSufficient? Overview of State Sentencing
Guidelines, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 425, 427 n.2 (2000) (listing seventeen states using guidelines
and eight states considering the adoption of guidelines).
58. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2379 (Thomas, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 2368.
60. Justice Stevens, in his McMillan dissent, also dismissed the difficulty of distinguishing
between aggravators and mitigators. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 100 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). He seemed content to accept the legislature's chosen label, arguing that the
democratic process would constrain excesses. Id.

2001]

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS

1483

Assuming that the legislative characterization is not determinative,
it is fruitless to ask in the abstract whether the defendant's provocation increases the punishment from that for manslaughter to that
for murder, or, rather, decreases the punishment for murder to that
for manslaughter, without a basis for determining whether murder
or manslaughter is the baseline offense. 61 As Justice O'Connor
notes in her Apprendi dissent, whether a fact is responsible for an
increase or a decrease in punishment may rest "in the eye of the
beholder."6 2 Although it may be possible to formulate a method for
determining a constitutionally significant baseline offense for each
set of related offenses, the approach of the concurrence poses a
much more significant challenge for the Court in reconciling past
precedent than does the narrow rule advanced by Justice Stevens.
Under the analysis of the concurring opinion in Apprendi,
each one of the myriad facts that the United States Sentencing
Guidelines and other presumptive sentencing schemes require a
judge to take into account becomes an element that must go to the
jury. These facts, like those that trigger mandatory minimum sentences, are, using Justice Thomas' phrase, "by law the basis for imposing or increasing punishment;" they empower the prosecution
"to require the judge to impose a higher punishment than he might
wish."63 Regardless of whether one views the Sentencing Guidelines

61. Justice O'Connor used this example to make the same point.
[The Wisconsin statute considered in Lacy v. State, 15 Wis. 13 (1862), could
plausibly qualify as either increasing or mitigating punishment on the basis of
the same specified fact. There, Wisconsin provided that the willful and malicious burning of a dwelling house in which "the life of no person shall have been
destroyed" was punishable by 7 to 14 years in prison, but that the same burning

at a time in which "there was no person lawfully in the dwelling house" was
punishable by only 3 to 10 years in prison. WIS. REV. STAT., ch. 165, § 1 (1858).
Although the statute appeared to make the absence of persons from the affected
dwelling house a fact that mitigated punishment, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
found that the presence of a person in the affected house constituted an aggravating circumstance.

Apprendi, 120 S.Ct at 2390 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2379 (Thomas, J., concurring). For example, though Congress has set the statutory penalty range for mail fraud, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1343, at zero to five years, a judge may
wish to sentence the defendant to zero to six months in prison. This is nominally permissble.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1(a) (1998). However, where the prosecutor
can establish that the defendant was the organizer of the mail fraud scheme, the prosecutor can
require that the judge impose the higher punishment mandated by section 3Bl.1 of six to twelve
months in prison. Id. § 3B1.1. Likewise, where the prosecutor can establish that the crime involved a fraud at a certain value level, she can insist that the judge impose the higher penalty of
fifty-one to sixty-three months in prison. See id. § 2F1.1(a). Thus, Justice Thomas' test requires
that these be treated as three separate offenses, each with a fact that increases the prescribed
range of penalties to which the defendant is exposed, and thus a fact that must be submitted to
the jury for a finding beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, Justice Thomas' test would turn every
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as progressive legal reform that brings needed "proportionality,
uniformity, and administratability" to criminal sentencing,6 4 or as
draconian legislation that replaces rationality and considered
judgment with inflexible procedures largely controlled by prosecutors, 65 all will agree with Justice O'Connor's prediction that for the
Court to invalidate the Guidelines and other presumptivesentencing schemes would be a "colossal" upheaval for the criminal

justice system. 66 In sum, Justice Stevens' narrow rule is pragmatic,

federal offense into multiple offenses, each differing by specific characteristics of the offense
(value, quantity, injury, use of a weapon), characteristics of the offender (the defendant's role in
the offense, whether he selected a vulnerable victim, whether he abused a position of trust or
used a special skill, whether he exploited a minor), and the criminal history of the defendant.
See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2397-98 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 2399 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Other defenders of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines include Frank 0. Bowman M, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear of Judging and the
State of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 299 (2000) (suggesting that the
Guidelines are a notable improvement over the prior federal sentencing scheme).
65. Critics of the Guidelines are too numerous to list here. Representatives include United
States v. Harrington, 947 F.2d 956, 963-64 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Edwards, J., concurring) (calling the
Sentencing Guidelines a "farce," and suggesting that they have not eliminated sentencing discretion but have transferred it from district judges to prosecutors and probation officers); KATE
STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS (1998) (dismissing the Guidelines as a failure and suggesting return to judicial hegemony); Daniel J. Freed, FederalSentencing in the Wake of the Guidelines: UnacceptableLimits on
the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992); Gerald W. Haney, The Reality of Guideline Sentencing: No End to Disparity,28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161 (1991) (arguing that the Guidelines ignore crucial distinctions among offenders, and that they frequently group offenders on the
basis of meaningless criteria); Marc Miller, True Grid: Revealing Sentencing Policy, 25 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 587 (1992) (criticizing the Guidelines' complexity).
66. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2395 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In addition to contesting the
analysis of history and precedent offered by the majority, the dissenting justices in Apprendi rely
upon arguments from policy. Justice Breyer predicts that defendants will be made worse off
under the Court's rule. Id. at 2401 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding that the result in Apprendi
might "mean significantly less procedural fairness, not more). He predicts that mandatory
minimum sentences will be more attractive to legislators once they are deprived of the ability to
specify increased penalties upon judicial findings. Id. We disagree. Legislatures inclined to
insist upon mandatory minimum sentences were not prevented or discouraged from doing so
before the Apprendi rule, and Apprendi gives them no additional reason to choose mandatory
minimum sentences over more discretionary schemes. For additional predictions of prejudice to
defendants, see Jacqueline E. Ross, UnanticipatedConsequences of Turning Sentencing Factors
Into Offense Elements: The Apprendi Debate, 12 FED. SENT. REP. 197 (2000).
Also making the price of historical fidelity too high for the dissenters in Apprendi is the great
disruption of existing sentences that they predict will follow from the decision. In another article, we examine this forecast in more detail and conclude that, while there may indeed be some
confusion as courts work through appeals and petitions for collateral relief by defendants sentenced under Apprendi-taintedlaws, absent an unusual decision to apply Apprendi retroactively
on collateral review, or to extend it to prohibit judicial determination of facts triggering mandatory sentences within the statutory maximum, the task of adjusting existing convictions and
sentences to comply with the Apprendi rule should be of limited duration and scope. See King &
Klein, supranote 5. Judging from early returns, courts seem to be handling most of these issues
fairly predictably. Id. The costs of such a limited realignment of judgments are, in any event,
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reflects historical practice, and preserves the Court's precedent as
well as the experiments in legislative control of judicial discretion
in sentencing that have flourished in the latter half of the twentieth
century.
C. Beyond Formalism:Real Limits on Legislative Choice
A rule that maintains fidelity to historical practice and prior
decisions is commendable, but is considerably less compelling if its
only attributes are consistency and predictability. Justice Stevens
does not articulate clearly the theoretical basis for the rule in Apprendi. As a result, it is hard to fault the dissenters for questioning
the Court's rule, particularly when it seems to be so easily circumvented by rearranging section symbols on a page or deftly editing
existing statutory language. As Justice Kennedy observed in Jones,
"Congress could comply with this principle by making only minor
changes of phraseology that would leave the statutory scheme, for
practical purposes, unchanged." 67 On the particular facts of Jones,
he noted that this would merely require increasing the prescribed
sentence for carjacking to life imprisonment and providing that the
judge shall decrease the sentence to twenty-five years where no
death resulted, and fifteen years where no serious bodily injury resulted. A rule forcing legislatures to write criminal statutes in one
way as opposed to another, when both achieve the same results,
requires some explanation.
The underlying value advanced by the Court's holding is not,
contrary to suggestions in Jones, related to the jury's ability to engage in nullification, or "pious perjury."'6 As we discuss in more detail in Part III.A.2 of this Article, the Court has not hesitated to
erode this ability of the jury to calibrate culpability to penalty in
other ways. The complete demise of this jury function makes its
resurrection as the unarticulated basis for the Apprendi rule particularly implausible.
Nor is the core value protected by the rule in Apprendi the
individual right of a defendant to receive adequate notice of the

much less significant than the burdens that would follow from the rule proposed by Justice Thomas.
67. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 267 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
68. Blackstone used this term to describe the jury's decision to convict of a lesser offense despite clear proof of guilt on a higher offense. 4 BLACKSTONE, COLMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 238-39 (1769). The Court referenced this practice in Jones, 526 U.S. at 245, in the

course of explaining why it might be unconstitutional to allow
mum-enhancing facts at sentencing.

a judge to determine the maxi-
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penalty he is facing. The justices at times phrased their discussion
as if the key to the decision was providing adequate information to
the rational-actor-criminal or the defendant facing trial. Justice
Stevens referred to.the "defendant's ability to predict with certainty
the judgment from the face of the felony indictment. 6 9 Justice
Scalia worried that a "criminal [could] get more punishment than
he bargained for when he did the crime. ' 70 Justice Scalia noted that
it is only fair "to tell a prospective felon that if he commits his contemplated crime he is exposing himself to a jail sentence of 30
years-and if, upon conviction, he gets anything less than that he
may thank the mercy of a tenderhearted judge .... -71 However,
these concerns about fair notice were not central to the decision at
all. There was no claim in Apprendi that the defendant was blindsided by the punishment he faced. Indeed, he reserved the right to
challenge the enhancement in his plea bargain. Neither did the case
present the Court with a need to resolve the application of Apprendi
to indictments.
Instead, the key to Apprendi is captured by the following
cryptic sentences in a footnote:
[S]tructural democratic constraints exist to discourage legislatures from enacting
penal statutes that expose every defendant convicted of, for example, weapons possession, to a maximum sentence exceeding that which is, in the legislature's judgment, generally proportional to the crime. This is as it should be. Our rule ensures
that a State is obliged "to make its choices concerning the substantive content of
its criminal laws with full awareness of the consequence, unable to mask substantive policy choices" of exposing all who are convicted to the maximum sentence it
provides ....
So exposed, "[tihe political check on potentially harsh legislative action is then more likely to operate."
In all events, if such an extensive revision of the State's entire criminal code were
enacted for the purpose the dissent suggests, or if New Jersey simply reversed the
burden of proof of the hate crime finding (effectively assuming a crime was performed with a purpose to intimidate and then requiring a defendant to prove that
it was not... ), we would be required to question whether the revision was constitutional under this Court's prior decisions.7 2

This footnote explains why the formalism of the Apprendi
rule is not pointless after all. Its meaning is two-fold. First, the rule
adds an additional hoop through which legislators must jump before taking action that disadvantages a politically powerless

69. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2356 (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 68, at 369-70 ("[The
court must pronounce that judgment, which the law hath annexed to the crime.')).
70. Id. at 2367 (Scalia, J., concurring).
71. Id.
72. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2363 n.16 (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977);
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975)).
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group-those accused of crime.7 3 In this way, it is not unlike decisions in recent years demanding clear statements from legislatures
regarding other aspects of the criminal law,7 4 decisions that were
also designed to promote "full awareness" of the "substantive content" of legislative choices. Legislators are free to lessen the government's burden in obtaining punishment by crafting the substantive law so that judges rather than juries select higher penalties for
an individual offender, but they must be clear with their constituents and their fellow lawmakers about the degree of discretion they
are delegating to judges and about the extent of punishment they
are authorizing for an offense.
The Apprendi Court appeared to assume that the rule will
encourage legislative debate, and that the rule may even help to
prevent a constitutional showdown between the judicial and legislative branches. When legislators are forced to admit that the only
thing standing between a defendant convicted of a given offense
and a "harsh" maximum sentence is a single judge's finding by a
mere preponderance, they and their constituents, the argument
presumes, will be more likely to recognize when such a sentence
may be disproportionate to the offense proven to the jury. 75
The second explanation behind the Court's "formalism" does
not depend on this optimistic view of legislative restraint. It is contained in the Court's warning that, even if a legislature clearly
states its intent to reduce the barriers to punishment by shrinking
offense definitions and expanding sentences, some particularly draconian efforts to impose punishment may be struck down as violations of due process.7 6 We believe this second admonishment is a
viable threat, and will soon become the focus of intense litigation.
For, as we explain below, right behind the wave of challenges to
convictions and sentences under existing statutes affected by Apprendi, another wave of challenges awaits. Defendants will ask

73. On the tendency of legislatures to favor prosecutorial interests, see generally Donald A.

Dripps, CriminalProcedure,FootnoteFour, and the Theory of Public Choice;or Why Dont Legislatures Give a DamnAbout the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L REV. 1079 (1993); Stuntz,
Uneasy Relationship,supranote 6.
74. See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994) (requiring a clear
statement from a legislature that it intends to dispense with the common-law presumption of
mens rea in criminal offenses); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983) (finding that clear legislative intent can override the double jeopardy presumption against multiple punishment for the

same offense in a single trial); see also Regents of the Univ. of California v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425
(1997) (requiring a clear statement of congressional intent to override state sovereign immunity).

75. Indeed, Justice Stevens made this argument more explicitly in his M1fc~illan dissent.
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 95-104 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See infra note 82
for scholars supporting this view.
76. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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courts to strike down, as violations of due process, statutes that
mandate minimum penalties upon a finding of fact within sentence
ranges that are extraordinarily broad, statutes that shift what were
once elements to affirmative defenses, and statutes that increase
maximum sentences and shift what were once elements into sentencing enhancements. Before discussing why and how due process
may limit such legislative experimentation, we first defend the prediction that this kind of experimentation will occur.
II. WHY COURTS ARE LIKELY TO BE ENLISTED IN TESTING
POST-APPRENDIREVISION OF SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
We are certain that litigation testing revisions of substantive
criminal law will be with us soon, despite the assurances of Justice
Stevens that this sort of legislative action is only a "remote" possibility.77 There will be many opportunities for legislators to respond
to Apprendi by modifying their criminal codes. As illustrated by
Appendices B and C of this Article, the carjacking and hate crime
statutes allowing judges to make findings that trigger higher sentences in Jones and Apprendi are not unique. Dozens of state and
federal statutes suffer from the same flaw. The volume of provisions
in which legislatures delegate to the judge the finding of maximumenhancing facts suggests that this allocation of power away from
the jury to the judge will be considered worth salvaging for at least
some offenses.
Numerous incentives to take advantage of this opportunity
are present as well. Trial-like adjudication is more costly, more
time-consuming, and riskier for the government than judicial determinations at less formal hearings. The ever-present need to appear "tough on crime" encourages legislators to present themselves
as supporters of laws that impose swifter, more severe punishment,
at less cost.78 Among those who have observed that legislatures are

77. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2363 n.16.
78. See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 211, n.12 (1977) C'Mhe impulse to legis-

lators, especially in periods of concern about the rise of crime, would be to define particular
crimes in unqualifiedly general terms, and leave only to sentence the adjustment between of-

fenses of lesser and greater degree. In times when there is also a retrogressive impulse in legis.
lation to restrain courts by mandatory sentences, the evil would be compounded.") (quoting People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 909-10 (N.Y. 1976)); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 172-73 (1980) (defending the Warren Courts criminal procedure decisions on the
grounds that those accused of crimes are a politically powerless group needing added protection);
Dripps, supra note 73, at 1098-100 (arguing that legislators, like the vast majority of their constituents, adopt the perspective of a potential crime victim when viewing anti-crime legislation,
thus limiting the police or prosecutors only when a powerful interest group intervenes);
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eager to ease the road to conviction through modifications of sub-

stantive law are Professors John C. Jeffries, Jr. and Paul B.
Stephan III, who more than twenty years ago warned that legislatures may abolish defenses entirely rather than accept the burden
79
of having to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Professor William Stuntz has argued that "the government's natural

incentive is to evade or exploit the procedural civil-criminal line by
changing the substantive civil-criminal line," leading Congress to

80
enact overbroad federal fraud statutes and strict liability offenses.

The Court itself has sometimes recognized this incentive as well.8 1
On the other hand, the clear-statement rationale that we
discussed in Part I.C is based on the assumption that the political
process provides some protection against extreme distortions of

criminal law. Legislators, it is argued, will not vote in favor of strict
liability laws that could ensnare one of their own family members

nor will they support lengthy prison terms for traditionally minor
82
offenses, for example.

Susan R. Klein, Redrawing the Criminal-CivilBoundary, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 679, 709 (1999)
(listing some examples of the competition between Democratic and Republican lawmakers to be
the toughest on crime, such as California's 'Three Strikes and You're Out law, and Alabama's
recent experimentation with chain gangs).
79. Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 6, at 1325, 1353-56 (finding that disallowing legislative
control over burdens of proof for affirmative defenses "would work to inhibit reform and induce
retrogression in the penal law").
80. Stuntz, Substance, Process,and the Civil-CriminalLine, supranote 6, at 1 (emphasis in
original).
81. See, e.g., Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 734 (1998) ("[W]ere we to apply double jeopardy here, we might create disincentives that would diminish these important procedural protections.").
82. See Frank R. Herrmann, 30=-20:. "Understanding"Maximum Sentence Enhancements,46
BUFF. L. REV. 175 (1998) (suggesting that legislators would not "expose themselves, or their
families, or members of their own electorate, to life imprisonment for possessing any amount of
cocaine, just to deny the safeguards of a criminal trial to those who possess great amounts"); see
also Patterson, 432 US. at 211 (noting that the option of creating affirmative defenses has "not
lead to such abuses or such widespread redefinition of crime and reduction of the proseution's
burden that a new constitutional rule was required"); Louis D. Bilionis, Process,the Constitution,
and Substantive CriminalLaw, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1286 (1998) (arguing that "political safeguards" are sufficient to guard against the enactment of most such laws); Note, Awaiting the
Mikado: Limiting Legislative Discretion to Define CriminalElements in Sentencing Factors,112
HARV. L. REV. 1349, 1365 (1999). As an illustration of legislative restraint, consider the present
Continuing Criminal Enterprise provision, part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act of 1970. It was originally introduced as a sentencing alternative invoked upon a
motion of the government. Because various members of the House thought that this raised constitutional questions, H.R. 18583 was amended, and the sentencing provision was transformed
into "a new and distinct offense with all its elements triable in court" H.R. Rep. No. 91-1444, at
83-84 (1970), reprintedin 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4651-53 Goint statement of Reps. Moss, Dingell, Adams, and Eckhardt); see also 116 CONG. REC. 1664-65 (1970) (statement of Sen. Hruska);
id. at 33,630 (statement of Rep. Poft); id. at 33,631 (statement of Rep. Eckhardt).
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Before taking sides in this debate about legislative behavior,
we decided to ask a question that no scholar who has debated these
issues has ever asked: How have legislatures responded in the past
to cues from the Court about circumventing procedural guarantees
through changes in substantive criminal law? We examined the
legislative activity by every state legislature and Congress following seven major Supreme Court decisions that allowed a change in
substantive criminal law to effectuate a relaxation in procedures.
Those seven decisions are: 1) Leland v. Oregon, upholding a state
law that placed on the defendant the burden of proving insanity
beyond a reasonable doubt;8 3 2) Patterson v. New York, upholding a
state law that placed on the defendant the burden of proving extreme emotional disturbance to mitigate murder to manslaughter; 84
3) McMillan v. Pennsylvania, upholding a state mandatory minimum sentence of five years upon judicial determination by a preponderance of the evidence of the fact that a defendant visibly possessed a firearm; 85 4) Martin v. Ohio, upholding a state law that
placed the burden of proving self defense on a defendant accused of
murder;8 6 5) Kansas v. Hendricks, upholding a state "civil" commitment to a separate section of a prison upon proof of mental abnormality and future dangerousness; 87 6) Almendarez-Torres v. United
States, holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2), which authorizes a
twenty-year term of imprisonment for any alien who reenters after
deportation for an aggravated felony, is a penalty provision rather
than a separate criminal offense, despite the eighteen-year increase
to the otherwise applicable statutory maximum penalty of two
years for reentry after deportation for a felony; 88 and 7) Montana v.
Egelhoff, upholding a state statute excluding evidence of voluntary
intoxication to negate criminal mens rea.89

83. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 797 (1952).
84. Patterson,432 U.S. at 205.
85. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986).
86. Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 236 (1987).
87. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997); see also Seling v. Young, 121 S. Ct. 727,
735 (2001) (finding that Washington state's civil commitment of sexually violent predators, once
found to be civil, cannot be deemed punitive "as applied" to a single individual).
88. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226 (1998).
89. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 (1996). A plurality held that the state can exclude
all evidence of voluntary intoxication offered to rebut mens rea for murder. Id. at 39-56. Justice
O'Connor, writing for four dissenters, would have held that, since the legislature, according to
Montana's highest court, had not eliminated mens rea as an element of the offense of murder,
due process forbade the exclusion of relevant evidence. Id. at 61-73. In a separate dissent, Justice Ginsburg reasoned that the Montana legislature had changed the substantive definition of
the crime, rewriting its murder statute to include either intentional or drunken killings. Id. at
56-61.
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Unlike these decisions, Apprendi does not give a green light
to legislators who would like to reduce the burdens on prosecutors
by redrafting substantive criminal law. Rather, Justice Stevens'
footnoted warning is more of a yellow light: Proceed if you must but
we'll be watching. Nevertheless, we have no reason to think that
the legislative response will be dramatically different than the response to these earlier decisions. The results of our survey are
summarized in Appendix A. With one exception, after each decision
additional states eventually jumped on the bandwagon, easing the
prosecutor's procedural burden through modification of the substantive law. 90 Fifteen states have relieved the prosecution of the

90. The legislative response to Hendrickshas been particularly dramatic. In addition to the
twenty bills already pending and six new state laws, of the seventeen states that already had
provisions to civilly commit sexual offenders, five amended their statutes to eliminate the procedural protections that the Hendricks Court held were not constitutionally required. Four others
have similar bills pending. In comparison, state legislatures essentially rejected the Court's
invitation in its 1987 decision, Martin v. Ohio, to place the burden of proving self.defense on a
defendant charged with committing murder.
We do not argue that these Court cases necessarily caused the legislative change. However,
we do show that, after the Court had placed its imprimatur of constitutionality on a particular
change that disadvantaged a criminal defendant, various state legislatures and Congress
changed their laws to follow suit. For some statutes, we were able to find references to these
Court cases in the legislative history of the responsive enactments. For others, there is similarity between the language of the responsive enactment and the language of the provision blessed
by the Court.
For example, though the impetus for the post.Hendricks Florida statutes was the brutal rape
and murder of a young boy, it was patterned after the Kansas statute and is nearly identical to
it. See Mari M. Presley, Jimmy Ryce Involuntary Civil Commitment for Sexually Violent Predators' Treatment and Care Act: Replacing CriminalJustice with Civil Commitment, 26 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 487, 489 (1999) (detailing the genesis of the Florida act, which became effective in 1999).
Both the Alaska and Texas legislatures have specifically referred to the Hendricbs decision
as an impetus for their proposed laws. The sponsor statement for Alaska's SB 216 notes that it
"is modeled after Kansas' statute, which has been upheld by the highest court of the land."
Alaska State Legislature's Majority Organization, Sponsor Statement for SB 216, at
http://wvnv.akrepublicans.orgfspstsb2l6Ol2898.htm (last visited on Dec. 28, 1999). Likewise,
Texas's SB 1224-filed by Senator Shapiro on May 13, 1999-notes that, "although the use of the
civil commitment of dangerous sex offenders... is highly controversial .... the United States
Supreme Court has upheld its constitutionality." Texas Legislature, An Act, available at
httpvlwww.capitoLstate.tx.us/tlo/76Rbilltext/SBO1224F.HTM (lastvisited on Feb. 26, 2001).
The New York legislature waited for the Hendricks decision to be rendered before passing its
own sexually violent predator act, which became law two days later. Michelle Boorstein, States
Busy with Sex PredatorLaws After High Court'sRuling, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 28, 1997,
at A23. New York Senator Dale Yolker, one of the authors of the act, stated that, "[u]ntil the
Supreme Court's decision of the other day... we were reluctant to move because we wanted to
feel we were on totally solid ground." Id. Likewise, the Illinois law is directly modeled upon the
Kansas statute. Terry Burns, Edgar Signs Sexual PredatorBill Into Law; Act Means Offenders
Can Be Locked Up ForFurtherTreatment, PEORIA J. STAR, July 1, 1997, at D7.
In addition to direct evidence that the five states previously discussed were influenced by the
Hendricks decision, we note that an additional eleven states use identical, or nearly identical,
boilerplate language from the Kansas statute: Alabama, Delaware, Louisiana, Mississippi, New
Jersey, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. We
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burden of proving the defendant's sanity;9 ' nine have relieved the
prosecution of the burden of proving the absence of heat of passion
in order to obtain a murder conviction; five have permitted the
judge to impose mandatory minimum sentences given a judicial
finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant
possessed a firearm; six states have relieved the prosecution of securing a criminal conviction before incarcerating sex offenders; one
additional state since Almendarez-Torres has already relieved the
prosecution of the burden of proving prior convictions to a jury under recidivism statutes; and three states exclude evidence of voluntary intoxication that negates the mens rea element of a criminal
92
offense.
This pattern, together with the multiplication of mandatory
minimum sentences, the general trend to higher sentences, 93 and
the recent proliferation of statutes like the ones examined in Apprendi and Jones, supports the prediction that some rewriting of
the substantive criminal law after Apprendi will undoubtedly be
attempted.
There are reasons to predict more movement with some statutes than with others. Apprendi affects two very different types of
laws. Most statutes affected by the rule in Apprendi are what Mr.
Bishop in his nineteenth-century treatise called "nested" statutes.9 4
An example is the carjacking statute in Jones, involving core conduct found by the jury with increasing levels of punishment depending on the presence of aggravating factors found by the judge.
This allocation of authority between judge and jury prior to Apprendi can easily be replicated after Apprendi through statutory
amendment. To retain the judge's power to determine aggravating
features, all a legislature must do is amend the statute so that the

doubt that this is coincidental. Finally, legislators in New Hampshire and Maine failed to secure
passage of sexual predator bills in their jurisdictions prior to the Hendricks decision, duo to constitutional concerns, but legislators in those states now plan to refile those same bills. See Boorstein, supra.
91. Most of these changes occurred after the "not guilty by reason of insanity" acquittal of
John Hinckley, following his attempted assassination of President Reagan in 1984, While the
Leland case might not have directly caused the state legislatures' shifting the burden of proof to
the defendant in these cases, it certainly left the door open for states to walk through when it
became attractive to do so.
92. No state has chosen to join Ohio in relieving the prosecution of the burden of proving
that a murder defendant did not act in self-defense. See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying
text.
93. See generally MARK MAUER, THE RACE TO INCARCERATE (1999); STITH & CABRANES, supra note 65; TONRY, supra note 28.
94. 2 BISHOP, supra note 12, at 327.
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penalty ceiling formerly specified for the most aggravated version of
the offense attaches once the offender is convicted of the core conduct. The actual sentence within this maximum may still be keyed
to judicial findings of aggravating or mitigating facts. A classic illustration here would be drug offenses involving punishment tied to
the quantity and type of drugs, such as the primary federal controlled substance statute, 21 U.S.C. § 841. Congress would have to
amend only the maximum penalty for the core conduct, changing it
to life imprisonment, and then specify the sentence within that
range depending on the type and quantity of drugs.
The other type of statute affected by Apprendi is illustrated
by New Jersey's hate crime law. Rather than defining crimes of increasing severity based on a single core offense, these "add on"
statutes authorize the imposition of an additional penalty for any
crime (or for a large group of crimes), on top of the maximum penalty authorized for that crime.9 5 Variations on this theme are plentiful. For example, when Apprendi was announced, more than a
third of the states and the federal government had "felony/firearm"
statutes providing for additional punishment for most felonies
whenever a gun was used. At least four states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government authorized maximumenhancing penalties for any crime committed while on pretrial release. 96 Because these "add-on" statutes affect so many different
types of crimes, replicating them after Apprendi in order to preserve the aggravating feature for judicial determination would require, as Justice Stevens observed, revision of a jurisdiction's entire
criminal code.
This is a more remote possibility than redrafted "nested"
statutes for three reasons. First, such revision may involve more
work because a legislature may have to amend the statutory maximum penalty for a large number of offenses, not just one. 97 Second,
because add-on statutes boost penalties indiscriminately for a wide

95. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Tafoya, 982 P.2d 890, 895 (Haw. 1999) (providing an extended term
if the victim is an elder, a minor, or disabled, or if the defendant inflicts serious injury on such a
victim); People v. Chanthalom, No. 2-98-1247, 2001 Ill. App. LEXIS 40, 16-26 (I. App. Ct Jan.
12, 2001) (discussing Illinois' extended-term statute, 730 ILL COUP. STAT. 515-.82, boosting sentences for a variety of aggravating factors).
96. See infra Appendix C. Recidivist statutes, such as three-strikes laws and the statute in
Almendarez-Torres, are of this type as well.
97. In states where sentence ranges do not vary with individual offenses but instead are
generally limited to a number of categories (e.g., first-degree felonies carry one sentence range,
second-degree felonies another, and so on), the work involved in raising sentence maxima for
every offense may be less onerous. A state need only raise the ranges for different degrees of
crime.
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variety of offenses, some lawmakers may oppose attaching high
maximum sentences to crimes formerly carrying minimal
penalties. 98
Third, a legislature has a much less costly alternative available if its goal is to provide stiff sentences for conduct involving a
particular aggravating feature. It could simply enact a separate offense that combined the enhancing factor as an element and the
commission of any felony as another. Many states chose this route
rather than adopting a statute like New Jersey's when crafting
their own hate-crime laws and felony firearm offenses. 99 While the
separate offense would require that the aggravating factor be
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, the cost of doing so
from the legislature's point of view may be lower than the cost of
reviewing the entire criminal code to raise sentence maxima. In
fact, bills in New Jersey were introduced after Apprendi to amend
that state's hate crime law to require proof beyond a reasonable
doubt to a jury of "purpose to intimidate because of race ....
100
Illinois is likewise considering a catch-all statute that would require pleading and proof to a jury of any fact that raises a statutory
maximum sentence.' 0 '
In addition, a legislature may be unlikely to redraft either
nested or add-on statutes to preserve informal adjudication of aggravating features when that revision would mean recasting a traditional offense element that separates the culpable from the
blameless in a new role as sentencing factor or affirmative defense.
We suspect there has been no replication of the statute in Martin v.
OhiO0 2 because that statute shifted to the defendant the burden of
proof of a fact, self-defense, that most would agree separates the

98. These two reasons did not stop Gov. Gary Locke of Washington state from recently proposing a bill that would circumvent the state's present hate crimes law, which requires prosecutors to prove racial animus to a jury, by amending the state sentencing guidelines to include hate
as an exceptional aggravating circumstance allowing a judicial upward departure from the otherwise applicable guideline sentence. See Beth Silver, Locke Bill Targets Bias Crimes Growing
Problems: With Such Crimes on Increase, Would Let Judges Consider Motivation, MORNING
NEwS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), Jan. 29, 2001, at B1, available at 2001 WL 3985855 (proposing
legislative change to WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.390). As noted by Gov. Locke's policy advisor,
this proposal "avoids" an Apprendi issue because it changes only a statutory guideline, not the
statutory maximum sentence. Id. (quoting Dick Van Wagenen, Locke's policy advisor on corrections). However, legislatures in other jurisdictions may not have the luxury of sufficiently high
statutory maxima.
99. Brief for Petitioner at 25, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000) (no. 99-478)
(identifying thirty "freestanding hate crime statutes" from twenty-six states).
100. H.R. 1897, 209th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2000).
101. H.R. 1511, 91st Gen Assem., Reg. Sess. (111. 1999).
102. Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
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guilty from the innocent, rather than a fact that separates the more
guilty from the less guilty. 10 3 Offenses requiring conviction for arguably innocent behavior, which reserve the finding of blameworthy
features such as mens rea for the judge, will continue to be harder
to enact than statutes that prohibit culpable conduct and reserve
only the determination of the extent of culpability to the judge.'0
Finally, it is also possible that, for some crimes, the prosecution and legislature will consider the benefits of forcing the defendant to defend against proof of the element at trial to be greater
than the benefits of a lesser burden of proof before a judge. Unless a
court is able to provide bifurcated trials or enforce protective
stipulations,10 5 once a jury hears proof of a prejudicial aggravating
fact, it may become more inclined to convict than it would have
been if no evidence of the aggravating fact had been introduced until sentencing.10 6 The inclusion of additional degrees of crime separated by aggravating elements may also provide more leverage for
plea-bargaining.' 07 Any prediction about whose ox is gored by the
inclusion of more elements depends on the individual aggravating
feature and crime, and on the frequency with which the aggravating feature is contested in prosecutions for that offense.
Certainly these drawbacks will make responding to Apprendi
through statutory amendment unrealistic or undesirable for many
statutes affected by the decision. But some statutes, particularly
nested offenses, will probably be attractive targets for amendment
following Apprendi, and, as Justice Stevens warned, will become
subject to "constitutional scrutiny."

103. Every state recognizes self-defense as a justification.
104. If one assumes that the insane are blameless, however, the popularity of placing the
burden of proof on the defendant for insanity admittedly cuts against this prediction. An even
narrower claim would be that legislatures will be more reluctant to impose criminal liability for
'justified" conduct than for "excused" conduct, or more skeptical of excuses like insanity than of
justifications like self-defense.
105. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 184 (1997) (discussing concession of prior
offense).
106. See Ross, supra note 66, at 198-200. For example, the defense, "I did not sell drugs, but
if I did, it was five-and not fifty-grams" is not very compelling. Of course, this problem arises
whenever a defendant faces a charge with a lesser included offense, such as with grades of larceny.
107. As Professor George Fisher has argued, prosecutors effectuated such bargains in murder cases carrying mandatory death sentences by nol prossing one element of a single count of
murder, reducing the charge to manslaughter. Fisher, supranote 25, at 890-91.

1496

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:4:1467

III. DEVELOPING DUE PROCESS LIMITS ON SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAW
We now turn to the shape of that scrutiny. The Court's only
hint at constitutional limits on efforts to evade Apprendi was its
citation of Patterson v. New York and Mullaney v. Wilbur. If the
promise to constrain legislative overreaching in Patterson was the
only barrier to legislative circumvention of the rule in Apprendi, we
would be more likely to agree with the dissenting justices that the
rule is a futile and costly exercise in formalism. As mentioned earlier, the Court has characterized these cases as turning on legislative labels. 108 But these rather unsatisfying burden-of-proof cases
are not the only context in which the constitutional concept of acceptable offense definitions and corresponding punishments has
been explored. The "constitutional scrutiny" of the substantive
criminal law, including a constitutional concept of element that
trumps that of legislatures, should draw its content from the full
spectrum of procedural protections in the Constitution that could be
eroded by legislative definitions of crime. These include Article III's
Jury Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the
Fifth Amendment's Grand Jury, Due Process, and Double Jeopardy
Clauses, the Sixth Amendment's Jury and Notice Clauses, and the
Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Because each of these provisions could contribute to constitutional
limits on what legislatures can define as non-crimes and nonelements, it is worth examining whether or not the individual provisions might pose a barrier to changes in substantive criminal law
that supplements or differs from the Court's formulation in Patterson.

Our survey of these provisions, described in detail below, reveals that none of them alone, at least according to the understanding of each that has evolved over the years, will restrain legislative efforts to respond to Apprendi's rule through statutory revisions. Nonetheless, as Justice Stevens suggested, the Court should
not cede entirely to legislatures the power to obliterate the procedural protections in the Bill of Rights through manipulations of
substantive law. This would render constitutional criminal procedural guarantees largely meaningless, and would profoundly
change the relationship between a criminal defendant and the

108. See supranotes 35-39 and accompanying text.
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state.1 0 9 In the absence of an existing identifiable test, how should
the Court resolve this dilemma?
There are two quite different ways of approaching the problem. The first is to develop a theory of "element" that would lead to
a tidy formula for limiting legislative primacy in defining elements
of a crime. Such a formula is likely to be rooted in a particular fundamental constitutional guarantee (such as the jury or the prohibition against excessive punishments), or a particular procedural goal
(such as maximizing factual accuracy, ensuring fairness, or equalizing power between a criminal defendant and the state). One could
imagine, to offer a few examples, a constitutional rule that identifies as essential elements those facts leading to particular lengths
of sentences, those facts most accurately determined by lay juries
as opposed to professional judges," 0 those facts inherently part of
the core of a particular criminal offense, or those facts upon which
criminal (as opposed to civil) culpability turns. The number of potential formulations of this kind is at least as great as the number
of theories justifying punishment generally or the number of constitutional provisions for which the concept of element carries significance. Enticing as this theoretical quest for the elemental holy grail
is, we reject it as unwise as well as unattainable.
We embrace a second approach to limiting the ability of the
legislature to diminish procedural protections through manipulating substantive criminal law: a standard, not a rule, to be applied
case by case, over time. Our nation's two-hundred year experience
of halting and uneven judicial control of the substantive criminal
law under the various provisions in the Bill of Rights suggests that
a one-size-fits-all rule for the constitutional regulation of crime and
punishment is not only elusive, but may be counterproductive. Using a rough standard, courts now identify through the common-law
process-one case at a time-those few statutes that transgress the

109. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Individual Liberty And ConstitutionalArchitecture: The
FoundersPrompt Correctionof Their Own Mistake, 16 HARV. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 75 (1993) (arguing that a functional federal Constitution must allow judicial enforcement of the Bill of Rights);
Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, supra note 6, at 40 ("Criminal procedure is largely self-defeating vithout limits on criminal law.").
110. This might include an analysis of whether the adjudication of the fact involves credibility determinations, or might create prejudice against the defendant. See, eg., the similar analysis described in Knoll & Singer, supranote 12, at 1086-87, nn.136-45. See also Note, The Constitutionality of Statutes Permitting Increased Sentences for Habitual or Dangerous Criminals, 89
HARV. L. REV. 356, 376-80 (1975) (describing a possible distinction between the treatment of
prospective predictions and historical fact, but advancing instead a distinction that would treat
as elements "evidence bearing on the seriousness of the crime," and treat as sentencing factors
evidence of character).
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civil-criminal divide. In doing so, courts clarify by increments the
limits of the Constitution."' Those unusual facts that transgress
the element/non-element divide can also be identified case by case,
allowing for gradual and dynamic clarification of constitutional
limits. There is no compelling reason to depart from this approach
and proclaim the key characteristics of an essential element for all
offenses under all circumstances, and, as we explain below, many
reasons to forswear such proclamation. Instead, we offer a modest
multi-factor test, animated by the many different concerns that
have guided the understanding of element under different constitutional provisions, as well as the historical practice in connection
with the particular offense in question. The test proposed here, like
the Court's test for policing the civil/criminal divide, is designed to
preserve legislative primacy in defining crime and punishment,
without wholesale abandonment of judicial control over the scope
and application of constitutional criminal procedural guarantees.
A. Deriving the Test: A Survey of Potential Sources of Limitation on
Legislative Freedom to Define Crime and Punishment
Past commentary and case law provides remarkably little
assistance for courts today that are seeking a meaning for the concept of element apart from whatever meaning is assigned by statute. This is particularly surprising considering the degree to which
so many features of constitutional criminal procedure are dependent upon the concept of element. We begin with the Grand Jury
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

111. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986).
Our inability to lay down any "bright line" test may leave the constitutionality
of statutes . . . to depend on differences of degree, but the law is full of situations in which differences of degree produce different results. We have no doubt

that Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act falls on the permissible side of the constitutional line.
Id.
For a classic analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the use of standards as opposed
to rules in constitutional interpretation, see generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court
1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992). See
also DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED
QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS, Ch. 8 (forthcoming 2001); Ronald J. Allen & Ross M.
Rosenberg, The FourthAmendment and the Limits of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical
Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1149 (1998) (suggesting that Fourth Amendment law is not
amenable to a top-down general theory, and advocating localized and fact-specific knowledge).
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1. Fifth Amendment Right to Grand Jury Indictment
In federal cases, the Fifth Amendment guarantees the accused the right to grand jury review of an indictment containing an
allegation of each of the elements of an offense.112 This Clause offers
potential authority for constitutional regulation of the substantive
criminal law if it requires the government to treat certain facts as
essential elements for purposes of including them in an indictment
even when the legislature has classified them as non-elements.
Thus, the Grand Jury Clause provides a useful starting point for an
analysis of the element concept. However, an examination of judicial interpretations of the Clause and of the functions that it serves
suggest that it provides no separate constitutional basis or theory,
independent of that associated with other provisions of the Bill of
Rights, for limiting legislative freedom to define crime and punishment.
In order to understand why, it is helpful to examine the
three different settings in which there has been a need to determine
if there is a constitutional meaning for element that trumps a legislative definition for purposes of inclusion in the charge. Importantly, in all three contexts, both federal and state judges in the
early nineteenth century did not identify the essential ingredients
of an offense by referring only to statute.11 3 Instead, the list of what
must be included in the indictment was derived when possible from
112. See, e.g., Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 239 (1998) (stating that all
elements of an offense must be charged in the indictment); Russell v. United States, 369 U.S.
749, 763-64 (1962) (finding a grand jury indictment insufficient for not specifying an element of
the offense as defined by statute); United States v. Carl], 105 U.S. 611, 612-13 (1881) (invalidat-

ing an indictment that omitted an allegation of mens rea). In United States v. Carll, the Court
held that an indictment upon a statute must:
set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be
punished; and the fact that the statute in question, read in light of the common
law, and of other statutes on the like matter, enables the court to infer the intent of the legislature, does not dispense with the necessity of alleging in the
indictment all the facts necessary to bring the case within that intent.
Id.
113. From the late 1700s through the middle of the 1800s, courts and treatise writers did not
regularly use the term "element" to describe that which must be alleged in a criminal charge.
Instead, one encounters with some frequency the use of the phrases "essential ingredients" and

"necessary ingredients." See, e.g., Beasley v. State, 18 Ala. 535, 539 (1851) (referring to the "necessary ingredients" and the "constituents" of the crime of assault); Tully v. Commonwealth, 45
Mass. 357, 358 (1842); Mears v. Commonwealth, 2 Grant 385, 387 (Pa. 1858); 3 SIMON
GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 14, 16-17 (6th ed. 1860) (noting that an indictment must "contain all that is material to constitute the crime," referring to "material facts").
The word "element" began to appear more frequently in the mid-1800s, about the same time that
state legislatures were increasing the number and complexity of offenses. See Carll, 105 U.S. at
612.
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the common-law understanding of each offense, even if the offense
was codified. 114 First, courts have drawn a distinction over the years
between facts that are elements and must be averred, and facts
that are relevant only to sentencing that need not be alleged as part
those
of the offense. 1 5 Second, courts have labored to distinguish
116
elements.
not
are
that
defenses
from
elements
are
facts that
Finally, case law has attempted to distinguish between facts
that are elements and facts that are merely alternative means of
establishing an element and therefore need not be included in the
indictment. 17 As waiver rules for pleading error developed over the

114. See, e.g., United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. 460, 474-75 (1827).
[I]n certain classes of statutes, the rule of very strict certainty has sometimes
been applied where the common law furnished a close and appropriate analogy.
Such are the cases of indictments for false pretences, and sending threatening
letters, where the pretences and the letters are required to be set forth from the
close analogy to indictments for perjury and forgery . . . . But these instances
are by no means considered as leading to the establishment of any general rule.
On the contrary, the course has been to leave every class of cases to be decided
very much upon its own peculiar circumstances.
Id.; see also United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 160 (1820) (stating that, "by such a reference
the definitions [of the common law] are necessarily included, as much as if they stood in the text
of the ace' when discussing the federal statute against privacy); United States v. Wilson, 28 F.
Cas. 699 (E.D. Pa. 1830) (No. 16,730); United States v. Watkins, 28 F. Cas. 419 (D.C. 1829) (No.
16,649) (drawing on common law to determine what must be alleged in prosecution for fraud); 1
BISHOP, supra note 12, at 244-48 (describing the relationship between statutory and common
law); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 290 (2d ed. 1985) (noting that
codification meant that "[jiudges lost the power to invent new crimes; but the common law still
defined the precise meaning and application of old crimes, like rape or theft) (emphasis in original).
115. Much of this history was recounted in the Apprendi decision itself, although the Court
did not reach the propriety of the indictment in that case. See also Benjamin J. Priester, Developments, Sentenced for a "Crime"the Government Did Not Prove:Jones v. United States and the
ConstitutionalLimitations on Factfinding by Sentencing Factors Rather Than Elements of the
Offense, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 249, 251-58 (1998) (reviewing approaches); see generally
Herrmann, supra note 82 (arguing that constitutional criminal procedural protections ought to
apply only to aggravating factors that enhance the statutory range).
116. See, e.g., Jefferson v. People, 3 N.E. 797 (N.Y. 1885); 1 BISHOP, supranote 12, at 268-79;
4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 49, at 763.
Courts look to various factors to distinguish between defenses and elements of
the offense [including) (1) whether the exception was treated as a defense at
common law; (2) whether the exception was "so incorporated in the language of
the statute defining the crime that the elements of the offense cannot be accurately described if the exception is omitted"; and (3) whether the exception appears in the enacting law of the statute (suggesting it is an element of the offense) or is located in a subsequent clause (suggesting it is a defense).
Id. (quoting Austin W. Scott, Fairness in the Accusation of Crime, 41 MINN. L. REV. 509, 527-28
(1957)); see also 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 49, at 750-51 & nn.25, 29-30; Note, Streamlining
the Indictment, 53 HARV. L. REV. 122, 124-45 (1939) (noting that the element pleading requirement means "statutory exceptions must be negatived').
117. See, e.g., United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. 460, 473-75 (1827) (distinguishing between
"matters of evidence" and "averment'e); 2 BISHOP, supranote 12, at 205-06, 212-13 ("W[If the thing
alleged to have been done is a crime only in certain circumstances defined by the law, the in-
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years, this distinction between element and means became a crucial
one: Failure to plead an essential element could be raised at any
time and was always reversible error, while a claim for relief due to
failure to provide sufficient factual specificity was lost if not raised
prior to trial. Even today, leaving out an element from a federal indictment is not considered harmless error." 8
Although all three questions arose in early cases as challenges to indictments, each had ramifications for what must be
proven to a petit jury at trial. Decisions and treatises from the first
half of the nineteenth century tied what must be pled to what must
be proven, and what must be proven to what must be pled. n1 9 What
was considered an "element" also influenced the scope of double
jeopardy protections under both federal and state law. Until written
records of trials and guilty plea proceedings became routine, the
only way to determine the validity of the accused's plea in bar
(claim of double jeopardy) was to compare the two charging documents to see if they involved the "same offense." 120 As appellate review of trial jury instructions became more commonplace, the Supreme Court's discussions of the meaning of "element" were not
confined to cases in which a defendant claimed that one was miss21
ing from the indictment.

dictment must aver and set out the existence of those circumstances."); see also United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 558 (1875) (noting that the allegation must include "every ingredient of
which the offence is composed") (quoting United States v. Cook, 17 U.S. (Wall.) 168, 174 (1872)).
118. See generallyKing & Klein, supra note 5, at 337 & n.20 (noting the majority view that
an omission of an element from the indictment is never harmless error). See also H.L MeClintock, Indictment By a Grand Jury, 26 MINN. L. REV. 153 (1941) (citing an ALI study and crime
surveys from two states). Folloving the Court's decision not to require grand jury review for
state prosecutions in Hurtado o. California,110 U.S. 516 (1884), many states moved to "short
form" indictments, used in conjunction with bills of particulars that furnished the specificity once
provided by the indictment. See 4 LAFAVE ET AL, supra note 49, § 19.1(c); see also People v.
Bogdanoff, 171 N.E. 890 (N.Y. 1930).
119. See, e.g., Clark v. State, 1 Scam. 117, 120 (Ill. 1833) (noting that because the fine was
set by arson statute at the value of property destroyed, the indictment "should have changed the
value .... otherwise it could not properly have been inquired into by the jury [and] would form
no part of the issue which they were sworn to try"); Divine v. State, 4 Ind. 240 (1853); State v.
Wilson & Strange, 9 S.C.L. (1 Mill) 135, 137 (S.C. 1818) (noting that "whatever is indispensably
necessary to be proven to warrant a conviction, must be alleged in the indictment," and finding
that, since it was necessary to prove that the defendants, charged with deceit, "knew that the girl
[whom they represented to be a slave] was free at the time of the sale, it ought to have been
alleged in the indictment"); 2 BISHOP, supranote 12, at 204-05; JOSEPH CHtTry, CRIMINAL LAW
168 (3d ed. 1836).
120. See 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 49, § 19.2(b).
121. See, e.g., Spurr v. United States, 174 U.S. 728 (1899); Coffin v. United States, 162 U.S.
664 (1896); Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396 (1884) (reviewing a trial jury instruction that
included the charge that motive was not an element of murder).
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During the 1950s and 1960s, the Court first expanded the
reach of federal habeas corpus review of state criminal cases to include constitutional as well as jurisdictional error, and then incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clauselimiting state courts-both the Jury Clause and the Double
Jeopardy Clause, but not the Grand Jury Clause. 122 This meant
that the need for all criminal courts to address the reach of the trial
and double jeopardy provisions of the Bill of Rights grew much
more pressing than the need to flesh out the meaning of the Grand
Jury Clause. As a result, the battle over the constitutional concept
of element spread, then shifted, from the Grand Jury Clause to the
Due Process, Double Jeopardy, and Jury Clauses.
The concept of element as a constitutional matter lost some
coherence as the Court addressed the original three problems separately. In Mullaney, and then Patterson,the Court tackled the first
problem-distinguishing elements from defenses. The Court treated
this problem as a question about the scope of substantive due process in the context of trial jury instructions. The third issue, the
means/element distinction, led to the decisions in Schad v. Arizona
and Richardson v. United States, discussed below. 123 The Court
again relied on the Due Process Clause in the trial context for guidance as to which facts are elements to be found unanimously by the
jury. The Court addressed the second distinction, between elements
and sentencing factors, in a series of cases including McMillan and,
of course, Apprendi. Again, each of these disputes raised the issue
124
in the context of the trial, not the grand jury.
122. See Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942) (finding that habeas corpus "is not

restricted to those cases where the judgment of conviction is void for want of jurisdiction of the
trial court to render it. It extends also to those exceptional cases where the conviction has been

in disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused."); Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 538 (ruling that
the protections of the Fifth Amendments Grand Jury Clause are not part of the "due process"
that a state must not deny a defendant under the Fourteenth Amendment).
123. See infra notes 163-82 and accompanying text.
124. The means/element question also became key to the ongoing debate on the Court about

the scope of the phrase "same offence" in the Double Jeopardy Clause, a debate that, for now, is
dominated by those justices who believe the term "same offence" carries no constitutional content
that might trump a legislature's characterization of the elements of an offense. Compare Illinois
v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980), with Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000). An examina-

tion of how courts have defined the "element' concept for the purposes of determining when two
offenses are the "same" under the Double Jeopardy Clause is beyond the scope of this Article.
Commentators continue to debate whether legislative definitions of sameness (through their
offense definitions) can be trumped by more abstract constitutional principles.
Compare Susan Klein, Double Jeopardy's Demise, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1001 (2000)
(suggesting that judges must independently define "offense" and "jeopardy" to
protect the value underlying the clause, thus protecting defendants from harassing multiple prosecutions and convictions), with GEORGE C. THOMAS III, DOUBLE
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Thus, the Court in its past decisions has not recognized in
the Grand Jury Clause any constraint independent of that provided
by the Jury and Due Process Clauses that would prevent a legislature from omitting elements from its offense definitions. Instead,

the decisions have fragmented into several pieces what began as a
unitary question: What are the essential elements of an offense?
Any constitutional evaluation of legislative revisions of the sub-

stantive criminal law after Apprendi must reunite these pieces. At
the very least, a court should take them into account when at-

tempting to evaluate whether the Constitution prohibits a legislature from labeling as non-element a fact formerly considered an
element.
Not only has precedent linked the concept of "element" under
the Fifth Amendment to the same concept under the Jury and Due
Process Clauses, the function of the Grand Jury Clause requires no
greater or lesser constraint on legislative choice than those Clauses.
The requirement of pleading each and every element provides: (1)
notice adequate to prepare for trial or plea; (2) information to facilitate a claim of double jeopardy; (3) information for the judge who
will rule on sufficiency of the charge; and, finally, (4) assurance
that the grand jury took all the elements into consideration in voting to indict (the "grand jury review" function). 1 - Actual notice of
the nature of the charge may not require the recitation of every

element in the indictment or charge and, in any event, it does not
require more than a simple list of those facts that the prosecution

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 126 As for the judge's ability

JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY, THE LAW (1998) (arguing that the history of the clause supports absolute deference to legislative definitions of offenses, and that it checks only judges and prosecutors).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 139-40 (1985); Jenchins v. McKeithen,
395 U.S. 411, 430 (1969) (plurality opinion); Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64
(1962); Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 9 (1959); Ex parle Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 13 (1887); see also
1 BISHOP, supranote 12, at 199-200, 207 ("Precision in the description of the offence is of the last
importance to the innocent; for it is that which marks the limits of the accusation and fixes the
proof of it. It is the only hold he has on the jurors, judges as they are of the fact and the law, or
on an insubordinate judge ... .") Cinternal quotations omitted); CHITTY, supra note 119, at 169; 4
LAFAVE ET AL., supranote 49, at 747; McClintock, supranote 118, at 159, 161.
126. Even where a reference to an element is missing from the charging instrument, a defendant may have actual notice of the crime charged, either through sources other than the charging instrument itself, or from the "short-form" allegation in the charge. See, e.g., 4 LAFAVE T
AL., supra note 49, § 19.2(c) at 751 n.29 (collecting cases); see also Edmund Morgan, Judicial
Notice, 57 HARV. L REV. 269, 293-95 (1944); James Roberton, Comment, ConstitutionalLawFederalCriminal Procedure-ShortForm Indictment, 35 MICH. L REV. 456, 461 (1937); supra
note 118 (discussing "short form" indictments). Arguably, if the function of the Grand Jury
Clause is to provide the defendant with the information he needs in order to prepare for trial and
make an informed plea, one might expect more information would be provided to an accused
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to rule on pretrial motions that challenge the legality or sufficiency
of the charge or that raise a double jeopardy bar, information about
the case and the crime charged is available from documents apart
127
from the formal charge itself.
That leaves grand jury screening as a potential reason for
insisting that certain facts be treated as elements and alleged in
the indictment, despite a legislature's decision to eliminate those
facts from the definition of the offense. One might argue that the
grand jury, as a bulwark against governmental oppression, is entitled to understand enough about the offense and its elements to
allow it to protect a particular defendant from an unfounded prosecution or to block the enforcement of a law with which it disagrees.
One response is that such protection is a fallacy. Any prosecutor
worth her salt will admit that a grand jury can indict a ham sandwich, and the Court has done absolutely nothing to prevent the pig
from becoming bacon. Indeed, the screening function of the grand

jury has been nearly obliterated by decisions of the Court. A no-bill
by a grand jury blocks nothing; the prosecutor can try again. Insufficient, even non-existent, proof before the grand jury is considered
"cured" by a subsequent conviction by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. 128 Exculpatory evidence need not be presented to the grand
jury. 29 Even accepting the "bulwark" argument, the Court is in no

prior to plea or trial than a list of the facts that must be proven by the prosecution beyond a

reasonable doubt. Defendants assessing whether or not to plead guilty or preparing for trial also
need notice of possible defenses that they might raise to escape punishment altogether. Yet
defenses have never been considered "elements" for purposes of the Grand Jury Clause.
127. See 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 49, § 19.2(d), at 755 ("[Piretrial review of the adequacy
of the prosecution's theory is readily available through procedures other than a challenge to the
pleadings."); see also id. § 19.2(b), at 749.
[Tihe determination of double jeopardy-especially with the introduction of
[the] doctrine of collateral estoppel-is no longer a matter that courts expect to
resolve on the basis of matching charging instruments in the first and second
prosecutions. Transcriptions of trial proceedings are available to determine exactly what was put before the jury in the first case and the prosecution can be
expected, in response to a defense objection, to explain how the anticipated
proof in the second case will differ.
Id.
128. See generally United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 (1986); Andrew D. Leipold, Why
GrandJuriesDo Not (and Cannot)Protectthe Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260 (1995).
Some have suggested that these developments have knocked away the support for the rule
requiring relief despite conviction when an indictment fails to allege every element. See, e.g., 4
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 49, § 19.2(f), at 759-60 (noting that "a challenge claiming that the
grand jury was not aware of the essential elements of the offense is quite similar to a challenge
that it did not have before it sufficient evidence to support a charge" that is not cognizable); King
& Klein, supra note 5 (listing cases examining the expansion of Neder's harmless error analysis
to the omission of elements from the indictment); Scott, supra note 116, at 517-18.
129. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 54 (1992).
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better position to determine what "elements" must be alleged in an
indictment than it is to determine what "elements" must be established for the trial jury. What minimum information about the alleged offense and its punishment does "the people's panel!' 130 need
to perform this function? When is a sentencing fact or an affirmative defense so crucial to the ability of the grand jury to screen the
charge that it must be treated as an element? There is no reason to
believe that the screening function of the grand jury, not essential
enough to be a part of the due process that states must guarantee
to their citizens, 13 1 requires more protection from the legislature
than the various functions of trial by jury. The grand jury's review
function thus provides no special guidance for ascertaining the constitutional line a legislature must not cross when it declines to classify a given fact as an element.
2. The Right to Trial by Jury
Like the Grand Jury Clause, the Sixth Amendment is a
plausible source of limitation on the freedom of a legislature to decide what is and what is not an element. Just as the Grand Jury
Clause has been construed to require the allegation of each element
in an indictment, the Jury Clause guarantees a trial jury finding of
each element. Indeed, the Court in Jones and Apprendi appeared to
derive the distinction between sentencing facts and elements from
the Jury Clause of the Sixth Amendment. It referred in both cases
to the power of the English jury to "thwart Parliament and Crown"
by returning convictions on offenses of a lower degree than the offense charged. 3 2 In Jones, the Court expressed concern that if
judges were authorized to find facts that raised maximum sentences from fifteen years to life in prison, "the jury's role would correspondingly shrink from the significance usually carried by determinations of guilt to the relative importance of low-level gatekeeping: In some cases, a jury finding of fact necessary for a maximum
fifteen year sentence would merely open the door to a judicial finding sufficient for life imprisonment."' It is easy to read these references as suggesting that the Sixth Amendment guarantees to the

130. RIcHARD YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED STATES
1634-1941 (1963).
131. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516,538 (1884).

132. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 245 (1999); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120
S. Ct. 2348, 2357 n.5 (2000).
133. Jones,526 U.S. at 243.44.
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accused a jury with the power to determine the extent of punishment through its verdict. If the jury guaranteed by the Constitution
is a jury that can continue to exercise its power to effectively set the
punishment for an individual defendant by convicting of a lesser
offense, then government action that deprives the jury of that ability may also violate the Sixth Amendment. Forbidden action would
include the enactment of statutes substituting one offense with a
large sentence range for what once was a set of separate, graded
offenses. However, as we explain below, the Sixth Amendment's
Jury Clause provides no authority on its own for limiting legislative

discretion to set extremely broad sentence ranges within which
judges, not.juries, select punishment.
As an initial matter, it is doubtful that the setting of penalties was ever as firmly a part of the jury's function in the United
States as it was in England. Compared to jurors on the other side of
the Atlantic, American juries at the time of the adoption of the Bill
of Rights played a minor role in sentencing. Instead, many-or per-

haps most-sentences were set by judges, at their discretion, within
broad statutory ranges. 3 4 In England, jurors dealt with dozens of
crimes carrying mandatory execution as the sentence. Unless they
convicted of a lesser offense carrying a lesser penalty, conviction on
the highest charge meant death. This led, as the Court has observed, to "pious perjury"-acquittal of the higher offense in cases

134. For example, in the Connecticut criminal code of 1784, only a handful of offenses were
punished by death (rape, murder, burglary with violence, highway robbery with violence, and
treason). The majority of offenses carried fines, imprisonment, or a corporal punishment such as
whipping. See Lawrence Henry Gibson, The Criminal Codes of Connecticut, 6 J. AM. INST. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 177, 185-88 (1916).
In Pennsylvania, maximum terms of imprisonment were set by acts of 1786 and 1790. 1786
Pa. Laws 280-290; 1790 Pa. Laws 293-306 (e.g., up to ten years for robbery, burglary, or sodomy).
In 1794, most sentences for major felonies carried set minimum as well as maximum ranges. See
1794 Pa. Laws 174-181 (limiting penalties for, e.g., treason (six to twelve years); arson (five to
twelve years); rape (two to twenty-one years); second-degree murder (five to eighteen years);
forgery (four to fifteen years)); see also Brief Historyof PenalLegislation of Pennsylvania, 1 PA. J.
PRISON DISCIPLINE & PHILANTHROPY 1, 3-4 (1845); Fisher, supranote 25, at 874 (noting that, at
least by the early nineteenth century in Massachusetts, "[e]xcepting only those very serious
crimes that carried mandatory life or death sentences, none of the typical common-law offenses
called for a minimum sentence," and noting, for example, the penalty of "zero to life" for unarmed
robbery or forging a bank bill); id. at 910 & n.183.
In Rhode Island as of 1787, larceny was punished by up to two years hard labor, and counterfeiting coins was punished by any fine or corporal punishment chosen by the judge. See 1787 R.I.
Acts & Resolves 6; 1785 R.I. Acts & Resolves 5.
See generally ADAM J. HIRSCH, THE RISE OF THE PENITENTIARY: PRISONS AND PUNISHMENT IN
EARLY AMERICA 8-14, 57 (1992). See also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICAN HISTORY, 77-82 (1993).
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where guilt of the higher offense was clear.'3s In many American
jurisdictions as of 1791, jurors encountered far fewer offenses for
which executions were mandatory. To be sure, some colonies, suffering from their generation's crime wave during the mid- to late1700s, expanded somewhat the number of capital offenses just before the Revolution.136 But in the 1780s, this trend began to reverse,
declarations of sentencing reform appeared in the constitutions of
some new states, and there was a widespread view that whipping
and capital punishment had lost their deterrent power. 137 In 1785,
Massachusetts, followed by many other states, reduced the number
of crimes punishable by death and began to rely on the penitentiary
for crime control, responding in part to the prevailing philosophy
that solitude and hard labor would cure the wayward. 318 Imprisonment offered a range of sanctions previously unavailable when the
only option was death. 3 9 And imprisonment eventually replaced
other punishments that had already been imposed at the discretion
of the court, such as whipping and the pillory. 140 For example, of the

135. See John H. Langbein, The English Criminal Trial Jury on the Eve of the French Revolution, in THE JURY TRIAL IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY 1700-1900, at 13, 37 (Antonio Padoa
Schioppa ed., 1987); John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-CenturyCriminalTriak A View
from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 22, 41 n.160, 51 (1983) (noting that "trials were
sentencing proceedings" in which the defendant's "main object was to persuade the jury "to
reduce the sanction from death to transportation, or to lower the offense from grand to petty
larceny, which ordinarily reduced the sanction from transportation to whipping"); see also JL
BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND, 1660-1800, at 426-30 (1986).
136. See, e.g., HIRSCH, supra note 134, at 40 (noting that Massachusetts added four capital
crimes between 1737 and 1770).
137. Id. at 41.
138. See id. at 11-12; DAVID ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUm: SOCIAL ORDER AND
DISORDER 1N THE NEW REPUBLIC 49 (1990); STITH & CABRANES, supra note 65, at 16; see also
MORTON J. HORWrTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 12 (1977) (noting
criticism of judicial discretion in 1786); O.F. LEWIS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN PRISONS
AND PRISON CUSTOMS 1776-1845, at 64-67 (1922) (describing the abandoned copper mine used
from 1790 to 1827 as Connecticut's state prison).

139. The shift from capital punishment to imprisonment took place later in some jurisdictions. For example, a 1792 Georgia statute punishing horse stealing with death was replaced in
1809 by a statute reserving death for the second offense, and setting the punishment for the first
offense at thirty-nine lashes plus between twenty and thirty days' imprisonment. See 1792 Ga.
Laws 34; 1810 Ga. Laws 32. Two years later, whipping was eliminated and the term of imprisonment was raised to three to seven years. See 1811 Ga. Laws 40. Forgery, too-punished by
death in 1792-carried four to twelve years after 1811. See 1792 Ga. Laws 35, 1811 Ga. Laws
37.
Virginia made the shift to imprisonment in 1796. See 1796 Va. Acts ch. 2, 5-14; RONALD J.
PESTRITrO, FOUNDING THE CRIMINAL LAW 52-53 (2000). See generally Kathryn Preyer, Crime,

the CriminalLaw and Reform in Post-RevolutionaryVirginia, 1 LAW & HIST. REV. 53 (1983).
140. See, e.g., Rogers v. Commonwealth, 5 Serg. & Rawle 462, 466 (Pa. 1820) (tracing this
development in Pennsylvania); PESTRITTO, supra note 139, at 29-44 (same); id. at 45-57 (tracing
the shift in Virginia and New York); Bradley Chapin, Felony Law Reform in the Early Republic,
113 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 163 (1989). For example, larceny of a horse, punished in New
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twenty-two crimes enacted by the First Congress in 1790, six were
to be punished by hanging. Thirteen provided maximum sentences
only, leaving the discretion of what sentence to assign to the judge.
For two others, the punishment was set at four times the value of
the property involved. For the remaining crime, bribery of a judge,
no penalty was specified; instead, a fine and imprisonment could be
imposed at the discretion of the judge. 141 At the turn of the century,
jurors did include sentences as part of their verdicts in non-capital

cases in several jurisdictions, 4 2 but jury sentencing was not universal, nor was sentencing part of the role of the jury in federal
143
cases.
As a result, expectations about jury function vis-a-vis sentencing when the Bill of Rights was ratified may have been very
different from those prevailing in England. Indeed, decades later in
England, after Parliament eventually followed the American trend

of replacing execution with incarceration as the penalty for property crimes, "pious perjury" declined and the "English came to conceive of the role of the jury... as merely to find fact and then to

Hampshire in 1792 by marking the face with India ink for the first offense and up to one hundred stripes (whipping) and standing at the gallows with a rope about one's neck for up to two
hours for the second offense, was punished after 1812 by one to five years' imprisonment, or two
to ten for the second offense. See 1812 N.H. Laws 15; 1792 N.H. Laws 431.
141. See 1 Stat. 112 (1790).
142. In Virginia, for example, jurors fixed some sentences, but not all. See HENING, STATUTES
OF VIRGINIA XII, at 333 (providing for jury decision on sentences for rioting and unlawful assembly); SHEPHERD, STATUTES OF VIRGINIA I, at 111 (bribery); id. at 193 (default on payment of
surety). In 1796, a new code replaced several corporal and death sentences with imprisonment.
Fines were set by "the court." See also SHEPHERD, STATUTES OF VIRGINIA ii, 5-13; VA. REV.
CODE, 1819, I, at 558-616 (providing for time at the pillory to be set by the court). The 1796 Act,
unlike the proposed sentencing reform legislation defeated by one vote twenty years earlier,
provided that for many serious crimes juries would set the sentence of imprisonment within the
statutory range. See Preyer, supra note 139, at 76-78 (listing sentence ranges for treason, arson,
rape, second-degree murder, robbery, burglary, larceny, maiming, and homicide under the 1796
Act, and noting that sentences were set by juries). Penalties for counterfeiting, however, remained in the hands of the judge. See 1789 Va. Acts ch. 15 (counterfeiting to be punished by
imprisonment as limited by the court); 1801 Va. Acts ch. 71 (court sets imprisonment from one to
ten years for delivering a person to be transported out of the United States); see generally Note,
Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L. REV. 968 (1967).
143. See generally Charles 0. Betas, Jury Sentencing, 2 NATL PAROLE AND PROBATION ASS'N
J. 369 (1956). See also Hawkins v. State, 3 Stew. & P. 63 (Ala. 1832) (noting that an 1807 state
statute providing for jury determination of the amount of fine, but retaining judicial detormina.
tion of the term of imprisonment, was "an innovation upon the rules of the common law, so far as
it transfers power from the court to the jury); Blevings v. People, 2 InI. (1 Scam) 172 (1835)
(noting that at common law, juries never were invested with the power of determining the character or extent of the punishment, and construing an 1833 statute to grant the jury power to
sentence, but not in guilty plea cases).
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apply the law as stated by the bench." 44 With the "emerging view of
Parliament as the quintessential democratic institution," "jury discretion had come, finally, to be viewed as potentially undemocratic,
and as a threat to the subject's right to be tried by a law that was
certain and predictable."'145 This same transformation in expectations about jury function may very well have taken place earlier in
America.
Even assuming that penalty-setting was once considered a

vital function of the jury that is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, this understanding has been obliterated beyond resurrection

by the past two centuries of sentencing reform and litigation. First,
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries came the continued decline of mandatory penalties in favor of judicial discretion
to set sentences within a range set by the legislature. 14G For such
crimes, jurors could only guess what sentence would follow their
conviction.
Second, with the rise of the "medical moder' of sentencing in

the late 1800s, and the ensuing indeterminate sentencing statutes
in the early twentieth century, came even broader sentence ranges.

This leeway was required so that experts in correction would have
the room they needed to prescribe the appropriate amount of treat-

144. Thomas A. Green, The English CriminalTrial Jury and the Law FindingTraditions on
the Eve of the French Revolution, in THE TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY 1700-1900,
supranote 135, at 72.
145. Id.
146. See supranotes 139-41. Discretionary sentences had been the rule in misdemeanors for
some time before the Revolution. See Kathryn Preyer, PenalMeasuresin the American Colonies:
An Overview, 26 AM. J. LEGAL MIST. 326, 350 (1982); see also supra note 140. Following the
Revolution, common-law crimes were attacked as unconstitutional and bad policy. Justice Samuel Chase declared, in an opinion rejecting common-law federal crimes, that legislative standards must control punishment
[it appears to my mind, to be as essential, that Congress should define the offenses to be tried, and apportion the punishment to be inflicted, as that they
should erect Courts to try the criminal, or to pronounce a sentence on conviction .... [1]f Congress had ever declared and defined the offence, without prescribing a punishment, I should still have thought it improper to exercise a discretion upon that part of the subject.
United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1798). The Supreme Court later rejected federal
common-law crimes in United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 7 U.S. (Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)
("Mhe legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to
it, and declare the court that shall have jurisdiction of the offense."); HORWlTZ, supranote 138, at
11-30. With the codification of crime came the increasing use of incarceration. Statutes often
specified broad ranges within which judges could choose an appropriate sentence. See, e.g., 1
BISHOP, supra note 14, at 606 ("]n some of our States the statutes fix only the maximum of
punishment, leaving the court to go as low as it sees fit."); Fisher, supra note 25, at 913-14 (discussing broad discretion given to judges in sentencing during this period).
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ment. 147 During this period, many states previously clinging to jury
sentencing in non-capital cases gave up or severely limited the
practice as inconsistent with the prevailing view that "disposition of
offenders is a problem for specialists in criminology and psychiatry."14 The number of jurisdictions that allowed any jury sentencing in non-capital cases dwindled by the mid-twentieth century to
thirteen states. Two of these states limited such sentencing to
homicide or a handful of serious crimes and one state limited it to
those few cases in which the code failed to set a maximum and
minimum sentence for the offense. All but three states disallowed
jury sentencing following a guilty plea. In addition, judges in four
states had significant power to modify the jury's sentence. 149
The most telling rejection of the penalty-setting role of the
jury hinted at in the Apprendi decision is the line of decisions, beginning in 1895, in which the Court considered jury instructions on
147. In many states, statutory sentence ranges expanded drastically as the rehabilitative

philosophy took hold. Massachusetts provided in 1886 that, "when a convict is sentenced to the
Massachusetts reformatory, the court or trial justice imposing the sentence shall not fix or limit
the duration thereof." Fisher, supranote 25, at 1046 (internal quotation omitted); see also id. at
874, 886 (noting that a sentence from zero to life could be imposed for 'Torging a bank bill or
unarmed robbery," or "assault with intent to rape'); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348,
2375 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that the robbery penalty in 1894 in Maine was any
term of years to life). A half-dozen states around the turn of the century enacted laws depriving
the judge of any power to set the sentence within the statutory maximum and minimum; release
dates were controlled entirely by the parole board. See Fisher, supra note 25, at 1055. The bifurcation of guilt and sentencing was
deepened and entrenched during the Progressive Era in response to our deep
uncertainty regarding free will. At trial the jury would determine guilt or innocence according to traditional, generally accepted notions of personal responsibility. At the sentencing phase, however, judges were to consider more individualized, explanatory, or mitigating factors such as the "defendant's background, upbringing, associates, and so on-matters rarely formally admissible
during the trial .... "
Sherman Clark, The Courage of Our Convictions, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2381, 2444 (1999) (quoting
Thomas A. Green, Freedom and Criminal Responsibility in the Age of Pound: An Essay on
CriminalJustice, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1915, 1923 (1995)).
In the 1900s, many states set maximum terms of twenty to life for a large number of felonies.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 114, at 159-63 (describing the history of indeterminate sentencing);
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 65, at 21 ("By the early 1970s, California ... sentenced nearly all
serious offenders to an indeterminate term of between one year and life [and] the duration of
almost all prison sentences in California was determined by parole authorities.'); Herbert Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction,and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 465, 473-74 & nn.1517 (1961) (listing statutes from New York, Pennsylvania and California); Note, Statutory Structures, supra note 28, at 1137-41 (noting that six states required minimum felony sentences of
only one year and that two states repealed all minima in 1959). The Model Penal Code graded
felonies into three degrees, the most serious carrying a sentencing range of one year to life.
148. Comment, Consideration of Punishment by Juries, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 400, 401 n.6
(1949); see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 65, at 18; Ronald F. Wright, Rules for Sentencing
Revolutions, 108 YALE L.J. 1355, 1374 (1999).
149. Note, Statutory Structures, supranote 28, at 1154-55.
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lesser-included offenses in murder cases. Murder at that time was
the only crime in which mandatory death sentences played a major
role. In order to avoid the mandatory sentence of death, juries had
"persistently" refused to convict "a significant portion" of those
charged with first-degree murder. 150 But rather than protect this
practice, the Court went out of its way to condemn it, first in the
1895 murder case of Sparf and Hansen,151 and then, nearly a century later, in a series of cases beginning with Beck v. Alabama. 52
Indeed, the jury practice of convicting a defendant of a lesser offense in order to protect that defendant from certain death was targeted by the Court as a source of arbitrariness and unfairness that
plagued the administration of the death penalty. It contributed to
the Court's decision to prohibit mandatory death sentences altogether. Efforts by juries to spare the lives of capital defendants by
acquitting them of capital murder were condemned by the Court as
an exercise of "unguided and unchecked discretion regarding who
will be sentenced to death."153 In the Court's view, this led to the
same "'wanton' and 'arbitrary' imposition of the death penalty" that
54 As perhaps the final blow to the comhad troubled it in Furman.1
mon-law vision of the jury as mediator of penalty, the Court upheld

150. Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 388 (1985) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 302-03 (1976)).
151. See generally Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895); Hawaii v. Kapea, 11 Haw. 293
(1898) (collecting cases); see also 5 WHARTON'S CRIMUNAL LAW & PROCEDURE § 2099, at 268-70
(1957) (collecting cases).
152. In Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980), and its progeny, the Court sought to separate
the sentencing decision from the jury's decision on guilt, not bind them together. Under Beck's
principles, a trial judge was required to instruct the jury on a lesser alternative to murder in
certain circumstances to give the jury a third choice other than outright acquittal or capital
murder. Beck, 447 U.S. at 637.
153. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302 (1976).
154. Baldwin, 472 U.S. at 388; see also Roberts v. Lousiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333 (1976) (striking down a statutory scheme under which five specific types of murder carried a mandatory
death sentence, and under which the jury in each case had to be instructed on lesser included
offenses of second-degree murder and manslaughter, whether or not the evidence justified those
instructions). The plurality in Roberts commented:
This responsive verdict procedure not only lacks standards to guide the jury in
selecting among first degree murderers but it plainly invites the jurors to disregard their oaths and choose a verdict for a lesser offense whenever they feel
the death penalty is inappropriate. There is an element of capriciousness in
making the jurors' power to avoid the death penalty dependent on their willingness to accept this invitation to disregard the trial judge's instructions. The
Louisiana procedure neither provides standards to channel jury judgments nor
permits review to check the arbitrary exercise of the capital jury's de facto sentencing discretion.
Id. at 334-35.
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statutes that allowed a judge's decision to trump the jury's selection
of life or death in a capital case. 155
Thus, the separation of juries from sentencing in America
began well before 1789 and has continued for over two centuries.
Even the remarkable explosion of mandatory sentences in the past
three decades, accompanied by the rejection of indeterminate sentencing in a third of the states and by Congress, has not been
enough to reverse this trend. 156 Arguments that the Sixth Amendment affords defendants the right to present sentencing information to their juries have been uniformly rejected. 157 By 1994, when
the Court in Shannon v. United States was asked to require judges
to instruct jurors on the sentencing consequences of a verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity, the Court dismissed the argument as
contrary to long-standing practice. 158 Today, in nearly all jurisdictions, 15 9 jurors in non-capital cases are forbidden to learn of the
sentencing consequences of their decisions, 160 and many statutory
16
sentence ranges remain quite broad. '

155. See, e.g., Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 505, 514 (1995).
156. For a summary of the rise of not only mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, but also
sentencing guidelines and presumptive sentencing schemes by which legislatures set presumptive terms from which judges cannot depart absent a finding of aggravating or mitigating facts,
see 4 LAFAVE ETAL., supranote 49, § 26.3, at 733-41.

157. See generally Milton Heumann & Lance Cassack, Not-So-Blissful Ignorance: Informing
JurorsAbout Punishment in Mandatory Sentencing Cases, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 343 (1983); see
also Adrian Lanni, Note, Jury Sentencing in Non-Capital Cases: An Idea Whose Time Has Come
(Again)?, 108 YALE L.J. 1775, 1782-85 (1999).
158. Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 586-87 (1994).
Shannon offers us no principled way to limit the availability of instructions detailing the consequences of a verdict to cases in which an NGI defense is raised.
...[A]s a general matter, jurors are not informed of mandatory minimum or
maximum sentences, nor are they instructed regarding probation, parole, or the
sentencing range accompanying a lesser included offense ....
[A] district court,
under Shannon's reasoning, might be obligated to give juries information regarding these possibilities as well. In short, if we pursue the logic of Shannon's
position, the rule against informing jurors of the consequences of their verdicts
would soon be swallowed by the exceptions.
Id.
159. In Georgia, in those limited cases where the jury does sentence, it must be informed accurately. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1 (2000) (one year to life for rape); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-123
(2000) (one year to life for hijacking). See generally Carbray v. Champion, 905 F.2d 314 (10th Cir.
1990). Louisiana requires the judge to provide sentencing information to the jury if requested by
the defendant. See State v. Hooks, 421 So. 2d 880, 886 (La. 1982) ('When the penalty to be imposed is a mandatory one, our law requires the trial judge to inform the jury, on request of the
defendant, of the penalty and to permit defense counsel to argue the penalty to the jury.').
160. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 62 F.3d 849, 850-51 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Thomas, 895 F.2d 1198, 1200 (8th Cir. 1990); Limose v. Florida, 656 So. 2d 947, 949 (Fla. 1995).
Of course, the penalty that a defendant faces is sometimes revealed during cross-examination of
prosecution witnesses, and is occasionally discovered by jurors from sources external to the trial.
See, e.g., Ross v. State, 231 Ga. App. 506, 509 (1998) (reporting that, on cross-examination in an
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Throughout American history, then, there has been significant variation in the allocation of authority between judge, jury,
and administrative officials in selecting sentences within statutory
ceilings. These fluctuations in who decides the sentence follow
shifts in prevailing philosophy about why and how we sentence.
There is no basis for believing that those changes will cease. If the
Jury Clauses of the Constitution do limit the facts that a legislature
can remove from the jury and shift into the sentencing phase, and if
those limits are not exceeded by the sentencing practices followed
in non-capital cases for most of the past two hundred years, the
permissible boundaries are very broad. They are broad enough, for
example, to accommodate statutes that delegate to a judge the unencumbered discretion to set a sentence for a serious crime at anywhere from a year to life in prison. In this sense, the Court's concern that the jury not be reduced to low-level gatekeeping" 1 62
seems curiously optimistic-the jury has played this role for years.
3. Due Process Right to Juror Unanimity
The Court has been more direct about using the Due Process
Clause itself to rein in legislative choice concerning what is and
what is not an element, at least in dicta. Twice in the past ten
years, in Schad v. Arizona163 and again in Richardson v. United
States,64 the justices have agreed that the Due Process Clause
would prevent legislatures from defining an element of an offense
so that it could be satisfied by alternative means that had been
treated historically as separate elements of offenses. This anticombination rule would protect against a guilty verdict accompanied by jury disagreement on a point that the Constitution would
require to be treated as an element. It is a specificity requirement
that forces courts to treat as independent elements what a legisla-

armed robbery trial, a defense witness stated that he faced "ten years mandatory" on an armed

robbery charge).
161. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (1994) (any term up to life imprisonment for child sexual
assault); IDAHO CODE § 18-1508 (Michie 1997) (zero to life for lewd conduct with a minor); IDAHO
CODE § 18-5609 (Michie 1997) (two years to life for inducing a minor into prostitution); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-4 (Michie 2000) (twenty to fifty years for a Class A felony); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2929.11 (West 2000) (four to twenty-five years for a first-degree felony); 18 PA.CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 106 (West 2000) (one to twenty years for a first degree felony); N.Y. PENAL LW §
70.00 (McKinney 2000) (three years to life imprisonment for a Class A felony); MASS GEN. IAWS
ch.269, § 10E (2000) (ten years to life for unlawful sale of twenty or more guns).
162. See supranote 133.
163. Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991).
164. Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 (1999).
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ture has chosen to characterize as simply different means of establishing a single element. The problem, the Court observed in Schad,
arises when "the inherent nature of the offense charged requires the
state to prove as an element of the offense some fact that is not an
element under the legislative definition." 165 Although the Court has
stopped short of invalidating any statute on this basis, every justice
has recognized this constitutional restriction on the substantive
criminal law.166

Drawing from the burden-shifting cases, the Court in Schad
explained that setting due process limits on offense definitions selected by states meant "deciding, as an abstract matter, what elements an offense must comprise."1 67 This required the Court to examine whether a "State's particular way of defining a crime has a
long history, or is in widespread use," or rather, whether it is a
"freakish definition of the elements of a crime that finds no analogue in history or in the criminal law of other jurisdictions."168 The
Arizona statute at issue in Schad permitted a jury to return a
guilty verdict on a charge of first-degree murder without first
agreeing unanimously on whether the defendant committed felony
murder or premeditated murder. Justice Souter, with whom three
other justices joined, and with whom Justice Scalia concurred on
this point, 69 found persuasive evidence that Arizona's scheme did
indeed have a long history. 170 Justice Scalia did not join the further
analysis of the plurality, namely, that a court considering a due
process claim like Schad's must, in addition, look past history "to
narrower analytical methods of testing the moral and practical
equivalence of the different" facts that could count as a single ele-

165. Schad, 501 U.S. at 639 (emphasis added).
166. Since Schad, reported decisions of lower courts have only rarely found in a defendant's
favor, upholding convictions absent jury agreement on whether the defendant was an accomplice
or a principal, stole employee time or paint supplies, committed voluntary or involuntary manslaughter, laundered money by promoting illegal activity or concealing it, etc. See, e.g., United
States v. Navarro, 145 F.3d 580 (3d Cir. 1998) (means of laundering money); United States v.
Sanderson, 966 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1992) (theft of employee time or paint supplies); Simms v.
United States, 634 A.2d 442 (D.C. 1993) (same); Walker v. State, 944 P.2d 762 (Nev. 1997) (aiding and abetting or principal); Evans v. State, 944 P.2d 253 (Nev. 1997) (same); State v. Andor.
son, 511 N.W.2d 174 (Neb. 1993) (voluntary or involuntary manslaughter).
167. Schad, 501 U.S. at 639.
168. Id. at 640.
169. Justice Scalia wrote that, under the Due Process Clause, it 'isprecisely the historical
practices that define what is 'due.'" Id. at 650 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). He
concluded that "[u]nless we are here to invent a Constitution rather than enforce one, it is impossible that a practice as old as the common law and still in existence in the vast majority of
States does not provide that process which is 'due.'" Id. at 651 (Scalia, J., concurring).
170. Id. at 642 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977) (citation omitted)).
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ment. i7 1 In Schad, this meant asking if the two different "mental
states" of felony murder and premeditated murder "may satisfy the
mens rea element" of first-degree murder.1 7 2 Subsequently in
Richardson v. United States, the Court interpreted the Continuing
Criminal Enterprise statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848, to require the jury to
agree which predicate "violation" occurred. 7 3 The Richardson Court
noted that a different interpretation would have raised a question
of constitutionality under Schad because there was no history of
treating individual criminal violations as simply different means
toward the commission of a greater crime even under habitual offender laws. 74
In examining what constitutional barriers exist for legislators who would otherwise shift elements to sentencing factors in
hopes of avoiding the consequences of the rule in Apprendi, it is
useful to review the three hypothetical examples of offense definitions that a majority of justices in Schad and Richardson agreed in
dicta would violate due process: 1) a crime of "recidivism" consisting
merely of a combination of offenses, without a requirement of jury
agreement on which offenses the defendant had committed;1 7 5 2) a
crime so "generic' or irrational that a finding of any combination of
"embezzlement, reckless driving, murder, burglary, tax evasion or
littering.., would suffice for conviction"; 176 and 3) "novel 'umbrella'
crimes (a felony consisting of either robbery or failure to file a tax
return)."' 7 These hypothetical statutes would violate due process
because they vary drastically from historical practice. In addition,
under the "history-plus-moral-equivalence" approach adopted by a
minority of justices, these statutes could not be applied as written
because they would allow jurors to mix and match criminal acts
that carry grossly disparate levels of moral blameworthiness (e.g.,
littering and murder), raise "serious questions as to fairness and
rationality because the jury's discretion would be so uncon-

171. Id. at 637.
172. Id. The plurality found such moral equivalence between the two alternatives in the Arizona statute. Id.
173. Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 824 (1999).
174. Id. at 819-20.

175. Id. at 835-36. Even the justices who dissented in Richardson agreed that a habitual of.
fender statute specifying a single element that could be met by any series of crimes, without
requiring juror unanimity on one particular underlying crime, would raise "serious questions as
to fairness and rationality because the jury's discretion would be so unconstrained." Id. at 836
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). The CCE statute was not such a statute, the dissenters maintained,
"for the various elements work together to channel the jury's attention toward a certain kind of
ongoing enterprise." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
176. Schad, 501 U.S. at 633.

177. Id. at 650 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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strained," 178 and amount to "an end run around the Constitution's
jury unanimity requirement."1 79
Prohibiting only such extreme departures from traditional
offense defintions, the Schad rule itself provides little ammunition
against statutes designed to preserve judicial adjudication of certain facts after Apprendi. Given the hypotheticals offered by the
Court, an offense definition reformulated to avoid the consequences
of Apprendi will be no more likely to violate the Schad rule than
any other criminal statute. An offense carrying a large sentence
maximum that binds a judge's discretion within that maximum depending on the presence or absence of aggravating features will not
require the use of an element that may be proven by any combination of disparate acts.8 0
But the rationale of Schad and Richardson is highly instructive. By linking what due process requires of states in defining
crime to consistent and widespread offense definitions of the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,' 81 Schad supports an
historically based rule for testing the constitutionality of a state's
designation of a fact as something other than an element. If the
crime (or its equivalent) has been punished for over two centuries

178. Richardson, 526 U.S. at 836 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
179. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
180. Schad might create difficulty should a legislature wish to combine into one element two

or more crimes that, throughout the history of this nation, have been treated fairly consistently
as separate offenses. For example, a crime of either rape or murder, or of either larceny or assault, would be the kind of unacceptably contra-historical crime prohibited under Schad. If the
New Jersey legislature wanted to retain as a sentencing factor, not an element, the presence or
absence of racial motivation for a broad range of crimes, it could create an offense of "felony
harassment," with a penalty of one year to life in prison, and define felony harassment to include
"any offense against a person or property, including but not limited to fraud, theft, assault, robbery, murder, or home invasion." Sentence ranges would be graded by the presence or absence of
aggravating factors, including discriminatory motivation. This kind of statute would undoubtedly trigger the Schad limitation because lumping such disparate crimes into one crime has no
basis in history, nor is assault or negligent damage to property anywhere near the moral
equivalent of murder.
In any event, a statute like this is highly improbable. The same quality that makes this
combination offense unlikely to survive scrutiny under Schad also makes it unlikely to be onacted into law. The offense definition is "irrational," particularly when the crimes lumped together are defined and punished less severely elsewhere in the state's code. No legitimate reason
exists for punishing the very same conduct so differently in two provisions of the code. Assault
charged as a misdemeanor assault would carry quite low penalties, while the same conduct
charged as "harassment" would carry the maximum penalty of life, even though each involved
identical conduct.
181. See, e.g., Schad, 501 U.S. at 641 n.8 (citing a state statute from 1794 and a state case
from 1903); id. at 651 (Scalia, J., concurring) (tracing the definition of murder to the sixteenth
century: "It was the norm when this country was founded, was the norm when the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted in 1868, and remains the norm today.').
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in this country with a drastically different allocation of authority
between judge and jury than exists in the challenged statute, the
novel statutory scheme should trigger further scrutiny. Also, the
Schad plurality presents another concern: that even where an offense definition has no common-law analogue, due process may require courts to override legislative decisions that allow jurors to
agree on a single element by mixing and matching acts of widely
differing blameworthiness.1l 2 Our approach for assessing statutes
enacted after Apprendi that shift what are arguably elements to the
sentencing phase, described in Part HI.B below, incorporates both
of these considerations.
4. Eighth Amendment Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual
Punishments
The Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause will offer weak barriers to post-Apprendi efforts by legislatures to omit facts that affect sentences from the definitions of offenses punishable by penalties less than death. 8 3 Death, of course,
is different, 184 and we expect that the Court will police postApprendi statutes that authorize execution as a penalty with con-

182. Richardson,526 U.S. at 836-37.
183. In addition to the proportionality analysis discussed in this Section, there are two other
areas where the Eighth Amendments Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause offers protection:
(1) Robinson v. California'sbar against "status" crimes; and (2) Weems ,. United States' bar
against inhumane modes of punishment. See generally Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). The former is covered in the section discussing substantive due process. See infra Part HILA.5. The latter wil be barred regardless of
whether the jury or the judge finds the facts necessary for imposition of punishment.
Justices and scholars continue to disagree as to whether the Framers, when modeling the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause upon the English Declaration of Rights of 1689, had

proportionality in mind. Compare, e.g., RICHARD L PERRY, SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 236
(1959); Charles Walter Schwarz, Eighth Amendment ProportionalityAnalysis and the Compelling Case of William Rummell, 71 J. CMt. L & CRIMINOLOGY 378 (1980); Note, The Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARV. L RLv. 635 (1966);
Note, What is Cruel and Unusual Punishment?,24 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1910); with Anthony Granucci, 'Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted,' The OriginalMeaning, 57 CAL. L REV.
839, 844-60 (1969); Deborah A. Schwartz & Jay Wishingrad, Comment, The Eighth Amendment,
Beccaria, and the Enlightenment: An Historical Justificationfor the Weems v. United States
Excessive Punishment Doctrine,24 BUFF. L. REV. 783 (1975).
184. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion).
Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year
prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of the qualitative
difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.
Id.; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270-71 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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siderably more vigor than statutes that authorize penalties less
than death.
Death cases. Capital punishment is not immune from Apprendi fallout. In capital cases as well as non-capital cases, a legislature may decide to bypass grand jury indictment, jury trial, and
proof beyond a reasonable doubt for certain factual matters. For
example, a number of federal statutes now label facts that must be
established for a sentence of death to be imposed as sentenceenhancing factors, such as the fact that a defendant proximately
caused the death of a victim in the course of another felony. 185 Although these existing "enhancements" have now become "elements"
in the wake of Apprendi, one could easily imagine Congress increasing the maximum penalty for the underlying offense to death,
and directing a judge to impose only imprisonment upon finding
that the defendant did not cause a death during the crime. 186 Arguably, nothing in the Eighth Amendment prohibits this course of
action. The Court in Cabana v. Bullock held that a federal court
reviewing a state prisoner's petition for habeas relief may reject a
claim that the state failed to satisfy the Eighth Amendment's requirement that some culpable mental state be shown before a defendant may be executed for felony murder simply by examining the
entire course of the state court proceedings, including the sentencing hearing and appellate findings. 8 7 The majority reasoned that
this culpability requirement "establishes no new elements of the
crime of murder that must be found by a jury." 18 Likewise, the
Court in Walton v. Arizona reiterated that capital sentencing, including the constitutionally required determination that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating ones, can be handled solely
by the judge. 8 9 This determination is not an element of the offense

185. See 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1994) (prohibiting engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise,
with a potential sentence of life imprisonment, but containing a subsection, labeled "death penalty," providing that, "in addition to the other penalties set forth in this section ....
any person
engaged in... a continuing criminal enterprise, . . . who intentionally kills,. . . may be sentenced
to death"). See infra Appendix B for additional examples.
186. Congress could rewrite the continuing criminal enterprise statute, for example, by increasing to death the maximum penalty for violation of the CCE provision, so long as the judge
at sentencing imposes a lesser sentence if the defendant had not killed another in the course of
the crime.
187. Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 382 n.1, 386 (1986) (five-four).
188. Id. at 385.
189. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647-48 (1990) (holding that an aggravating factor is a
sentencing enhancement, not an element of the offense); see also Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S.
638, 640-41 (1989) (per curiam) (holding that the sentencing judge may determine deathqualifying aggravating facts); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 448 (1984) (finding that neither
the Sixth nor the Eighth Amendment provides a capital defendant the right to jury sentencing).
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of conviction that must be determined by a jury. 190 Thus, one might

argue if both the mens rea necessary for execution of a felonymurderer and the individuation necessary for any execution can be
found by the judge rather than the jury, why not the fact of the
killing itself?
There are at least two possible answers to this question.
First, crimes that do not include the death of a human as an element of the offense may not be sufficiently serious to warrant the
penalty of death under the Eighth Amendment. Indeed, the Court
has upheld the death penalty for only those offenses that require
proof of a homicide as an element of the offense. 191 To be sure, the
Court may subsequently approve of execution as a penalty for serious non-homicide felonies, such as child rape, treason, or
espionage. 192 However, we expect that the Court will judge the constitutionality of death sentences for crimes other than homicide by
examining exclusively the elements of the offense of conviction, not
what might be proven at sentencing.19 3 An alternative answer is to
accept that, so long as a jury determines the elements designated
by the legislature as sufficient to authorize the execution of the ac-

190. Hildwin, 490 U.S. at 640.
191. See, e.g., Cabana,474 U.S. at 385.
Enmund holds only that the principles of proportionality embodied in the
Eighth Amendment bar imposition of the death penalty upon a class of persons
who may nonetheless be guilty of the crime of capital murder as defined by
state law: that is the class of murderers who did not themselves kill, attempt to
kill, or intend to kill.
Id.; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (five-four) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
does not permit "imposition of the death penalty on one such as Enmund... who does not himself kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed'); see also Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) (finding that the imposition of capital
punishment for the rape of an adult female violated the Eighth Amendment). Enmund was
limited in Tison v. Arizona, in which the Court found that "major participation in the felony
committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund
culpability requirement." Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (five-four).
192. The Court has not yet passed on the many federal and state statutes authorizing the
death penalty for those convicted of certain crimes not resulting in the death of the victim, such
as espionage, child rape, aircraft hijacking, and kidnapping. See 83 ABA J. 30 (Aug. 1997) (listing states and crimes); see also Bethany v. Louisiana, No. 96-8334, 138 L. Ed. 2d 188 (1997)
(statement of Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., that denial of certiorari as to a 1995 Louisiana
law authorizing the death penalty for rape of a child younger than twelve does not constitute a
ruling on the merits).
193. This is precisely the position the lower federal courts have taken in determining the
proportionality of non-capital sentences; they compare the enhanced sentence solely to the elements of the offense of conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 121 F.3d 928, 942-43 (5th
Cir. 1997) (stating that a sentencing enhancement of thirty years for using or carrying a machine
gun during and in relation to a drug offense, consecutive to the seventy-eight months for the
drug offense, is not grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the drug offense, and thus does not
violate the Eighth Amendment).
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cused, proof that the defendant caused a death may be assessed by
a judge in a capital case consistent with the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause. If so, restraints on this sort of legislative experimentation must instead be found in the Due Process Clauses.
The due process inquiry would presumably differ from that under
the Eighth Amendment alone. We offer one alternative, a multifactor test described in Part III.B, below. 194
Non-capital cases. Outside of capital cases, we believe that
the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
offers little protection against disproportionate prison sentences in
a post-Apprendi nation. In an influential article, Professor Ronald
J. Allen suggested that the answer to legislative redefinitions of
crimes that shift "elements" into "defenses" is to impose a constitutional requirement of "maintaining proportionate punishment,"195
though he did not articulate the contours of such a test. 19 6 Without

194. Alternatively, one of us believes that the Court might reconsider the five to four hold-

ings of Walton and Cabana in light of Apprendi. There is some inconsistency in holding both
that the federal Constitution demands that the state prove a certain fact not included by the

legislature as an element of a crime before the state can impose the authorized punishment, and
that this fact is not subject to those procedural protections afforded elements of crimes because it
is merely a "substantive limitation on sentencing." Walton, 497 U.S. at 680-81 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); id. at 709 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that aggravating circumstances do "operate as statutory 'elements' of capital murder'). Labeling as a 'limitation on sentencing" the
affirmative defense in Pattersonand the sentencing factor in McMillan is plausible in part because New York could have rejected the defense of extreme emotional distress, and Pennsylvania
could have imposed the same sentence regardless of whether the defendant visibly possessed a
firearm. The greater power to eliminate the significance of facts entirely may include the lesser
power to shift the burden of proving a fact to the defendant and to recognize the fact only at
sentencing as found by a judge. This "greater includes the lesser" rule of constitutional interpre.
tation is the subject of rich and intense scholarly and judicial debate in both the criminal and
civil context. See infra note 212 and accompanying text. This argument, however, fails on its
own terms when applied to facts that a state cannot eliminate because of federal constitutional
commands.
195. Ronald J. Allen, StructuringJury Decisionmakingin Criminal Cases: A Unified ConstitutionalApproach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 HARV. L. REV. 321, 325 (1980) [hereinafter Allen,
Structuring Jury Decisionmaking]; see also Ronald J. Allen, Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Supreme
Court, and the Substantive CriminalLaw: An Examination of the Limits of Legislative Intervention, 55 TEX. L. REV. 269, 295-301 (1977) (hereinafter Allen, Limits of Legislative Intervention];
Allen, Reflections on the Limits of Legislative Imagination,supra note 6, at 648-54. Examples of
more recent scholarship advocating stronger proportionality review include Steven Grossman,
Proportionalityin Non-Capital Sentencing: The Supreme Court's TorturedApproach to Cruel and
UnusualPunishment, 84 KY. L.J. 107 (1995) (advocating "limited retributivism" as a justification
for a ban on disproportionate sentencing); Nancy Jean King, Portioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits on Successive and Excessive Penalties, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 105 (1995) (suggesting that because due process, double jeopardy, and common-law preclusion rules permit
successive penalties for the same conduct, the Court should engage in "cumulative excessiveness"
review under the Eighth Amendment).
196. For example, after correctly noting that the rebuttable presumption of intent to kill in
Sandstrom v. Montana,442 U.S. 510, 517 (1977) ("[Ihe law presumes that a person intends the
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significant revision of current standards, however, the Eighth
Amendment alone cannot shoulder this load.
First, even though seven justices currently ascribe to some
form of proportionality review of sentences of imprisonment in noncapital cases, 197 the Court's present test is so narrow that it is difficult to imagine a constitutionally disproportionate felony
sentence, 198 especially where the sentence is anything less than life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.1 99

ordinary consequences of his voluntary act."), is the functional equivalent of a negligent murder
statute with an affirmative defense of lack of intent to kill, Professor Allen concludes without
explanation that the 100-year sentence imposed was disproportionate to the murder committed.
Allen, StructuringJury Decisionmaking,supranote 195, at 358.
Likewise, Professors Jeffries and Stephan also argue that the legislature is limited in redefining crimes to evade criminal procedural guarantees by the Eighth Amendments requirement
of proportionality. Jeffries & Stephan, supranote 6, at 1383.85. They assert that if felony murder is viewed as a strict liability crime, it is always an unconstitutionally cruel and unusual
punishment; on the other hand, if felony murder is viewed as an adjunct of the underlying crime,
it does not violate the Eighth Amendment if the underlying offense is rape, but it is disproportionate if the underlying offense is selling alcohol to an inebriated customer. Id. at 1385. Professors Jeffries and Stephan offer as little guidance on proportionality review as does Professor
Allen. In any event, cultural attitudes toward the seriousness and moral culpability surrounding
drunk driving have changed since Professors Jeffries and Stephan wrote their article.
197. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) (upholding a mandatory life sentence
without the possibility of parole imposed upon a first-time drug possessor). The plurality agreed
to engage in the intra- and inter-jurisdictional analysis it developed in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
277 (1983), but only upon "an initial judgment that the sentence is grossly disproportionate to a
crime." Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1006; see also Solem, 463 U.S. at 278, 290-92 (measuring proportionality by comparing: "i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty, ii) the
sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and iii) the sentences imposed for
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions).
198. The Court repeatedly gives the single example of life imprisonment for overtime parking
as a statute under which the proportionality principle would "come into play," suggesting but not
holding that such an offense might be insufficiently serious to warrant a severe penalty. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 963; Salem, 463 U.S. at 288; Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 n.3 (1982);
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 n.11 (1980). Life or near-life sentences have been upheld
by federal courts for felonies such as possession of small quantities of controlled substances. See
generallyDavis, 454 U.S. 370 (per curmin) (upholding a forty-year sentence for the crime of distributing nine ounces ($200 worth) of marijuana). In only a handful of pre-Harmelincases have
Eighth Amendment challenges to felony sentences succeeded. See Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136,
143 (4th Cir. 1973) (finding that life imprisonment under a West Virginia recidivism statute for
offenses of perjury, bouncing a $50 check, and transporting forged checks worth $140, was constitutionally disproportionate), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974); Thacker v. Garrison, 445 F.
Supp. 376, 380 (W.D.N.C. 1978) (finding that a fifty-year sentence for breaking into a nursery
and stealing $10 was constitutionally disproportionate); Roberts v. Collins, 404 F.Supp. 119, 124
(D. Md. 1975) (finding that consecutive twenty-year sentences for two counts of simple assault
were constitutionally disproportionate, where the maximum sentence for a charged, greater
offense of assault with intent to murder was fifteen years), affd, 544 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1976). In
only two post-Harmelincases have Eighth Amendment challenges to felony sentences succeeded,
while hundreds of similar claims have been rejected. See State v. Bartlett, 830 P.2d 823, 823-24
(Ariz. 1992) (after Supreme Court's reversal of a sentence reduction and remand in light of Harmelin, the Arizona Supreme Court again determined that a forty-year sentence with no possibility of parole was disproportionate to the offense of consensual sexual intercourse between a
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Second, there is no consensus regarding a method for determining whether any particular penalty is unconstitutionally harsh.
It is difficult to dispute Justice Kennedy's conclusions in Harmelin
that fixing prison terms "is properly within the province of the legislature not the courts," that "there are a variety of legitimate punishment schemes based upon theories of retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation," that "the Eighth Amendment
does not mandate the adoption of any one penological theory," and
that divergences "in the length of the prescribed prison term are
the inevitable, often beneficial" result of Federalism. 200
This means that the Eighth Amendment will rarely, if ever,
check legislative efforts to bypass procedure through redefinition of
substantive criminal offenses already serious enough to be punished as felonies.2 01 Consider statutes redrafted to achieve the results vacated in Jones, Apprendi, and Castillo. Congress could increase the maximum sentence for simple carjacking from fifteen
years to life, the New Jersey legislature could increase the sentence
for possessing a firearm for an unlawful purpose from ten to twenty

twenty-three-year-old defendant with no criminal record and two fifteen-year-old girls); State v.
Bonner, 577 N.W.2d 575, 582 (S.D. 1998) (fifteen-year sentence for second-degree burglary dis.
proportionate when compared to sentences received by co-defendants); Adam M. Gershowitz, The
Supreme Court's Backwards ProportionalityJurisprudence: Comparing JudicialReview of Excessive Criminal Punishment and Excessive Punitive Damages Awards, 86 VA. L. REV. 1249,
1276-79 (2000) (collecting post-Harmelinauthority, and arguing that the analyses in Bartlett and
Bonner were flawed). But see United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998) (five-justice majority adopting the same "grossly disproportionate" test for the Excessive Fines Clause as for the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, striking fine, and suggesting that failure to report
legally-earned currency is not a serious offense).
199. Some circuits limit proportionality review after Harmelin exclusively to cases involving
sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. See, e.g., United States v. Lockhart, 58 F.3d 86, 89 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding that a 120-month sentence does not violate the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, since "proportionality
review is not appropriate for any sentence less than life imprisonment without parole). Though
such a conclusion is not mandated by Harmelin,it is certainly consistent with it. Justice Powell,
a dissenter in Rummell but writing for the majority in Solem, maintained in Solem that he was
not overruling Rummell, noting the factual distinction that Rummell's life sentence carried with
it the possibility of parole while Helm's did not. Solem, 463 U.S. at 300-03.
200. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998-99 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
201. Defendants may have better luck in the state courts where many of the state constitutional counterparts to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause are more charitable. A num.
ber of states have clauses in their constitutions providing both that "cruel or unusual punishment is prohibited," and that penalties and punishments be proportioned to the nature of the
offense. See, e.g., People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697 (Cal. 1983) (finding a life sentence constitutionally disproportionate for felony murder based on attempted robbery); State v. Lewis, 447 S.E.
570, 570-72 (W.Va. 1994) (finding a one- to ten-year sentence constitutionally disproportionate,
under both state and federal constitutions, for felony murder of third-offense shoplifting of $8.83
worth of groceries); State ex rel. Bose v. Hedrick, 391 S.E.2d 614, 614-17 (W.V. 1990) (finding a
life sentence imposed under a recidivist statute constitutionally disproportionate for burglary).

2001]

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS

1523

years, and Congress could increase the sentence for possession of
any firearm from five to thirty years. Such statutes suffer no
Eighth Amendment infirmity under present doctrine. Though these
crimes become less serious when we eliminate from their definitions
proof that the carjacker also caused death, or that the shooter acted
out of racial hatred, or that the gun possessed was a machine gun,
the longer sentences are still in no measure "grossly disproportionate" to these crimes.
While disproportionality alone will generally be insufficient
to invalidate statutes redrafted to avoid the consequences of Apprendi, when combined with other factors it can assist in drawing a
constitutional line that cannot be crossed. Proportionality of punishment is therefore included in the multi-factor test proposed in
Part HILB, below.
5. Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Substantive and Procedural
Due Process
Present doctrine surrounding the rights to a jury trial, juror
unanimity, grand jury indictment, and freedom from punishments
that are disproportionate is not, at present, capable of curbing legislative efforts to sidestep Apprendi's rule, and we are not inclined
to suggest radical or even significant overhaul of this doctrine. A
final source of limits on the substantive criminal law is the Due
Process Clause itself. Since the Court decided the seemingly conflicting cases of Mullaney v. Wilbur and Patterson v. New York in
the late 1970s, much ink has been spilled by scholars regarding the
question of whether the Due Process Clause in some manner prohibits legislative circumvention of Winship's requirement that
crimes be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Professor Scott
Sundby previously divided these scholars into three camps: expan2 2
sive proceduralists, restrictive proceduralists, and substantivists. 0
We will use his handy taxonomy, with some elaboration, to review
alternative existing proposals for due process limits on substantive
criminal law. None provides a satisfactory test for identifying when
legislative efforts to bypass the procedural ramifications of Apprendi are unconstitutional.

202. Scott Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, 40 HASTINGS
L.J. 457, 463 (1989) (classifying expansive proceduralists, restrictive proceduralists, and sub-

stantivists).
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Restrictive Proceduralists:Elements are what the legislature
says they are. The restrictive proceduralist position limits constitutional procedural guarantees to those facts included within the legislature's definition of a criminal offense. This describes Patterson's
reinterpretation of Mullaney,2 3 as well as the Court's decision in
Martin v. Ohio, to uphold a statute that placed on the defendant the
burden of persuasion on the issue of self-defense.20 4 This approach,
however, allows a legislature to circumvent criminal procedural
guarantees through legislative draftsmanship. While the Court
should afford substantial deference to legislative definitions of
crime, it should not give up the store. A meaningful Bill of Rights
must be enforceable by the courts.

20 5

Expansive Proceduralists:Any fact identified by the legislature as controlling the sentence is treated as an element. Expansive
207
proceduralists, represented by Scott Sundby, 2 6 Donald Dripps,
and Stephen Saltzburg, 208 argue that the Constitution demands the
application of criminal procedural guarantees to all facts designated by statute as affecting criminal liability, regardless of
whether or not those facts are designated presumptions, defenses,
or sentencing enhancers. For example, Professor Dripps argues that
the legality principle inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause prevents a state from punishing a person unless he
clearly violated positive law, and that the beyond-a-reasonabledoubt rule is needed for all facts recognized by the legislature as
affecting criminal liability or punishment to insure that there are
no unjust convictions of persons who have not violated such positive
law. Similarly, Professor Sundby argues that the presumption of

203. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 212-16 (1977).
204. Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 232 (1987).
205. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
206. See generally Sundby, supranote 202, at 465-69.
207. See generallyDonald A. Dripps, The ConstitutionalStatus of the Reasonable Doubt Rule,
75 CAL. L. REV. 1665 (1987).
208. See Stephen Saltzburg, Burden of Persuasionin Criminal Cases: Harmonizing the Views

of the Justices,20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 393 (1983) (suggesting that the requirement of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt must attach to all facts recognized by a legislature as leading to a greater
penalty, because a defendant has a liberty interest in protection against the stigmatization attached to the offense); see also Note, The Constitutionalityof Statutes PermittingIncreasedSen.
tences for Habitualor Dangerous Criminals,supra note 110, at 374-75 (describing and critiquing
this approach). See generally Knoll & Singer, supra note 12; Barbara Underwood, Thumb on the
Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299 (1977) (arguing
that the application of the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to every fact specified
by the legislature as justifying the invocation of the particular criminal sanction at issue is necessary to fulfill the rule's function-reducing erroneous convictions and symbolizing the great
significance of a criminal conviction).
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innocence extends beyond the constitutional prerequisites for assessing criminal liability, because the state creates a protected liberty interest in being free from erroneous condemnation and punishment when it provides defenses and gradations of punishment in
a criminal statute. 2 9 Justice Thomas essentially adopts this expansive proceduralist position in his Apprendi concurrence, though he
attempts to exclude penalty mitigators from constitutional proce21 0
dural protections.
To be sure, this simple rule is an attractive option, resolving
the tension between substance and procedure with logic and predictability. Once the legislature tagged a fact as having such importance that its presence or absence must lead to an increase or decrease in punishment, it would invariably create an entitlement in
the accused to have that issue resolved with the full array of criminal procedural guarantees that are constitutionally mandated. The
Pattersons of the world would have a legislatively created entitlement to be free from punishment for murder (as opposed to voluntary manslaughter) unless the government established that they
acted in the absence of heat of passion. Such an entitlement to a
certain punishment could not, this argument holds, be revoked absent the full array of criminal procedure any more than a legislatively-created civil entitlement could be revoked without procedural
21
due process. '
While recognizing the significant appeal of the expansive
proceduralist position, we reject it.212 First, as applied to sentencing

209. Sundby, supra note 202, at 491.
210. See supra notes 59-62 (discussing the difference between aggravating features and miti-

gating features). In his

cMilan dissent, Justice Stevens voiced a similar view: "Once a State

defines a criminal offense," he argued, "the Due Process Clause requires it to prove any component of the prohibited transaction that gives rise to both a special stigma and a special punishment beyond a reasonable doubt." McDfillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79. 96 (1986). He explained that "Patterson... clarified that the Due Process Clause requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of conduct which exposes a criminal defendant to greater stigma or punishment, but
does not likewise constrain state reductions of criminal penalties." Id. at 99.
211. For a collection of civil cases, see infra note 212.
212. In rejecting the expansive proceduralist position, we do not rely upon the argument that
the greater ability of the legislature to eliminate the defense or mitigating fact entirely includes
the lesser option to offer the defense or mitigator with a procedural price tag. See, e.g., Allen,

StructuringJury Decisionmaking, supranote 195, at 347 ("lfa state limits its manipulation of
burdens of persuasion to issues that need not be proved under the Eighth Amendment's proportionality standard or principles of substantive fairness imposed by due process, then whatever
the state does should be acceptable."); Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 6, at 1345 ("[T]he first fault
of this approach is its illogic.... [It] would allow the government to abolish a given ground of
exculpation, but not to retain it as an affirmative offense .... [The logic of the greater-powerincludes-the-lesser argument seems compelling."). See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process,1982 SUP. Gr. REV. 85 (arguing, in the context of procedural due process
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factors that do not raise the allowable maximum sentence, it lacks
clear support in historical practice, as discussed earlier. 213 Additionally, cases and treatises from the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries reveal that, at least for purposes of inclusion
of a fact in an indictment, judges regularly distinguished between
elements (facts that increased sentence maxima) on the one hand,
and defenses (facts that mitigated punishment or relieved a defendant of liability) on the other. 214 To be consistent with this history,
the approach would have to include a method of distinguishing as a
constitutional matter between those facts that increase punishment, and those facts that decrease punishment, and it does not.
In any event, this position, on balance, is undesirable for
purely consequentialist reasons. Modern criminal trials have
evolved in such a way that conducting them in the manner sug-

in civil claims, that where the legislature retains power to control substantive entitlements, it
ought to retain control of the process used to evaluate claims of entitlement arising under that
substantive rule).
Although this argument has thus far carried the day as a constitutional canon in the criminal
context, it has not had nearly the same success in the civil arena. Compare Pennsylvania v.
Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) (finding that, since a state has no constitutional obligation to provide
post-conviction review, the Due Process Clause does not mandate that the state supply a lawyer
to indigent defendants when it chooses to offer such relief); Bordenkirtcher v. Hayes, 434 U.S.
357 (1978) (finding that, since the government has the constitutional authority to seek the
maximum criminal penalty against the defendant, it can condition a lower sentence through plea
bargaining upon the defendant's non-assertion of his constitutional right to a jury trial); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (finding that, since a homicide defendant has no constitutional right to the extreme emotional distress defense, a state can place upon him the burden of
proof); and Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (finding that, since the defendant had no constitutional right to discretionary review by the state supreme court or the United States Supreme
Court, he had no constitutional right to appointed counsel for this review); with Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (finding that the government could not coercively condition the bonefit of a development permit on the plaintiffs dedicating a portion of her property to a storm
drainage system without asserting her constitutional right to just compensation); and Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (finding that, despite the power of states to treat
employees at-will, once the state civil service statute at issue provided that employees would be
discharged only for cause, due process required a pre-discharge hearing even though the statute
entitled them only to post-discharge review). Constitutional scholars have offered persuasive
justification for rejecting the "greater-includes-the-lesser" argument in the civil law context. See
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-16, at 744 (2d ed. 1988) (suggesting
that procedural safeguards "are ultimately more understandable as inherent in decent treatment
than as optimally designed to minimize mistakes"). See generally Douglas Laycock, Due Process
and Separationof Powers: The Effort to Make the Due Process Clause Nonjusticable, 60 TEX. L.
REv. 875 (1982) (arguing that legislative control over both substance and process makes the Due
Process Clause nonjusticiable).
213. See supra notes 21-28. Statutes that control eligibility for parole and good time may
even fall within this expansive proceduralist rule, so that the factors determining such eligibility
become elements of an offense, though historically parole eligibility has not been a question for
the jury. See Note, Statutory Structures, supranote 28, at 1151-54.
214. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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gested by the expansive proceduralists would constrict even further
the tiny percentage of those accused of crime who could realistically
take advantage of the right to insist that the government prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury. If prosecutors would have
to include in the indictment and present to the jury for a beyond-areasonable-doubt finding every affirmative defense, any statutory
exception, every statutory mitigator, and every fact presently determined by the judge at sentencing in the growing number of jurisdictions with presumptive sentencing systems (such as the
Guidelines), indictments would expand and trials would
lengthen.2 15 The system limps along at present only because fewer
than one of every ten criminal defendants goes to trial,216 and many
claim that we have not devoted sufficient resources to try even this
tiny fraction. 21 7 With a significant increase in the cost and time of
trial for any crime accompanied by legislated sentencing factors,
something would have to give. One possibility is that prosecutors
would be prompted to offer much greater incentives to defendants
to plead guilty, so that an even smaller fraction of these longer
cases need be tried. This may have the perverse effect that the
worst offenders-those with the greatest number of aggravators
that must be proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt-would
be the most attractive plea candidates, because their trials would
take the longest.
Alternatively, the "something" that might shift in response
to the inability to adjudicate defenses and sentencing factors with
less exacting procedures is the substantive law itself. In order to
avoid the procedural costs of their efforts to calibrate penalty with
culpability through defenses and sentencing controls, legislators
would have a strong incentive to repeal defenses and statutory constraints on the sentencing discretion of judges and to provide very
wide, unguided sentence ranges for every crime. 21 8 This returns us

215. Justice Breyer makes this point quite effectively in his Apprendi dissent. Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2398 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that, if the jury had to
make every one of the twenty or more factual findings that the Guidelines presently require the
judge to make, with the considerable assistance of the Presentence Report prepared by the Pro-

bation Department, at sentencing, in a bifurcated proceeding, trials would become absurdly long
and complicated).
216. See 1 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 49, § 1.3(q) at 21 & n.226 (noting that only three to
seven percent of all felony complaints are resolved by trial).

217. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counselfor the Poor:The Death Sentence Not for the Iorst
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1843-45 (1994) (lamenting inadequate
funding for indigent defense in most states).
218. See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 207-08 (1977) C'[Tjhe due process clause,
as we see it, does not put New York to the choice of abandoning [affirmative] defenses or undertaking to disprove their existence in order to convict of a crime that otherwise is within its con-
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to a regime of pure judicial discretion, where we would simply hope
that judges would use their discretionary power wisely. A primary
impetus of the sentencing reform movement over the last thirty
years was recognition that relying entirely on judicial discretion led
to gross inequalities in sentencing. Offenders who committed the
same crime received vastly different penalties depending upon the
judge, or upon factors such as gender or race.2 19 A return to unguided judicial discretion does not, in our opinion, represent progress.
Compromise Proceduralists:Enhanced procedure at sentencing. Professor Sarah Beale and other commentators advocate what
might be termed the compromise proceduralist approach, suggesting that due process compels the prosecutor to prove certain sentence enhancements by "clear and convincing" evidence, and mandates that the defendant be afforded a hearing at which he has the
opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against
him. 220 There is some reason to believe the Court may be receptive

to this rationale, although its willingness to use the procedural due
process test of Mathews v. Eldridge in the criminal setting has been
uneven. 22 1 In any event, a resolution of the debate over whether to

stitutional powers to sanction by substantial punishment.'); Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 6, at
1354.
In point of fact, however, the burden shifting defense quite generally is employed to moderate traditional rigors in the law of crimes. There is, therefore,
reason to believe that rejection of this device would result in abandonment of
the underlying substantive innovations and reversion to older and harsher
rules of penal liability.
Id.
219. See, e.g., SENATE REPORT ON THE 1984 FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINE LEGISLATION,
S. REP. NO. 98-225 (1983) (finding that the federal criminal sentencing system had the "unjustifled" and "shameful" consequence of great variation among sentences imposed by different judges
upon similarly situated defenders); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING REFORM IN THE UNITED
STATES: HISTORY, CONTENT AND EFFECTS (August 1985) (finding that similarly situated defendants in indeterminate-sentencing schemes receive widely disparate sentences); JUDGE MARVIN
E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973).
220. See Sarah Sun Beale, ProceduralIssues Raised by Guideline Sentencing: The Constitutional Significance of Single "Elements of the Offense," 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 147 (1993); see
also Professor Susan N. Herman, The Tail that Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Factfinding Under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 289 (1992).
One of the authors made a similar suggestion regarding the policing of the criminal-civil divide.
See generally Klein, supra note 78 (suggesting that the Court develop heightened procedural
protections for nominally civil actions imposing arguably punitive sanctions).
221. Compare Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992) (refusing to employ Mathews to determine whether the defendant's right to due process was violated by a state statute that placed
upon him the burden of proving his mental incompetency to stand trial); and McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) (rejecting the clear and convincing standard for proving sentence
factors, without discussing Mathews); with Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 148,
149 (1998) ("We express no view on whether some heightened standard of proof might apply to
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use Mathews to impose heightened protections at sentencing for

some facts will not help to answer whether a fact designated as a
sentencing factor or affirmative defense in a statute enacted following Apprendi must be treated as an element. 222
Expansive Substantivists: Constitutionally essential elements
for all criminal culpability. Rather than tying procedural protec-

tions to the legislature's decision to recognize a fact as relevant to
penalty, some commentators have argued that the government
must prove a given fact beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury whenever its presence or absence is constitutionally required as a condition for imposing criminal punishment. The champions of what we
call expansive substantivism include Professors Jeffries and
Stephan, who argue that substantive due process requires that all
criminal offenses include certain fundamental elements, such as
actus reus and mens rea.223 This faith in the Court's ability to fulfill
the criminal theorist's dream of determining, in the abstract, the
4
minimum components of crime appears somewhat unrealistic.2
Criminal law theorists themselves are unable to agree on the 'best"

theoretical structure for criminal law, 225 and are unable even to

sentencing determinations which bear significantly on the severity of sentences.) (citing United
States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 149 (1997), which acknowledged a circuit split regarding the
proper standard of proof for relevant conduct under the federal sentencing guidelines and listed
the cases); Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996) (finding that due process was offended by
Oklahoma's procedural rule presuming that a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial
unless he proves his incompetence by clear and convincing evidence); and Medina, 505 U.S. at
454-55 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that Mathews is particularly helpful in "the context
of modern administrative procedures" such as "the new administrative regime established by the
federal criminal sentencing guidelines"). See generally Jerold K- Israel, Free StandingDue Process and Criminal Procedure, The Supreme Court's Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript on file with author).
222. Indeed, one of us believes that identifying a middle ground between elements and nonelements requiring some processes but not others is subject to the same criticism leveled at the
Court's short-lived experiment with a middle ground between civil and criminal penalties. See,
e.g., Carol Staiker, Punishment and Procedure:Punishment Theory and the Criminal-CivilProceduralDivide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775 (1997).
223. Jeffrieis & Stephan, supranote 6, at 1347.
A constitutional policy to minimize the risk of convicting the "innocent" must be
grounded in a constitutional conception of what may constitute "guilt." Otherwise "guilt" would have to be proved with certainty, but the legislature could
define "guilt" as it pleased, and the grand ideal of individual liberty would be
reduced to an empty promise.
Id.
224. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 547 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (rejecting a system in
which the Court would "set itself up as a board of Platonic Guardians to establish rigid, binding
rules upon every small community in this large nation... . ).
225. See, e.g., GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRMUNAL LAW (1978) (identifying the German structure of criminal law theory as superior to Anglo-American theory). See generally
HYMAN GROSS, A THEORY OF CRhIINAL JUSTICE (1979) (suggesting ideals of a criminal justice
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agree on the purposes of criminal liability and punishment. 226 Aside
from the counter-majoritarian consequences of such an approach,
the Court as an institution is not well suited to resolve the philosophical, medical, and social issues necessary to develop a grand
theory regarding the constitutionally mandated components of

"crime."

The problems inherent in such an approach are best demonstrated by considering just one small incursion into substantive
criminal law-the requirement that the actus reus of a crime be
committed voluntarily. If the Court were to constitutionalize a re-

quirement of voluntariness, it would, in subsequent cases, be forced
to define it. Are acts committed while sleepwalking, while under

hypnosis, 227 while suffering from "confusional arousal syndrome," 228
or while unconscious 229 committed voluntarily? Issues such as the
extent of the human capacity for free will, whether there is an aggression gene at the root of crimes of violence, 23 0 and whether suf-

system); Paul H. Robinson, CriminalLaw Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
199 (1982) (suggesting a five-tiered conceptual framework for a system of criminal defenses).
226. See, e.g., CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 11 (Henry Peolucci
trans., 1936) (arguing that punishment is necessary only to protect public security); JEREMY
BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 170-203 (1789) (arguing that doter.
rence provides justification for the imposition of punishment); GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH
HEGEL, HEGE.'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 97 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford 1967) ("A crime... is
something negative, so that its punishment is only a negation of the negation."); SANFORD H.
KADISH, BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 22-34 (1987) (decrying adverse
consequences of using the criminal law to enforce morality, provide social services, and avoid
restraints on law enforcement); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 100
(John Ladd trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1965) ("Judicial punishment can never be used merely as a
means to promote some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society .... The law concerning punishment is a categorical imperative.'); KARL MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF
PUNISHMENT (1968) (suggesting that rehabilitation should be the aim of criminal punishment);
HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 48-49 (1976) (advocating a modem version of the
retributive argument, in the tradition of Kant and Hegel, by suggesting that punishment expresses respect for the criminal's autonomous choices); BARBARA WOOTrON, CRIME AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW (1963) (arguing that the ultimate aim of punishment is rehabilitation); Kent
Greenawalt, Punishment, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1336, 1340 (Sanford Kadish, ed., 1983) (arguing that the justification for punishment is to "reinforce community norms by
affecting the dictates of individual consciences"); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal
Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401 (1958) (suggesting that the purpose of criminal law is to
express the community's moral condemnation of particular conduct); see also Paul W. Tappan,
Sentencing Under the Model Penal Code, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 528, 532-34 (1958) (noting
that "even the basic objectives of correction raise dispute among reputable authorities," and
describing the "contrariety of expert opinion about sentencing procedures and their effects').
227. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2)(c) (Official Draft 1985) (providing that conduct under
hypnosis is not a voluntary act).
228. People v. Cegars, 7 Cal. App. 4th 988, 1000 (1992).
229. State v. Mercer, 165 S.E.2d 328, 336 (N.C. 1969).
230. See, e.g., STEVEN J. GOULD, MISMEASURE OF MAN 151-75 (1996) (debunking "projects"
purporting to find biological causes of violence); STEVEN ROSE, LIFELINES (1998) (critiquing
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fering abuse as a child leads to adult criminal behavior 31 are matters suited for robust democratic debate in a legislative body. It is
surely for this reason that the plurality opinion in Powell v. Texaswhich upheld a Texas statute punishing a defendant for being
found in a state of intoxication in a public place2-3-limited the
holding in Robinson v. California 33 to an Eighth Amendment ban
on punishing status. "Unless Robinson is so viewed," the plurality
in Powell observed, "it is difficult to see any limiting principle that
would serve to prevent this Court from becoming, under the aegis of
the cruel and unusual punishments clause, the ultimate arbiter of
the standards of criminal responsibility, in diverse areas of the
criminal law, throughout the country."234

studies purporting to find biological or medical causes of violent behavior); Carolyn Abraham,
Doctor Pinpoints Key to the Criminal AlTid, Research Cites Damage to Brain's Frontal Lobes,
GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto, Canada), March 22, 2000, at Al (citing twenty years of research by Dr.
Daniel Tranel, neuropsychologist at the University of Iowa, suggesting that injury to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex results in anti-social and violent behavior); Adrian Rain, NEW
SCIENTIST, May 13, 2000, availableat httpi/ wn..newscientisLcom/opinion223819.html (arguing that biology turns certain individuals into rapists and serial killers).
231. Phyllis L Crocker, ChildhoodAbuse and Adult Murder: Implicationsfor the Death Penalty, 77 N.C. L REV. 1143, 1158 (1999) (citing medical literature to support the contention that
"strong evidence exists that a person who was abused as a child is at risk of suffering long-term
effects that may contribute to his violent behavior as an adult").
232. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535 (1968).
233. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that punishing for addiction,
which is "apparently an illness which may be contracted innocently or involuntarily," violates the
Eighth Amendments Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, because "even one day in prison
would be cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold").
234. Powell, 392 U.S. at 514 (plurality opinion). A head count shows that five justices in
Powell believed that the concept of voluntariness had been constitutionalized. Four justices in
dissent believed that Mr. Powell's conviction should have been reversed because Robinson stood
for the principle that "criminal penalties may not be inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is powerless to change." Id. at 533 (Fortas, J., dissenting). While Justice White concurred
with the plurality in the outcome of upholding the conviction, he agreed with the dissenters that,
if it cannot be a crime to be addicted to narcotics, "I do not see how it can constitutionally be a
crime to yield to such a compulsion." Id. at 548 (White, J., concurring). However, Justice W1hite
found that, even if Powell was a chronic alcoholic with a compulsion to drink, nothing in the
record supported the defense's conclusion that he had a compulsion to frequent public places
when intoxicated.
The Court had earlier rejected the similar argument that due process prohibited states from
punishing those acting under an "irresistible impulse." In Leland v. Oregon, the Court refused to
require Oregon to define legal insanity to include not only the inability to distinguish right from
wrong, but also the inability to control one's behavior. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
The Court noted that "the choice of a test of legal insanity involves not only scientific knowledge
but questions of basic policy as to the extent to which that knowledge should determine criminal
responsibility." Id. at 800-01. Despite five votes to constitutionalize a requirement of voluntariness, conventional wisdom today is that a defendant may be punished for an involuntary act.
See, e.g., Richard Singer & Douglas Husak, Of Innocence and Innocents: The Supreme Court
Mens Rea Since HerbertPacker,1997 BUFF. CRIM. L REV. 68, 70 n.19.
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Even mens rea, a notion "as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and of
consequent ability and duty of normal individuals to choose between good and evil," 235 has not been entrenched as an essential
element of every crime under the Constitution. 236 Instead, the Court
has blessed strict liability crimes, 237 though it has curbed the worst
excesses via statutory interpretation. 23 8 While scholars vehemently
230
denounce the propriety of criminal liability without mens rea,

235. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
236. Lambert v. California,the only case in which the Court overturned a conviction on strict
liability grounds, did indeed "turn out to be an isolated deviation... a derelict on the waters of
the law." Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 232 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (striking
down a statue imposing criminal liability for being in Los Angeles and failing to register as a
felon); see also GEORGE DIX & M. MICHAEL SHARLOT, TEACHER'S MANUAL TO CRIMINAL LAW 14950 (4th ed. 1996) (suggesting that Lambert is best explained as a case involving the unreasonable
search and seizure of an attorney's African-American secretary, that simply required reversal,
except that Mapp's application of the exclusionary rule to the states did not yet exist); Allen C.
Michaels, ConstitutionalInnocence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 828 (1999) (suggesting that strict liability
crimes will be upheld as constitutional unless the non-strict liability elements of the offense
could not themselves be criminalized without violating another clause of the Constitution, and
interpreting Lambert as a right to travel case).
237. See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673-74 (1974) (involving a potential oneyear imprisonment for first offense and three-year imprisonment for second offense for violation
of § 301(k) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act); United States v. Int'l Minerals and
Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 564-65 (1971) (involving the strict liability felony of undocumented
shipping of acids); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607 (1971) (involving a maximum pen.
alty of ten-year imprisonment and/or $10,000 fine for possession of a hand grenade); United
States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 (1922) (involving a potential five-year imprisonment for sale
of opium and cocoa leaves not pursuant to an I.R.S. order form); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minne.
sota, 218 U.S. 57, 70 (1910) (upholding a strict liability felony with a fine of up to $1,000 and/or
imprisonment of up to two years).
238. See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1994) (interpreting the
Protection of Children Against Exploitation Act of 1977 to require that the defendant be aware
that the person depicted was a minor); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 616 (1994) (reading the National Firearms Act prohibiting possession of an unregistered machine gun to require
that the defendant know that his AR-15 assault rifle was an automatic weapon); Ratzlaf v.
United States, 510 U.S. 135, 149 (1994) (interpreting 31 U.S.C. § 5322 as requiring that the
defendant knew that the structuring was unlawful); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426
(1985) (interpreting a statute criminalizing the unauthorized acquisition and possession of food
stamps as requiring proof that the defendant knew his possession was unauthorized); Morissetto
v. United States, 342 U.S. at 252-56 (interpreting a theft of government property statute as
requiring that the defendant knew that the spent casings were the property of the federal government rather than abandoned property); see also John Shepard Wiley, Jr., The New Federal
Defense, Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal CriminalInterpretation,
85 VA. L. REV. 1021 (1999) (concluding that this method of statutory interpretation in federal
criminal cases all but eliminates strict liability crimes).
239. See generally FLETCHER, supra note 225, §§ 9.3.3-.4, at 729-36; Henry M. Hart, Jr., The
Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 422-25 (1958); Sanford H. Kadish,
Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 257, 267-69 (1987); Herbert Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme
Court, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 107; Alan Saltzman, Strict Criminal Liability and the United States
Constitution: Substantive Criminal Law and Due Process, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1571, 1592-615
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certain strict liability crimes with a long pedigree retain popular
support 240 and should probably remain constitutional.
The few attempts by the Court to develop a grand theory of
substantive criminal law have fallen flat and have been quickly
abandoned. We have already discussed the Court's retreat from
Robinson two years later in Powell.241 Additional examples abound.
The Court in United States v. Halper offered a comprehensive theory aimed at distinguishing civil from criminal penalties. 242 "[A]
civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial
purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment."24 3 Finding it difficult to identify criminal punishment by using deterrent purpose,
the Court began backpedaling and completed its retreat with Hudson v. United States.244 The Court had done precisely this same
thing in the burden of proof cases, which tested statutes that attempted partial rather than total circumvention of the process
guarantees reserved for criminal cases. The actual holding in Mullaney v. Wilbur was that due process was offended by shifting the
burden of proving the absence of heat of passion to the defendant
because "criminal law is concerned not only with guilt or innocence
245
in the abstract but also with the degree of criminal culpability."
The retreat from this position in the form of a reinterpretation of

(1974); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05, cmt., at 282 (1985); Peter Buscemi, Conspiracy.

Statutory Reform Since the Mfodel Penal Code, 75 COLUM. L REV. 1122, 1152 (1975). But see
Mark Kelman, InterpretiveConstruction in the Substantive CriminalLaw, 33 STAN. L REV. 591
(1981).
240. For example, one study suggests that the public overwhelmingly supports the felony.
murder doctrine. See David Crump & Susan Waite Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder
Doctrine,9 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 259 (1985) (analyzing a national survey of crimes conducted
by the Bureau of Justice Standards of the United States Department of Justice). The same is
true for statutory rape, a traditional strict liability crime. See, eg., Jenkins v. State, 877 P.2d
1063 (Nev. 1994). But see State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836 (Alaska 1978) (requiring criminal intent
in a statutory rape case). See PAUL ROBINSON & JOHN L DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND
BLAME (1975) (surveying public attitudes regarding criminal offenses, and suggesting that definitions of crime cannot stray too far from public sentiment).
241. See supranotes 227-35 and accompanying text.
242. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989).
243. Id.; see also Dep't of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 777 n.4, 784 (1994) (finding
that a state tax on marijuana after criminal conviction for the same offense was barred by the
Double Jeopardy Clause); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1993) (finding that civil
in rem forfeitures under the federal controlled substances statutes are punitive for purposes of
the Excessive Fines Clause).
244. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 105 (1997) (finding that civil sanctions may also
serve a deterrent purpose); see also United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 354 (1995); United
States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 284-85 (1996).
245. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697 (1975).
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Mullaney came two years later in Patterson v. New York. 246 Imposition of a uniform theory regarding what must be contained in the
definition of a crime strangles experimentation and evolution.
Mandating top-down global change even on a small part of a system
as complex and interrelated as criminal law and procedure affects
247
the system as a whole, often in unexpected ways.
Restrictive Substantivists: Crime-specific trumping of legislative labels. We call the final category of scholars restrictive substantivists. These scholars believe that the legislature is supreme
in defining substantive criminal law except in the rare case, though
they disagree as to what that rare case is. Professor Louis Bilionis
believes that the Court should trump legislative choice in matters
of substantive criminal law only when the democratic process
breaks down, 248 though he does not pinpoint exactly how the Court
can recognize such a phenomenon. Professor William Stuntz has
advocated invigorating judicial constraint of legislative excesses by
constitutionalizing both a limited mens rea requirement and the
249
doctrine of desuetude.
Although the proposal advanced in this Article would not go
nearly as far in restraining legislative experiments as that proposed by Professor Stuntz, nor, probably, the proposal of Professor
Bilionis, we nonetheless place ourselves in this category. Some of
the criticisms leveled against the expansive substantivists are applicable to any test, including ours, which requires judges to substitute a legal standard for legislative choice. We note, however, that
there are significant differences that soften the impact of these
criticisms. The expansive substantivist position constitutionalizes
certain elements of all criminal offenses, and thus straightjackets
the states with a set of inflexible rules. Our proposed test does not

246. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
247. See Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 111, at 1187-202. See generally Stuntz, Substance,
Process, and the Civil-CriminalLine, supranote 6.
248. Bilionis, supranote 82 (suggesting that the criminal process breaks down in the absonco
of deliberative legislative choices or where there is dysfunction in political or institutional safo.
guards).
249. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and Civil-CriminalDivide, supra note 6, at 33 (advocating
that courts require proof of "negligence as to illegality where the relevant criminal statute prohibits conduct that is not obviously wrongful," and disallow prosecutions under statutes that
criminalize behavior "ordinary people do not see as crim[inal]," unless the state can show "regular nonstrategic enforcement, enforcement aimed at the conduct specified in the crime rather
than at something else"). We include Professor Stuntz's work in this category because his proposal is jurisdiction-specific, requiring an inquiry into the particular practices of an individual
legislature and state law enforcement system, and because his mens rea requirement is moro
limited than those advanced by others.
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require the Court to identify the constitutive components of all
crimes. Rather, it is steeped, to the extent possible, in objective factors such as history; it is sensitive to individual offenses; and it is
drawn from the law that has evolved as courts have interpreted
specific constitutional provisions.
B. A ProposedMulti-FactorTest
This survey of possible limits on a legislature's ability to
designate a fact as something other than an element reveals several
recurring themes. First, some outer limit on the substantive criminal law is necessary in order to prevent legislatures from bypassing
criminal procedure guarantees wholesale. Procedure and substance
are inexorably linked, and Apprendi suggests the importance of
keeping that link secure.
Second, avoiding the complete abdication to legislatures of
control over the substantive criminal law protects a variety of constitutional values. While the right to a jury determination of criminal guilt does not include the right to a jury determination of penalty, the narrower the offense and the broader the sentence range,
the farther the jury is moved from its potential position as a safeguard between an individual and abuse of the criminal process, and
the closer it gets to being a 'low-level gatekeep[er]."2 5 0 Every expansion of an element such that it can be accomplished by different
means makes it more likely that jurors disagree as to "whether a
defendant has engaged in conduct that violates the law."251 Every
shift in the burden of proof from the government to the defendant
increases "the risk of convictions resting on factual error."' 2 Each
time a legislature chooses to accommodate degrees of culpability by
expanding the sentence range for a crime rather than by creating
multiple graded offenses, there is less "proportionality" between the
maximum penalty and the base offense.2 3 The test proposed here
incorporates each of these different yet important values as factors,

250. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
251. Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 818 (1999).
252. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
253. It has been suggested to us that, since different criminal procedural guarantees protect
different values, we ought to construct a different test for the constitutionality of an evasion
statute based upon which criminal procedural guarantee is evaded. We decline to do this, both
because it is too complicated, and, more importantly, because the Court will never accept it. The
Court uses the word "element" interchangeably, regardless of whether it is referring to a fact
that must be pled in a grand jury indictment, submitted to a jury, or proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, included. The Court is unlikely to "redo" this case law and redefine "element" for each
context
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rather than formulating a one-size-fits-all litmus test for unconstitutionality. Each of the factors identified deserves consideration,
and no single factor should be determinative. Nor will every factor
apply to every challenged statute. The concept of element is too
bound up with individual procedural protections to be defined in
the abstract, or to be divorced from the considerations that have
shaped those individual guarantees. It is, at the same time, too
pervasive a concept in the criminal process to be defined differently
depending upon which textual provision a particular litigant happens to champion.
Past efforts to find constitutional limits on substantive
criminal law have taught a third lesson-the importance of incremental limits. Legislative freedom to accommodate the criminal law
to the times should remain unconstrained except in the most extreme circumstances. Identifying those circumstances through the
common-law process, one case at a time, has proved the more durable approach in clarifying the civil/criminal line. This suggests that
a similar analysis would be appropriate when defining the distinction between elements and non-elements. Consequently, the test
here leaves undisturbed all but the most unusual and startling offense-penalty combinations. This is disappointing to those who
would rein in the punitive trends in criminal law. But, to quote Justice Stevens in Apprendi, "This is as it should be. '' 25 4 Too much
regulation of the evolution of criminal law by courts would stunt
the ability of legislatures to fulfill their representative function, to
respond to the evolving nature of the procedural guarantees themselves, 255 as well as to the changing social, political, and economic
influences that shape both criminal law and criminal procedure.
Due process must bar only those statutory formulations of crimes
that profoundly disturb our deepest notions of fairness. The best
that one can do to articulate what that means is to cobble together
those factors that have mattered most to courts forced to answer
this question over the years and to identify factors that will best
protect the values safeguarded by the Bill of Rights in criminal
cases.
The most useful and well-worn guide to constitutional
meaning here is tradition. Not surprisingly, the Court in each of the
opinions discussed above relied heavily on common-law definitions

254. See supranote 72 and accompanying text.
255. See Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship,supranote 6.
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of crime and punishment. 256 It makes sense to turn to historical
practice for answers to this difficult question. If for centuries in
American law a given fact was treated as an element of a certain
offense, a statute that eliminates that fact from the offense definition and shifts it to a defense, or shifts it to sentencing, deserves
further scrutiny.257 To be sure, the historical inquiry is not limited
to divining the intent of the Framers on a particular point of substantive criminal law. Instead, the question should resemble that
asked in Schad, which was whether a "State's particular way of defining a crime has a long history, or is in widespread use," or
rather, whether it is a "freakish definition of the elements of a
crime that finds no analogue in history or in the criminal law of
other jurisdictions." 258 For crimes with no common-law or wellestablished analogue, courts must rely on considerations other than
historical comparison.
A second factor is based upon the distinction at common law
between a misdemeanor and a felony. This distinction has traditionally determined the process provided to the accused. For example, only a felony was serious enough to warrant capital punishment and to require grand jury indictment. Courts should consider
whether the statutory offense in question reclassifies a traditional
misdemeanor offense as a felony. Specifically, courts should be cautious when a statute collapses both petty and serious crime into one

256. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2355-60 (2000); Jones v. United States,

526 U.S. 227, 244(1999); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 148, 243 (1998); Schad v.
Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 640 (1991); Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 235 (1987); Mc1illan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 90 (1986); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977); Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 692 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970); Kennedy v. Mendoza.
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 170 n.23 (1963); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 800 (1952). For an
extensive discussion and analysis of the use of history in defining "free-standing" due process in
criminal proceedings, see Israel, supranote 221, at 119-34.
257. Lower courts, too, rely on history as a guide to when a fact must be treated as an element. See, e.g., State v. Eagle, 994 P.2d 395, 398 (Ariz. 2000) (rejecting a challenge to a kidnapping statute that set penalty at second-degree felony, then provided that, if the victim was released without physical injury, the penalty would be lower, except if the victim was less than
fifteen years old). The scheme at issue in Eagle essentially created the crime of kidnapping up to
second degree, but allowed mitigation to a lesser penalty if the victim was over fifteen and released. The court looked at whether release was typically an element of kidnapping. Citing
cases from other states, it noted that, "[a]t common law, kidnapping involved the forcible taking
of a person .... [and] movement or confinement of the victim," and it also observed that some
states have added release or injury as elements, but that this is not consistent with the commonlaw view. Id. at 399.
258. Schad, 501 U.S. at 640; see also Patterson,432 U.S. at 226-27 (noting that due process
requires prosecutors to bear the burden of proving a factor if "the factor at issue makes a substantial difference in punishment and stigma" and if, "in the Anglo-American legal tradition[,]
the factor in question historically has held that level of importance"); Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516, 528-32 (1884).
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offense carrying a very large sentencing range. The elements of the
former misdemeanor would become the only facts submitted to the
jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the government
would escape criminal procedural requirements for those facts that
traditionally had been treated as elements of a separate felony.
Such a scenario is more than hypothetical. A number of jurisdictions presently have statutes that combine in a single statutory
provision a misdemeanor offense with more serious felony
conduct. 259 After Apprendi, such provisions must be considered a
series of separate offenses. Nevertheless, a legislature could preserve judicial adjudication of aggravating facts by providing in a
new statute that, upon conviction of the least aggravated version of
the offense (the former misdemeanor), the defendant faces a maximum penalty high enough to accommodate the most aggravated
version of the offense. 260 A legislature, of course, does not violate
the Constitution whenever it reclassifies a petty offense as a felony.
There are a number of good reasons a legislature might choose to do
so. We merely suggest that courts, in passing upon the constitutionality of a criminal statute, should consider this, along with historical treatment of the offense and the other factors that follow.
Third, Schad warns against the blending of historically distinct crimes into one element, and criminal offense definitions may
occasionally tread over this line (as the Court suggested in
Richardson). While legislatures reacting to Apprendi are no more
likely to enact such statutes than they were before the case was decided, one option a legislature might pursue in order to reduce the

259. For example, the misdemeanor failure to stop when signaled by an officer is transformed into a felony failure to stop when it results in great bodily injury. See generally United
States v. Davis, 184 F.3d 366 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding that S.C. CODE ANN. § 56.5-750 failure to
stop, which is a misdemeanor carrying a ninety-day to three-year sentence, also provides a felony
ten-year sentence where the driver also causes great bodily injury); State v. Morton, No. C-

980391, 1999 WL 252631 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 30, 1999) (unpublished opinion) (interpreting OHIO
REV. CODE § 2921.331(b)-(c)(2) as providing that it is a misdemeanor to fail to stop for an officer,
but that it is a felony if injury to a person or property results), and misdemeanor theft is trans-

formed into a felony theft when the property stolen is sufficiently valuable, see TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN.

§

31.03 (Vernon Supp. 2000) (providing that it is a criminal offense for a person to "unlaw.

fully appropriate property with intent to deprive the owner of property," with maximum penalties ranging from a $4,000 fine to life imprisonment based primarily upon the amount of the
theft). See infraAppendix C.

260. For example, the Texas legislature could consolidate theft into a single "nested" provision with a high maximum penalty, thus effectively avoiding jury review of the facts separating

the former Class C misdemeanor leading to a nominal fine (where theft involved less than $50)
from the former first-degree felony leading to life imprisonment (when the theft involved at least
$200,000). TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(e) (Vernon Supp. 2000); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§§ 12.21-12.35 (Vernon 1994) (penalty provisions).
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burden on the government would be to bypass the unanimity requirement and allow a single element to be established by one of
several alternative facts.
Fourth, no gauge of the constitutionality of a criminal statute is complete without some evaluation of whether the punishment
it imposes is either cruel and unusual or excessive under the Eighth
Amendment. The citations in Apprendi to Mullaney and Patterson
rather than to Harmelin and Solem suggest that it was not proportionality the Court was worried about but rather the outer limits of
due process past which legislatures dare not tread. Still, it is not
easy to explain the references to "generally proportional" and
"harsh legislative action' '2 61 as anything but invocations of Eighth
Amendment concepts, concepts which must at least inform the due
process calculus applied when assessing whether an offense definition lacks an essential element.
Fifth, and closely related to the last factor, is the penalty
range specified for the offense by the legislature. When a defendant,
upon the finding of a fact at sentencing, can receive a penalty two
or three times as severe as the sentence authorized without the
fact, a court may conclude that such a fact is much more important
than its legislative designation indicates. The fact is the "tail which
wags the dog," to use the phrase employed by the Court in McMillan.262 Particularly suspect would be a legislative scheme that creates a new statute with a high maximum sentence and a wide penalty range but which retains the prior lesser offense with the much
263
lower penalty maximum.

261. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2363 n.16.
262. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79,88 (1986).
263. By preserving the lower penalty option, the legislature itself has indicated that the large
maximum penalty is not the appropriate one. Prosecutors may prefer the flexibility provided by
two grossly disparate penalties for the very same conduct, as this scheme provides more charging
and bargaining options. Moreover, if a legislature raises statutory maxima instead of creating
separate offenses, there will be far fewer "different" offenses, and hence fewer possibilities for
successive prosecutions under the Court's present "same elements" double jeopardy test. For
example, if every increased penalty under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(l)-(6) (violent crime in aid of racketeering activities) is treated as a separate offense, the government could prosecute the defendant

at least six times (once for attempting to maim, a second time for attempting to murder, a third
time for threatening to commit a violent crime, a fourth time for assaulting with a dangerous
weapon, a fifth time for maiming, and a sixth time for murder). See United States v. Dixon, 592
F.2d 329 (6th Cir. 1979).

If Congress makes this a single offense with a maximum penalty of

death, in order to avoid the consequences of the Apprendi rule, a defendant could be tried only
once for any of the above acts. Cf. Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000) (defendant un-

successfully argued that property value was a sentencing factor and not an element of bank
larceny, that bank larceny was thus a lesser included offense of bank robbery, and that the jury
should have been instructed on it).
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Sixth, courts should closely examine true strict liability
statutes
proof of
ness, or
tencing,

carrying felony penalties and statutes dispensing with
a voluntary act. The elimination of mens rea or voluntarithe shift of these features to affirmative defenses or senespecially when inconsistent with the common-law ana-

due proclogue of the offense, while not in itself sufficient to violate
264

ess, should prompt close examination of the statute.
Finally, a word about legislative purpose. The Court has considered legislative motive relevant when policing legislative decisions to classify a given penalty as civil or criminal, in the burdenshifting cases, and in Apprendi itself.265 Moreover, legislative purpose has intuitive appeal as a factor to consider when evaluating
the constitutionality of a criminal statute that eliminates from an
offense definition what under a former statute would have been
treated as an element after Apprendi. For example, consider two
hypothetical statutes based upon 18 U.S.C. § 2119, as described in

264. See supra notes 227-41 and accompanying text (discussing strict liability and voluntari.
ness).
265. In Apprendi, the Court made it a point to specify the relevance of purpose analysis in
evaluating the constitutionality of legislative reaction to its holding, noting that it would be
required to question the constitutionality of the dissent's predicted "extensive revision of the
State's entire criminal code," if it were "enacted for the purpose the dissent suggests." Apprendi,
120 S. Ct. at 2363 (emphasis added); see also Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 836 (1999)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that, unlike an habitual criminal statute, "the sole element of
which was the existence of a series of crimes without a requirement of jury unanimity on any
underlying offense," the CCE statute in Richardson "does not represent an end run around the
Constitution's jury unanimity requirement, for Congress had a sound basis for defining the ele.
ments as it did: to punish those who act as drug kingpins"); Almendarez-Torres v. United States,
523 U.S. 224, 245 (1998) ("The relevant statutory provisions do not change a pre-existing defini.
tion of a well-established crime, nor is there any more reason here than in McMillan to think
Congress intended to 'evade' the Constitution, either by 'presuming' guilt or 'restructuring' the
elements of an offense."); United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996) (considering whether the
statutory scheme at issue was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate Congress' intention to establish a civil remedial mechanism, and finding that forfeiture statutes "serve important non-punitive goals"); United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 55-56
(1993) (striking down a section of a statute authorizing ex parte seizure of real property, because
protection of an adversarial hearing "is of particular importance here, where the government has
a direct pecuniary interest" in the outcome of the proceeding); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S.
602, 620 (1993) (holding that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment applied to
civil in rem forfeiture of real property and conveyances that facilitated a drug related crime because, despite the legislature's label, the 'legislative history of § 881 confirms the punitive nature of the provisions"); McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87-88 ("[T]he specter raised by petitioners of
States restructuring existing crimes in order to 'evade' the commands of Winship just does not
appear in this case."); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963) (listing a number
of factors that "must be considered," it reasoned, "absent conclusive evidence of congressional
intent as to the penal nature of a statute," and rejecting the dissent's warning that inquiry into
Congressional motives is "a dubious affair indeed," and that it was wrong to hope that "the underlying purpose" could be "refined to the point of isolating one single, precise objective").
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Jones v. United States.266 In hypothetical number one, Congress
immediately reacts to the Jones and Apprendi cases by increasing
the maximum penalty for carjacking to life imprisonment, but caps
the sentence at twenty-five years if the victim is not killed, and at
fifteen years if no victim suffers serious bodily injury. In hypothetical number two, there was no carjacking statute prior to Apprendi,
and Congress for the first time creates the identical carjacking
statute described in hypothetical number one. Some may find statute number one more troubling than statute number two because
they suspect that Congress redrafted the statute in hypothetical
number one for the express purpose of avoiding the necessity of including the facts of serious bodily injury and death in the indictment and proving those facts to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
We reject, however, the use of legislative motive to assess
the constitutionality of criminal statutes. The constitutionality of
the statute in the first hypothetical above should not depend upon
why one or more Representatives or Senators voted for its passage.
Purpose analysis has been reviled as indeterminate, illogical, and
futile by many academics and judges for good reason. 2G7 Reliance on
legislative purpose would mean that the very same criminal law
might be unconstitutional due to bad motive in one state, but upheld as constitutional in the absence of bad motive in another state.
Defining which legislative motives for crafting crimes and punishments undercut the constitutionality of criminal law is more difficult than articulating illicit purposes in the context of Equal Protection, First Amendment, or Commerce Clause challenges. 268

266. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
267. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 558 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968) ("The Court will not strike down an otherwise

constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive."); TRIBE, supra note
212, § 3-2, at 24.

[I]f a government-enacted rule is constitutionally inoffensive both on its face
and as applied to the particular individual challenging it, the fact that the rule
would not have been promulgated . . . but for the enacting body's desire to
achieve a constitutionally forbidden result tells us nothing more than that the
government body engaged in an unsuccessful attempt to violate the Constitution.
Id. See generally Larry Alexander, Affirmatiue Action and Legislative Purpose, 107 YALE L.J.
2679 (1998).
268. In those contexts, there is at least a shaky consensus on what kinds of reasons or pur-

poses the Constitution forbids; the government may not censor ideas because it disapproves of
those messages, nor discriminate among people on the basis of race, nor seek to promote or restrict a religion, nor seek protectionist ends. In the context of crime, the Court has permitted the
legislature to burden intentionally a constitutional protection that a defendant would otherwise
receive. After all, the Court has upheld a sentencing scheme that was designed to encourage
defendants to plead guilty and not to insist on trial; along with its decision to uphold jury waiver,
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Moreover, purpose evidence is so easy to manipulate that due process would become little more than instructions on manners. 269 Finally, a defendant's interest in having a grand jury and trial jury
stand between her and the government's curtailment of her liberty,
her interest in being free from disproportionate punishment, and
her interest in having the risk of factual error rest with the government do not change depending upon whether the legislature is
infringing upon these interests intentionally or unintentionally.
The other factors of our proposed test which are designed to determine when legislative substantive law reform unfairly impinges
upon procedural values actually do a pretty fair job of ferreting out
bad legislative motive. When legislatures jettison history, ratchet
misdemeanors up to felonies, blend historically distinct crimes, and
create wide sentencing ranges, these acts indicate a motive to bypass procedural guarantees. Thus, the test reaches this behavior
without the many drawbacks of inquiring into legislative intent.
C. Applying the ProposedTest: Outer Limits
We readily admit that our multi-factor test for determining
the constitutionality of criminal statutes will not yield wholly predictable results. Even judges and legislators who agree about the
historical background of an offense may often weigh each factor differently. However, the test will in all likelihood prohibit the worst
legislative excesses, and this is as far as the Court should intrude
upon the supremacy of the legislature in defining substantive
criminal law.
This point is best demonstrated by applying the test to a
number of hypothetical statutes. Several statutes have already
been discussed which would withstand scrutiny under this test.270
Consider now a state's effort to preserve judicial adjudication of
grading facts in a nested petty/grand theft statute, with penalties
ranging from a nominal fine to life imprisonment, depending upon

the Court's tacit approval on this front has contributed to plea-bargaining's serious and seemingly irreversible erosion of the right to a jury trial. See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212
(1978); see also 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 49, at 33-36.
269. Elena Kagen, PrivateSpeech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 439 (1996) (finding that the problem of futility
arises only because legislators, at any time, can feign a purpose they do not have); see also
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (noting that a motive test to assess constitutionality is
one that will lead to its own obsolescence because the legislature will never provide evidence of
motivation).
270. See supra note 94 and text following note 201.
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the value of the property stolen. 271 Assume further that the state
wishes after Apprendi to continue to avoid charging and proving to
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt the value of stolen property, while
preserving a tight rein on the sentence that a judge may impose for
thefts of differing degrees. Thus the state enacts felony theft, a new
statute, with a maximum penalty of life imprisonment with the
possibility of parole, but it requires the judge to mitigate the sentence to no more than twenty years if the defendant can establish
that the value of the property stolen was less than $200,000; to no'
more than ten years for property valued at less than $100,000; to no
more than two years for amounts less than $20,000; to no more
than one year for amounts less than $1500; and to no more than a
fine if the defendant can show that the value of the property was
less than $50.
This statute should be found unconstitutional under our
multi-factor test. The first and second factors weigh against it.
Value in theft statutes has historically been considered an element,
and the value of the property is what distinguished misdemeanor
from felony thefts at common law. 272 Those factors alone, however,
are insufficient unless the Constitution simply freezes crimes into
their nineteenth-century forms. Our fourth factor, proportionality,
is particularly troubling here. While some might rationally conclude
that petty thieves deserve life imprisonment, or that such a steep
penalty is necessary for general deterrence, this would certainly be
at the margin of what the Eighth Amendment allows. The sixth factor likewise should cause concern, because the penalty range of a
fine without jail time to life imprisonment is striking.
As another example of a statute that would probably test
constitutional limits, consider a legislative definition of an offense
called "felonious injury" that 1) is broad enough to encompass every
infliction of harm by one person upon another; 2) carries a maximum sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole; but 3)
provides for a decreased sentence if the defendant can show that he
did not act intentionally or knowingly and for further decreases if
he can show that "he did not rob, rape, or kill his victim during the

271. See TE)L PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(e) (Vernon Supp. 2000) (providing that theft is a
Class C misdemeanor if it involves less than $50; that the offense is a state jail felony if the
property is stolen from the person of another or from a corpse; that the offense is a second degree
felony if the property stolen is worth $20,000 or more, the defendant was a public servant, and
the property came into his custody by virtue of that status; and that the offense is a first degree

felony where the theft involved at least $200,000).
272. See supranote 14.
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commission of the offense. '273 This hypothetical statute should also
be stricken under our proposed test for slightly different reasons.
Admittedly, a state might rationally conclude that physical assaults
have become a sufficiently grave problem to merit this severe sanction. If this hypothetical felony assault statute is unconstitutional,
it is not because of disproportionality. Other factors instead weigh
in against it: Simple assault was classified at common law as a
misdemeanor rather than a felony; 274 the extent of the victim's injury was traditionally considered an element of this kind of criminal offense; the statute includes strict liability, at least as to the
extent of injury; and the offense combines what historically had
been treated as separate offenses into one offense.
CONCLUSION
It is not surprising that the United States Supreme Court
has once again announced a decision that restricts Congressional
experimentation in crime and punishment, and that will prompt
considerable backing and filling in the offices of United States Attorneys and our elected federal representatives. But Apprendi does
much more than constrain Congressional excess. It reasserts constitutional limits on state power in the definition of crime, an area
that lies at the very core of state autonomy. Even in this age of
states' rights, the Court in Apprendi recognized that the ability of
the law to ensure that the procedural rights of the accused are re-

273. This is a variant of a hypothetical offered in McMillan. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477

U.S. 79, 102 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Similar hypotheticals have been posited by the
justices and scholars. See Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 737 (1998).
Suppose that a State repealed all of the violent crimes in its criminal code and
replaced them with only one offense, "[purposefully] causing injury to another,"
bearing a penalty of 30 days in prison, but subject to a series of "sentencing enhancements" authorizing additional punishment up to life imprisonment or
death on the basis of various levels of mens rea, severity of injury, and other
surrounding circumstances. Could the state then grant the defendant a jury
trial, with requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, solely on the question whether he "knowingly cause[d] injury to another," but leave it for the
judge to determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether the defendant
acted intentionally or accidentally, whether he used a deadly weapon, and
whether the victim ultimately died from the injury the defendant inflicted?
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698-99 (1975) ("[As] an
extreme example ...Maine could impose a life sentence for any felonious homicide-even one
that traditionally might be considered involuntary manslaughter-unless the defendant was able
to prove that his act was neither intentional nor criminally reckless.") (emphasis in original);
Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 6, at 1358.
274. See the authority collected in Rogers v. Commonwealth. Rogers v. Commonwealth, 5
Serg. & Rawle 462 (Pa. 1820) (noting that infamous penalties were restricted to assaults attended with an intent to murder or some gross attempt on the person).
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spected in state court depends in the end upon the power of the judiciary to enforce, against state legislative circumvention, constitutional conceptions of crime and of punishment.
Looking beyond the context of sentencing to other aspects of
the criminal process, it is apparent that Apprendi is only the latest
in a series of decisions that acknowledge this simple concept. The
decision presents an ideal opportunity to develop that insight further, to synthesize prior efforts to define constitutional limits on
substantive criminal law, to begin to define the ephemeral line that
states may not cross when choosing which facts are elements and
which facts are something less. Just as the continuing stream of
newly minted civil penalties necessitated a more specific standard
for distinguishing which penalties labeled "civil" must nevertheless
be treated as criminal, innovative offense definitions following Apprendi will require the development of some method of distinguishing elements from non-elements under the Constitution.
Taking on that task here, we offer an approach that, unlike other
efforts to give content to "due process" limits on the substance of
crime, would require neither the radical realignment of federal and
state power in criminal justice matters, nor the abandonment of
venerable precedent, nor the disruption of a half-century of sentencing reform.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A

Case
Name

Provision authorized by decision

Leland v.
Oregon,
343 U.S.
790 (1952)
Patterson
v. New
York,
432 U.S.
197 (1977)

Insanity must be
proven by defendant
beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Defendant must
prove extreme
emotional disturbance in order to
mitigate murder to
manslaughter.
Five-year mandatory minimum
sentence upon
finding by a judge
by a preponderance
that defendant
possessed a firearm
during the commission of offense.
Defendant has
burden of proving
self defense in
murder case.
Evidence of intoxication not admissible to prove lack of
mens rea in murder
case.
Civil commitment of
sex offender to
penal institution
upon proof of mental abnormality and
future
dangerousness.
Prior conviction not
pled in indictment
for offense of conviction raised statutory maximum
sentence beyond
that of offense of
conviction.

McMillan
v. Pennsylvania,
477 U.S.
79 (1986)

Martin v.
Ohio,
480 U.S.
228 (1987)
Montana
v. Egelhoff,
518 U.S.
37 (1996)
Kansas v.
Hendricks,
521 U.S.
346 (1997)

AlmendarezTorres v.
United
States,
523 U.S.
224 (1998)

# states with
similar provision at time of
Supreme Court
decision

increase in #
states with
similar provision since
decision

Total states
with similar
provision

25

15

40

3

9

12

6

5

11

2

0

2

10

3

13

17

6

23

20

1

21
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Appendix B
Selected Federal Statutes Subject to Apprendi Challenge
Statute
7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)
(food stamp fraud)

8 U.S.C. §
1324(a)(1)(B) (alien
smuggling)

18 U.S.C. § 13 (drunk
driving on military
base or federal lands)
18 U.S.C. § 34 (penalty
when death results)
18 U.S.C. § 43(b) (aggravated offense, animeal enterprise terrorism)
18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(2)
(assaulting federal
officer)

18 U.S.C. § 111(b) (use
of a weapon in assault
of federal officer)

18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)
(bribery)
18 U.S.C. § 215 (bribery of a bank officer)

Maximum enhancing
feature(s)
Increasing maximum
sentence from one to
five years if value exceeds $100, and from
five to twenty years if
value exceeds $1,000.
Increasing maximum
sentence from five years
to the death penalty if
smuggling was for
commercial advantage
or gain, if serious bodily
injury is caused, or if
the violation results in
the death of any person.
Increasing maximum
sentence by one year
where minor in vehicle.
Increasing maximum
sentence to death penalty based upon crime
resulting in death.
Increasing maximum
sentence from one year
to life imprisonment
based upon finding of
bodily injury or death.
Increasing maximum
sentence from one to
three years based upon
seriousness of assault.
Increasing maximum
sentence from three to
ten years based upon
use of a deadly weapon
or infliction of bodily
injury.
Increasing fine to three
times the monetary
equivalent of the thing
of value.
Increasing maximum
sentence from one to
thirty years if value
I exceeds $1,000.

Discussed In:
United States v. Garcia,240
F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2001)

United States v. Hernandez.
Guardado,228 F.3d 101 (9th
Cir. 2001)

Ferrantiv. United States, 2001
WL 273827 (2d Cir. 2001)
(unpublished)

United States v. McCulligan,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16013
(E.D.Pa., Nov. 30, 2000);
United States u. Nufiez, 180
F.3d 227 (5th Cir. 1999)
United States u. Chestaro, 197
F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1999)
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Discussed In:

feature(s)

18 U.S.C. § 216 (penalty and injunctions)

18 U.S.C. § 247 (damage to religious property)

Increasing maximum
sentence from one to
five years if violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 203-205 or
§§ 207-209 (bribery and
gratuity) occurs willfully.
Increasing maximum
sentence from one year
to death penalty based
upon finding of bodily

Jones v. United States, 1998
WL 713483 (1999) (oral argument)

injury or death.

18 U.S.C. § 248(b)
(penalties for violation
of freedom of access to
clinic entrances act)

Increasing maximum
sentence from three to
ten years or life inprisonment based upon
serious bodily injury or
death.

18 U.S.C. § 510 (forgery)

Increasing maximum
penalty from one to ten
years if value exceeds
$1,000.

18 U.S.C. § 521 (criminal street gang statute)

Increasing maximum
sentence by additional
ten years if federal
felony offense was
committed while participating in or to promote a criminal street

United States v. Matthews, 178
F.3d 295 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 944 (1999)

gang.

18 U.S.C. § 653 (misuse of public funds)
18 U.S.C. § 659 (interstate or foreign shipments by carrier)
18 U.S.C. § 661 (theft
within special maritime jurisdiction)
18 U.S.C. § 893 (extortionate extensions of
credit)

Increasing fine to
amount embezzled.
Decreasing maximum
sentence from ten years
to one year based upon
value of goods stolen
not exceeding $10,000.
Increasing maximum
sentence from one to
five years based upon
value of property.
Increasing fine to twice
the value of the money
or property so ad-

United States v. Galuez, 2000
WL 1140343 (S.D. Fla. 2000)

vanced.

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (use
of firearm in relation
to crime of violence or
drug trafficking)

Increasing maximum
sentence by additional
five to thirty years
based upon type and
use of firearm.

Castillo v. United States, 530
U.S. 120 (2000) (Congress
intended the statutory references to particular firearm
types to define separate
crimes)

2001]
Statute
18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1)(A) (enhanced
penalties for use of
weapon in relation to
crime of violence or
drug trafficking)
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)
(Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984)

18 U.S.C. § 9246)
(causing death of a
person in the course of
a violation of subsection (c))
18 U.S.C. § 982 (criminal forfeitures)

18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)
(penalty for fraud in
connection with computers)
18 U.S.C. § 1033
(crimes by or affecting
persons engaged in the
business of insurance)
18 U.S.C. § 1091(b)
(punishment for genocide)
18 U.S.C. § 1201
(death during kidnapping)

18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and
1343 (mail and wire
fraud)

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS
Maximum enhancing
feature(s)
Increasing maximum
sentence by an additional five to ten years
based upon brandishing
or discharging weapon;
increasing maximum
sentence to life based on
type of firearm.
Providing a mandatory
minimum of fifteen
years and no specified
maximum sentence for
violating 922(g) after
three previous convictions.
Increasing maximum
sentence by additional
five years to death sentence based upon a
murder.
Authorizing property
forfeiture in addition to
maximum penalty for
violation of money
laundering or bank
secrecy act based on
offense involving property or generating proceeds.
Increasing maximum
sentence from one to
five years based upon
value of information.
Increasing maximum
sentence from ten to
fifteen years based upon
jeopardizing the soundness of an insurer.
Increasing maximum
sentence from twenty
years to death penalty
based upon resulting
death.
Increasing maximum
sentence from life imprisonment to death
penalty based upon
death of victim.
Increasing maximum
sentence from five to
thirty years based upon
violation affecting a
financial institution.

1549

Discussed In:
United States v. Harris,2001
WL 273146 (4th Cir. 2001);
United States u. Sandoual, 241
F.3d 549 (7th Cir. 2000);
United States u. Carlson,2000
WL 924593 (8th Cir. 2000);
United States u. Pounds, 230
F.3d 131 (11th Cir. 2000)
United States u. Thomas, 2001
WL 178506 (11th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Mach, 2000
WL 1456245 (3d Cir. 2000)

United States u. Pefia.
Gonzalez, 62 F. Supp. 2d 366
(D. P.R. 1999)

United States v. Montgomery,
2001 WL 132210 (10th Cir.
2001) (unpublished); Hernandez u. United States, 226 F.3d
839 (7th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Brown, 1999 W,
1068273 (D. Me. 1999)
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Discussed In:

feature(s)

18 U.S.C. § 1347
(health care fraud)

Increasing maximum
penalty from five years
to death penalty based
upon whether bodily
injury or death.

18 U.S.C. § 1363
(buildings or property
within special maritime jurisdiction)

Increasing maximum
sentence from five to
twenty years based
upon the building being
a dwelling or a life being placed in

18 U.S.C. § 1503(b)
(punishment for influencing juror)
18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)
(witness tampering)

United States v. Ellis, 2001
U.S. App. LEXIS 2234 (9th
Cir., Feb. 15, 2001); United
States v. Nachamie, 2001 WL
266349 (2d Cir. 2001) (unpublished)
United States v. Davis, 202
F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 2000)

jeopardy.

Increasing maximum
penalty from ten years
to death penalty based
upon killing.
Increasing maximum
penalty from twenty
years to death based

United States v. Russell, 234
F.3d 404 (8th Cir. 2000)

upon death of witness.

18 U.S.C. § 1791(b)
(federal inmates possessing prohibited
object)

Increasing maximum
sentence from six
months to twenty years
based upon nature of

United States v. Allen, 190
F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 1999)

prohibited object.

18 U.S.C. § 1958(a)
(use of interstate
commerce in commission of murder-forhire)
18 U.S.C. § 1959 (violent crime in aid of
racketeering activities)

18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3)
(criminal RICO forfeiture)
18 U.S.C. § 2113(b)
(bank theft)
18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(d)
and (e) (bank robbery)

Increasing maximum
penalty from ten years
to life imprisonment if
death results.
Increasing maximum
penalty from three
years to death penalty
based upon use of
weapon, injury to victim, death of victim.
Mandating forfeiture of
proceeds derived from
or proceeds of racketeering activity.
Increasing maximum
sentence from one to ten
years if value exceeds
$1,000.
Increasing maximum
penalty from twenty
years to death if person

United States v. Tinsley, 238
F.3d 418 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished); United States v.
Smith, 232 F.3d 651 (8th Cir.
2000)
United States v. Kee, 2000 WL
863119 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)

United States v. Corrado, 227
F.3d 543 (6th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Corrado,227
F.3d 528 (6th Cir. 2000)

is assaulted or killed.

18 U.S.C. §§ 2261(A)
(interstate stalking)
and 2261 (interstate

Increasing maximum
sentence from five years
to life based on injury to

domestic violence)

victim.

United States v. Brown, 1999
WL 1068273 (D. Me. 1999)

2001]
Statute
18 U.S.C. § 2262(b)
(penalties for interstate violation of protective order)

18 U.S.C. § 2326 (enhanced penalties for
fraud)

18 U.S.C. § 2332(b)(c)
(penalties for acts of
terrorism transcending
national boundaries)

18 U.S.C. § 2701(b)
(punishment for violation of video piracy
protection act)
18 U.S.C. § 3147 (penalty for offense cornmitted while on release)
18 U.S.C. §
3559(c)(3)(A) (federal
three-strikes law)

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)
(penalties for marjuana possession)

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS
Maximum enhancing
feature(s)
Increase sentence from
five to ten years if serious bodily injury to the
victims result, twenty
years if permanent
disfigurement results,
or life imprisonment if
the victim dies.
Increasing maximum
fraud sentence by additional five years based
upon telemarketing,
and additional ten years
based upon victimizing
at least ten persons
over age fifty-five.
Increasing maximum
sentence from ten to
twenty-five years based
on damage to property,
thirty years based on
serious bodily injury,
thirty-five years for
maiming, life imprisonment for kidnapping,
and the death sentence
for killing.
Increasing sentence
from six months to one
year based upon purpose of commercial
advantage.
Increasing maximum
sentence by additional
one to ten years for
commission of an offense while on release.
Increasing maximum
sentence for a serious
violent felony to mandatory life imprisonment
based upon recidivism,
with exceptions for
certain kinds of robberies.
Decreasing maximum
sentence from five years
to one year based upon
small amount and no
remuneration.

1551

Discussed In:

United States v. Pavelcih,232
F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpublished)

United States v. Nichols, 2001
WL 208713 (D. Colo. 2001);
United States v. Bin Laden,
126 F. Supp. 2d 290 (S.D.N.Y.
2001)

United States u. Ellis, 2000 WIL
33173123 (9th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Parolin, 239
F.3d 922 (7th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Davis, 114
F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 1997)
United States v. Gatewood, 230
F.3d 186 (6th Cir. 2001) (en
bane); United States u. Williams, 230 F.3d 1368 (Table)
(9th Cir. 2000); United States
v. Kaluna, 192 F.3d 1188 (9th
Cir. 1999)
United States v. Lowe, 2000
NVL 1768673 (S.D. W.Va. 2000)
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Discussed In:

feature(s)

21 U.S.C. §§
841(b)(1)(A), (B) and
(C) (manufacture or
possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute)

Increasing maximum
sentence from twenty
years to life based upon
quantity of Schedule I
or II substance or injury/death.

21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(D) (manufacture or possession of a
controlled substance
with intent to distrib-

Increasing maximum
sentence from one to
five years based upon
quantity of marijuana.

United States v. Fields, 2001
WL 241804 (D.C. Cir. 2001);
United States v. Brough, 2001
WL 278479 (7th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Cambrelen,
2001 WL 219285 (2d Cir.
2001); United States v. Smith,
240 F.3d 927 (11th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Rebmann, 226
F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2000); Jones
v. United States, 194 F.3d 1178
(10th Cir. 1999), cert. granted,
vacated and remanded, 120 S.
Ct. 2739 (2000)
United States v. Keeling, 235
F.3d 533 (10th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Kelly, 2000
WL 103972 (S.D. Cal. 2000)

ute)

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(7)
(penalties for distribution)

Increasing maximum
sentence from one to
twenty years based
upon commission of
crime of violence during
drug offense.

21 U.S.C. § 843(d)
(penalties for prohibited acts)

21 U.S.C. § 844(a)
(penalties for simple
possession)

Increasing maximum
sentence from four to
ten years based upon
intent to manufacture
methamphetamine.
Increasing maximum
sentence from one to
twenty years based
upon the substance
containing cocaine base,
from one year to three
years based upon pos-

United States v. Caldwell, 238
F.3d 424 (6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished)

session of flunitrazepan.

21 U.S.C. § 846 (attempt and conspiracy
to distribute controlled
substances)

Authorizing same enhancements as under 21
U.S.C. § 841(b).

21 U.S.C. § 848(e)
(death penalty for
violation of continuing
criminal enterprise)

Increasing maximum
sentence from life imprisonment to death
penalty based upon an

United States v. Porter,1999
WL 1116812 (10th Cir. 1999);
United States v. AguayoDelgado, 2000 WL 988128 (8th
Cir. 2000)

I intentional killing.
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Maximum enhancing
feature(s)
21 U.S.C. § 859 (disAuthorizing twice the
tribution to persons
maximum sentence for
under age 21)
violation of § 841(b),
based upon distribution
to a person under
twenty-one years of age.
21 U.S.C. § 860 (disAuthorizing twice the
tribution near schools)
maximum sentence
available for violation of
§ 841(b) based upon
distributing within
1,000 feet of a school
21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a)
Increasing maximum
and 960(a)(1) (imsentence from five years
porting controlled
to life based on type and
substance)
quantity of controlled
substance.
31 U.S.C. §§ 5322(b),
Increasing maximum
5324(c) (criminal pensentence from five to
alties for violation of
ten years based upon
bank secrecy act)
violating the bank secrecy act while violating
another law or as part
of a pattern of illegal
I activity.
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Discussed In:

United States v. Edmonds, 240
F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2001)

United States u. Ayala-foreno,
2001 WL 231694 (9th Cir.
2001) (unpublished); United
States v. Mfartinez, 232 F.3d
728 (9th Cir. 2000)
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Appendix C
Selected State Criminal Statutes Subject to Apprendi Challenge
Examples of "Nested"Statutes That Allow Judge to Raise the Penalty
Within a Certain Type of Crime
1. Theft Statutes
State and Statute
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-812 (Georgia) (1933)

Maximum Enhancing
Feature
Increasing offense from
misdemeanor to tenyear felony if theft exceeded $500; to fifteenyear sentence if defendant is fiduciary or

Discussed In:
State v. Forthe, 514 S.E.2d 890
(Ga. Ct. App. 1999); Hight v.
State, 472 S.E.2d 113 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1996)

public employee.

MD. ANN. CODE art. 27
§342 (Maryland)
(1977)

Increasing offense from
misdemeanor to fifteenyear felony if theft ex-

State v. Stackowitz, 511 A.2d
1105 (Md. 1986); Proctor v.
State, 435 A.2d 484 (Md. 1981)

ceeded $300.

2. Controlled Substance Statutes
State and Statute

Maximum Enhancing

Discussed In:

Feature

ALA. CODE ANN. § 13A-12-250; § 13A-12-270

Adding five years if sale
within three miles of
school.

GA. CODE ANN. § 1613-31 (Georgia) (1989)

Increasing sentence
from ten to twenty-five
years based upon quan-

Sanders v. State, 2001 Ala.
Crim. App. LEXIS 33 (Ala.
Crim. App. March 2, 2001);
Pearson v. State, 2001 Ala.
Crim. App. LEXIS 19 (Ala.
Crim. App. March 2, 2001)
Cleveland v. State, 463 S.E.2d
36 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)

tity.

N.D. CENT. CODE § 1903.1-23.1 (North Dakota) (1989)

Raises offense to next
higher class of felony
based upon quantity.

State v. Allesi, 216 N.W.2d 805
(N.D. 1974)
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Examples of "Add-on" Statutes That Allow Judge to Raise the Penaltyfor all Crimes
1. "While on Release" Statutes
State and Statute

CONN. GEN. STAT. §
53a-40b (Connecticut)
(1990)
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 597:14-b (New
Hampshire) (1988)

Maximum Enhancing
Feature
Additional one to five
years if felony, ninety to
180 days if misdemeanor.
Court may increase
statutory maximum by
up to 25% if it finds two
"substantial aggravating factors."
Adds ten years to offense if felony, adds one
year if misdemeanor.
Adds up to seven years
to sentence if felony
offense, one year if

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 1213-1.2
(Rhode Island) (1985)

Additional two to ten
years if felony, ninety to
365 days if misde-

D.C. CODE ANN. § 231328 (D.C.) (1970)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13604.02(A) (Arizona)
(1993)

Discussed In:
Speight v. United States, 569
A.2d 124 (D.C. 1989) (en banc)
State v,.Hurley, 741 P.2d 257
(Ariz. 1987); State v. Powers,
742 P.2d 792 (Ariz. 1987)
State u. Sanho, 62 Conn. App.
34 (Conn. App. Ct 2000)
State v. Ringuette, 697 A.2d
507 (N.H. 1997)

misdemeanor.

meanor.

2. Firearms Statutes
State and Statute

Maximum Enhancing

Interpreted In:

Feature

CAL. PENAL CODE §§
12022 et. al. (Califor-

Additional one to ten
years for felony if

nia) (1977)

weapon used.

IND. CODE § 35-42-1-3
(Indiana) (1987)

Raises voluntary manslaughter to higher
class of felony.

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
218A.992 (Kentucky)

Controlled substance
offenses raised to

(1994)

higher class of felony.

ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17-A § 401 (Maine)
(1977)

Burglary offenses raised
to higher class of felony.

N.J. STAT. ANN. §

Controlled substance

2C39-4.1 (New Jersey)
(1998)
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A1340.16A

offenses raised.
Adding sixty-month
enhancement.

Adams v. Commonwealth, 931
S.W.2d 465 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996)
State v. DelValt, 684 A.2d 1291
(le. 1996)

State L,.Guice, 541 S.E.2d 467
(N.C. App. 2000), stay granted,
2001 N.C. LEXIS 136 (N.C.
I Jan. 18. 2001)

